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STELLINGEN 
I 
Indien, zoals in de sociologische literatuur gebruikelijk is, de begrippen 'traditioneel' 
en 'modern' gebruikt worden om die cultuurpatronen aan te duiden die de begin- en 
de eindfase van het proces van economische ontwikkeling in een maatschappij ken-
merken, impliceert dit dat de inhoud van deze begrippen niet in iedere cultuur dezelfde 
kan zijn. 
(Dit proefschrift) 
II 
De vooral door agrarisch sociologen frequent geuite veronderstelling dat het begrip 
traditioneel (c.q. modern) cultuurpatroon overal ter wereld min of meer dezelfde 
waarden en houdingen omvat, heeft het sociologisch inzicht in de ontwikkelingspro-
blematiek van met name de Latijns-Amerikaanse landen in de weg gestaan. 
(Dit proefschrift) 
ín 
Het beginsel dat donorlanden zich dienen te onthouden van inmenging in de binnen-
landse politiek van het ontvangende land mag hen niet beletten om de sociale en po-
litieke implicaties die hun hulp daar zal hebben te evalueren en bij hun beleidsbeslis-
singen te betrekken. 
IV 
In maatschappijen waar patronagerelaties het sociale handelen in sterke mate bepalen 
mag niet worden verwacht dat coöperaties gebaseerd kunnen worden op de solidari-
teit van de leden. 
(Dit proefschrift) 
V 
Bij het sociologisch onderzoek naar de verschillen in vooruitstrevendheid tussen boe-
ren zou meer aandacht moeten worden geschonken aan de kwaliteit van hun grond. 
Aangezien de invloed van deze factor op de adoptie per innovatie kan verschillen zou 
hij voor iedere innovatie afzonderlijk moeten worden nagegaan. 
VI 
Proefschrift van Ir. B. F. Galjart 
Wageningen, 4 oktober 1968. 
De verhoging van de spaarquote die noodzakelijk is voor het op gang brengen van 
economische ontwikkeling in de meeste onderontwikkelde landen impliceert een soort 
bewind dat die verhoging kan afdwingen aan bevolkingsgroepen die erop uit zijn om 
hun consumptieniveau te verhogen. 
(De Groot: Overdaad en gebrek in de 20ste eeuw) 
vn 
In het kader van de ontwikkelingshulp dient ruilhandel in industriële produkten tussen 
onderontwikkelde landen bevorderd te worden. 
(Galjart: Het organiseren van ruilhandel: een vorm van ontwikkelingshulp? Econ. Stat 
Berichten 3 mei 1967) 
vin 
Discontinuïteit van langdurige aard in het Nederlandse assistent-deskundigen pro-
gramma zal in de toekomst op elk gebied van wetenschap leiden tot een drastische ver-
mindering van het aantal Nederlandse deskundigen, geschikt om in minder ontwik-
kelde landen adviezen uit te brengen. 
IX 
Om zich vertrouwd te maken met een hem vreemde maatschappij en cultuur - een 
vertrouwdheid die noodzakelijk is om op zinnige wijze onderzoek te kunnen doen -
heeft een socioloog een periode van 'culturele acclimatisatie' nodig die op een jaar ge-
steld kan worden. 
X 
Dat een socioloog, die onderzoek gaat verrichten in een hem vreemde cultuur, een 
periode van 'culturele acclimatisatie' behoeft, zouden instellingen, die dergelijk onder-
zoek subsidiëren, voortdurend voor ogen moeten hebben. 
XI 
Studenten in de agrarische sociologie (westers zowel als niet-westers) hebben grote 
moeite om verband te leggen tussen de statistische kennis die zij opdeden tijdens het 
Kandidaats A en de statistische toetsen en technieken waarmee de sociologische litera-
tuur hen confronteert. 
XII 
De confessionele partijen in Nederland dragen bij tot het afzwakken van de belangen-
tegenstelling tussen werkgevers en werknemers. 
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Quem pode pode, quem nao pode se sacode. 
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Brazilian saying 
Brazilian saying 
Cuando se subraya un hecho como específico de la condición española, no falta nunca 
algún discreto que nos cite otro hecho igual acontecido en Francia, en Inglaterra, en 
Alemania, sin advertir que lo que se subraya no es el hecho mismo, sino su peso y 
rango dentro de la anatomía nacional. Aun siendo, pues, aparentemente el mismo, su 
diferente colocación en el mecanismo colectivo lo modifica por completo. 
Ortega y Gasset: España Invertebrada. 
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Samenvatting 
Deze studie bevat de resultaten van een sociologisch onderzoek verricht in een 
Braziliaanse landbouwkolonie in de buurt van de stad Rio de Janeiro. Het onderzoek 
duurde, met enige onderbrekingen, van midden 1963 tot midden 1965. Het had een 
tweeledig doel. 
In de eerste plaats is getracht een antwoord te vinden op de vraag, in welke opzich-
ten de kolonisten die moderne landbouwmethoden gebruikten, verschilden van de 
overigen. Het onderzoek hiernaar geschiedde door middel van een enquête onder be-
drijfshoofden. Het blijkt, dat de adoptie van moderne landbouwmethoden in de eerste 
plaats geassocieerd is met de sociaal-economische status van de boer, zijn inkomen 
en zijn grondbezit. De associaties tussen adoptie enerzijds en genoten onderwijs, 
alfabetisme en contact met de stedelijke cultuur anderzijds blijken per statuscategorie 
te verschillen en vaak alleen in de hoogste categorieën significant te zijn. Contact met 
de landbouwvoorlichting blijkt het meest voor te komen onder de innovatievere boe-
ren. De verschillen tussen de kolonisten die moderne landbouwmethoden gebruikten 
en de overigen werden verder nog nagegaan voor verscheidene andere variabelen, 
zoals: de aard van hun relaties met andere boeren, hun vroegere mobiliteit, hun par-
ticipatie in coöperaties, hun leeftijd, hun nationaliteit, de grootte van hun gezinnen, 
de mate waarin zij hun zoons op het bedrijf lieten werken, het onderwijs dat zij hun 
kinderen gaven, het in dienst hebben van vreemde arbeid en de aanwending van cre-
diet. Al tijdens het vooronderzoek bleek, dat de mate waarin moderne landbouwme-
thoden werden toegepast echter niet de enige verklarende factor kon zijn voor het 
feit, dat de kolonie bepaald geen bloeiende landbouwstreek geworden was. 
Het herkennen en beschrijven van andere verklarende factoren, gelegen in het vlak 
van de culturele waarden en houdingen, vormde het tweede doel van het onderzoek. 
Slechts voor enkele van deze factoren kon een vraag worden opgenomen in de enquête; 
voor de meeste factoren zijn kwalitatieve gegevens beschikbaar, verkregen uit partici-
perend onderzoek. Aan de hand van een analyse van bepaalde gebeurtenissen ener-
zijds, en van de verschillen tussen de Japanse en de Braziliaanse kolonisten anderzijds, 
is aannemelijk gemaakt, dat de onderkende waarden en houdingen inderdaad van in-
vloed zijn en de ontwikkeling van de kolonie hetzij geremd, hetzij in bepaalde banen 
gedwongen hebben. 
De sociale relaties tussen de boeren worden beïnvloed door een drietal samenhan-
gende cultuurelementen, samen het 'patronic syndrome' genoemd. Dit syndroom be-
staat uit: 
1. de verwachting dat de eigen inspanning alleen dan tot werkelijke lotsverbetering 
zal leiden als er van hogerhand (dat wil zeggen door een hogergeplaatste, een overheid 
of een bovennatuurlijke macht) steun wordt verleend; 
2. de neiging om patronage-relaties aan te knopen met personen die een dienst kun-
nen bewijzen; 
3. een gebrek aan solidariteit tussen sociaal gelijkstaanden die niet door bloedver-
wantschap, vriendschap of patronage verbonden zijn. 
In de traditionele sociale structuur, die gekenmerkt was door een grote mate van 
ongelijkheid, hadden deze houdingen een functie. In de kolome echter, waar deze 
structuur in beginsel vervangen was, blijken zij de noodzakelijke samenwerking tus-
sen de boeren in de weg te staan. Hun voortbestaan mag voor een enkeling nog functio-
neel zijn, maar is dat niet voor de gemeenschap. Het bevordert de, gedeeltelijk reeds 
verwezenlijkte, terugval tot een traditionele sociale structuur. 
Uit de wijze waarop de landbouw in de kolonie beoefend wordt is op te maken, dat 
de kolonisten nog steeds bepaalde waarden aanhangen die in het verleden kenmerkend 
waren voor de grootgrondbezitters en planters. In grove trekken komt deze 'grote 
landbouwtraditie' neer op het bezitten van veel grond, het verbouwen van een han-
delsgewas (vaak als monocultuur), het in dienst hebben van anderen voor het ver-
richten van de manuale arbeid, en het investeren van kapitaal in de verwerking en het 
transport van het product maar niet in de productie zelf. De bedoeling van het be-
drijven van landbouw was dus niet in de eerste plaats om te zorgen voor het eigen 
voedsel, zoals in andere delen van de wereld, maar: om rijk te worden. 
Uit een vergelijking van verschillende categorieën Japanse en Braziliaanse kolo-
nisten blijkt, dat de minder innovatieve Brazilianen nog het meest werken volgens de 
'grote traditie', hoewel deze juist op de omstandigheden waarin zij verkeren het minst 
past. Het zijn vooral de Japanse boeren die rekening houden met het feit, dat zij be-
schikken over weinig grond. Zij bereiken bijzonder goede resultaten met de teelt 
van arbeids- en kapitaalintensieve tuinbouwgewassen. De innovatieve Braziliaanse 
boeren blijken de 'grote traditie' nog voor een deel te handhaven. 
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Introduction 
The first time I heard of the land-settlement project of Santa Cruz was after a 
lecture which I had been asked to give at the nearby Universidade Rural do Brasil. 
But it was the work I had been engaged in for the previous year, a trend-report on the 
literature relating to land reform in Brazil, that lent significance to what I heard. In 
the publications which I had read, a recurrent topic of debate had been the relative 
importance, as obstacles to agricultural development, of land tenure relations and 
rural culture. Whereas most writers were inclined to blame the concentration of land 
in a few hands as the greatest obstacle to development, others wondered whether the 
values and attitudes of peasants and landlords alike were not equally important an 
impediment. 
After the lecture, I was driven, in the rapidly falling darkness, to Itaguai. The settle-
ment project we were passing, I was told, was doing badly. Since every settler had 
been provided with a plot of ten hectares, this failure, for once, did not seem to be due 
to an unequal distribution of land. 
I did not decide then and there to do research in the project, at least I do not re-
member having taken that decision. Nevertheless, when in the ensuing months the 
urge grew stronger to study the cultural obstacles to agricultural development (a 
subject which ultimately had received far less attention than the tenure relations), I 
thought of the project again. 
Why I did indeed choose the project of Santa Cruz as the site for my study, and 
what problems I studied, will be explained in chapter 3. Before that, I will take the 
reader on an imaginary tour through the project, pointing out some striking features 
of the landscape, and introducing him to a few settlers. I do this because he should be 
made to feel the atmosphere of the place before being asked to digest the facts and 
assertions that will be presented in later chapters; especially so since he will often be 
foreign to Brazil. It is not out of condescension that I fear the reader will apply his 
frame of reference to a situation it does not fit. Sociologists themselves have committed 
that error. More than once foreign sociologists have come to Brazil not only with 
their research techniques, but also with their problems and interview schedules ready 
prepared; in short, with a frame of reference developed elsewhere. As a result, they 
studied fictitious problems, or problems of little significance. If I avoided that error 
myself, it is only because I was inexperienced enough to begin the study without many 
hypotheses and fixed ideas, and lucky enough to have good advisers. After my own 
narrow escape, I want to prevent the reader from applying too facilely a frame of 
reference derived from another culture. So I begin this book with a simple description 
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of the project and some people. 
Chapter 2 deals rapidly with the history of the area and the legal provisions regu-
lating its settlement. Firstly, the reader must have some idea of this background, even 
though it impinges only indirectly on my study. Secondly, the few historical notes 
may help to indicate that economic development in Brazil need not be lasting. 
Chapter 3 describes what were the problems and what methods I used for the 
survey and the anthropological research. A special section discusses a theoretical 
problem the study evoked, to wit the usefulness and implications of the concepts 
'modern' and 'traditional'. I explain why, after having used them initially myself, I 
concluded that they do not fit a culture of the Mediterranean type like the one ob-
taining in the project. Since these concepts, with their 'non-Mediterranean' contents, 
are still very much in vogue in diffusion studies that are at present undertaken in Latin 
America, the argument may have some importance. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are based on the results of the survey I carried out in the project 
of Santa Cruz. Chapter 4 contains quantitative data on cropping patterns, production 
techniques, tenure relations, marketing, and professional relations with other settlers. 
Some of the data presented merely provide general information, but the distinguished 
traits often anticipate the agricultural tradition that will be described in chapter 7. 
Chapter 5 discusses the quantitative differences between the 'high' and the 'low' 
adopters among the respondents. This chapter will be of interest mainly to diffusion 
researchers; the reader who is interested in the cultural obstacles to agricultural devel-
opment may well feel lost among (or worse: bored with) the statistics, the more so 
because the findings are not unlike those reported in other diffusion studies. 
The general reader, and the social scientist concerned with development in Latin 
America, may prefer to skip chapter 5 and concentrate on chapters 6 and 7. These 
contain the (mainly qualitative) results of the exploratory study of the cultural values 
and attitudes which seemed to hinder agricultural development in the project. Chapter 
6 postulates the existence of a 'patronic syndrome', marked by a preference for pat-
ronage relations over peer relations. The syndrome is an important obstacle to cooper-
ative action. The analysis of a number of historical incidents shows reason for the 
belief that this syndrome is a useful interpretative construct. Chapter 7 tries to show 
how far and in what ways a centuries-old tradition which originated among the great 
landed proprietors still influences agricultural production in the project of Santa Cruz. 
Finally, chapter 8 contains a summary and some suggestions. 
2 
1 A visit to the project 
The land 
About seventy kilometers to the south-west of the city of Rio de Janeiro lies the 
land-settlement project of Santa Cruz. To get there you should follow the bus to 
Itaguai that leaves the city by the Avenida das Bandeiras, then take the old main 
road to Sao Paulo, past the immense new water-purification plant on the bank of the 
River Guandu, and turn left a few kilometers before reaching the Universidade Rural 
do Brasil. 
Not far from this cross-road the project of Santa Cruz begins. That is to say, on 
the left side of the road; to the right empty fields that belong to the University stretch 
away, green or yellow-brown according to the season. 
Each farm measures about ten hectares. Every hundred and fifty meters or so stands 
a small single-story house, often surrounded by high trees that hide the rest of the 
farm from view. But where trees are absent, the fields seem remarkably empty, as if 
they were lying fallow. Apart from orange orchards and some sugar-cane you hardly 
see any crops. Two farms look as if they have been abandoned completely; nothing 
is grown on the fields and the houses are shuttered. The other houses are at least 
occupied; the open door and windows are great dark holes in the front; a child is 
sitting on the doorstep. Crude signs are nailed to the trees that line the road: farm for 
sale; we sell orange-tree grafts; or a number. It is only after you have passed many 
times that you begin to suspect that those fruit trees, those thickets of eucalyptus and 
bamboo groves, those orange orchards at the road side, not only obstruct the view to 
the fields behind, but have been set out many years ago for that very purpose. They 
are remnants from the time when it mattered not to show that the land was not inten-
sively used. 
After a few kilometers the land-settlement project occupies both sides of the road. 
Here the farms seem to be in better shape; you see brighter and roomier houses and 
more crops: young coconut palms, fields of dry, grey maize, the cobs still intact (not 
because harvest is late but because corn is preserved and stored that way), and cassava, 
curiously few leaves above thin, straggly stems. Some farms are closed off from the 
road by walls; if so, you often see a big new house next to the original dwelling. Along 
this all-weather road live many of the city people who have bought a farm in the pro-
ject. They are all sorts. Some are pensioners who retired to a farm as a quiet place on 
which to live; others have not yet reached retirement and travel daily to Rio; a few 
have bought a farm as a hedge against inflation, or in the expectation that the price 
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of land will rise in relation to other prices and that they will be able to sell the farm 
at a profit. A number of city people have seriously begun to grow crops or raise 
chickens. On a farm to the left of the road, for example, fourteen great brick poultry 
houses have been erected, that accommodate 40,000 laying hens and broilers. But 
something is done on most of the farms that are owned by city people. Although there 
are often sharecroppers or labourers to do the work, the land at least remains in 
cultivation. 
After about eight kilometers you reach the centre of the settlement. To the right, 
friendly and very white amidst high trees, is a small hospital; on the left, a row of 
shops, built with unpainted boards and rather dilapidated. A grocer who also sells 
concentrates, pesticides and working clothes; a cycle repairer; a bar. A wide dirt 
road crosses the main road here; round the corner are a few other shops. On the 
other two corners stand similar decrepit constructions: two more bars, a barber's 
and a tailor's. Some men lean against the counter; others play billiards. In the shade 
of a tree a woman and her daughter wait patiently for the bus to Itaguai. Against 
the wall of one of the bars a small blackboard is hanging. Mysterious numbers have 
been chalked on it: today's results of the popular but illegal lottery, the jogo do bicho. 
As a stranger, you are not stared at, but you have been noticed and remain under 
observation. You may be anybody. When you strike up a conversation with a shop-
keeper, the man is on his guard and gives evasive answers. You get the impression 
that everybody here has something to hide and prefers not to make your acquaint-
ance. Later, when you have been recognized for the harmless but curious queer that 
you are, people become cordial and open. But this recognition is an act of the indivi-
dual or at most of a very small group, not of a community or a neighbourhood; it is a 
process which has to be repeated from the start with every local you meet. Thus you 
can be a trusted and welcome guest in one bar and a stranger in the bar across the 
road. 
If you turn to the right, into the dirt road, you pass the administrative office of the 
project One or two at a time, the whole day long, people call; to inquire when the 
official title to their land will be forthcoming, since they have paid off their debts two 
years ago already; to ask for a declaration to the effect that they are settlers, with 
which they can obtain credit from the State bank; to inquire whether 'Rio' has decided 
to let them have the farm of which they bought the benfeitoiias; to ask if there is still 
a plot of land to be had; to complain about the state of a certain road; to ask for a 
job; to hear that they will have to pay 2 Cruzeiros instead of the ridiculous amount 
of 0.1 Cruzeiro (then 0.01 US cents) per square meter if they want to receive the con-
cession to the farm they have been living on for the past five years; to settle a row; 
to talk politics; to hear what is new. 
Further down the road you pass a number of bungalows built for the administrative 
staff of the settlement, and the closed shop of the cooperative. Opposite these houses 
is an extensive field with workshops, warehouses, and a hangar-like garage. A mass 
of rubbish and scrap iron lies about; parts of machines and trucks, old tires, disc-
ploughs. Two tractors are still recognizable, but they are incomplete. The dirt road, 
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which is full of holes, has been straight as an arrow once, but as a result of the repeated 
attempts of truckdrivers to avoid the worst holes it now reels a little. In the distance 
it disappears over a hill. There is always movement on this road; trucks coming to 
load produce; cars of owners or visitors; a herd of cattle being driven to another 
pasture; a man on horseback; children going to school in their white and blue uni-
forms; a woman with a bulging bag. 
Here inside the settlement, where the roads are bad and passage becomes difficult 
after a night's rain, the city people are less numerous but not absent. The farm next 
to the field with the warehouses is a good example. From end to end it is planted with 
maracock. The owner, an agronomist, only visits the farm from time to time. He sells 
his entire production to the ice-cream factory of Kibon, in Rio. His is the only farm 
in the project where maracock is grown in such quantities. 
Inside the settlement it is easier to see to what use the land is put. The first impres-
sion, again, is that it is rather empty; but those fields full of grass, weed and bushes 
are often pastures rather than fallow. And the further you penetrate into the project, 
the more numerous become the cultivated fields. Orange orchards are to be found on 
most farms. In the dry season the leaves of the trees are sometimes covered with a 
black mold, from a fungal disease called fumagina, but during the wet season, if it is 
wet enough, the trees become green again. Also maize and cassava are rather common. 
Here and there you see a field of sugar-cane, which the settlers use as fodder. In the 
rainy season rice also is grown, generally on the lowest fields. Around the houses 
grow fruit-trees; bananas, mango, cashew, jaca (jackfruit), genipap, sweetsop, avoca-
do-pears. These are for home consumption, although the farmers who live on the 
asphalt road often try to sell their surpluses of these fruits to the passers-by. On sever-
al farms you will find a plantation of coconut palms. The trees are often low as if they 
have been planted recently, but that can be misleading: on some soils they do not 
develop properly. 
The paramount impression, however, remains one of emptiness and disorderliness. 
The tall grass in which an orange plantation can be hidden; the custom of intercala-
ting several crops on one field; the irregular shape of the fields, which often follow con-
tours (one meter difference in altitude can mean different soil characteristics or, after 
heavy rains, the division between inundated and dry land); and the fact that some 
crops are cultivated in minute quantities only and are overlooked in passing; all 
contribute to this impression. 
Although you will find throughout the project exceptions to this rule, farms that 
are intensively cultivated, in the section which we are visiting, Piranema, there is only 
one area where you can see a series of regular, clean fields in the European manner. 
It is the area called Chaper6, where the soil, black and granular, consists almost enti-
rely of organic material. This area concentrates on vegetables; okra (hibiscus esculen-
tus) mostly, but also gil6 (solanum ovigenum), tomatoes, cabbage, anguria. Most of 
the settlers here are of Japanese descent. Two different accounts are given of how it 
happens that they five so close together and have the best land. According to one 
story, Chaper6, at the time the section Piranema was settled, after 1945, was not much 
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more than a marsh. Only the Japanese were willing to settle there; the Brazilians did 
not like the risk of having their land flooded every year. (Chaper6 is indeed one of 
the lowest areas of the project, and in summer inundations are still common after 
a few days of rain. A few deep and numerous smaller ditches usually manage to drain 
the water off within a day or two). According to the other story, the Japanese have 
gradually bought all farms on this soil type, or have exchanged farms with the original 
Brazilian settlers. Probably, both stories contain some truth. 
On a field bordering the road a couple of men are working. As you approach, you 
notice that it is a Japanese settler with his labourers, who are Brazilians. They are 
spraying okra. The sprayer is connected by means of a long rubber hose to a reservoir 
mounted on a wagon. Dragging the hose along, the worker walks between the rows 
of okra, rapidly gyrating the nozzle around each individual plant. The mood is light; 
they are nearing the end of the field. Suddenly you observe that the Brazilian labourers 
who relieve each other at the sprayer play at their work rather than labour at it. They 
dance from plant to plant, demonstrate the agility of their wrists whirling the long 
metal nozzle around each plant, quickly trot past the empty spaces in the rows. When 
they are relieved, they stand about on the path, and keep a conversation going above 
the sound of the pump. Although it happens right before their eyes, they do not seem 
to notice it when the long hose threatens to flatten a few plants near the path on which 
they stand. You notice it, though, and the Japanese settler notices it too. He bends 
down and drags the hose to one side. He does that several times, without comment and 
not demonstratively. You have the feeling that you and he are suffering from the 
Protestant ethic. 
In this north-west corner of the project, you see that the land, after all, is not wholly 
flat. Here and there, irregularly distributed and unconnected, as small islets, hills 
stand in the landschape. They are between ten and fifty meters high. The plain is 
crossed by a number of drainage canals, but these wind so much that you hardly see 
them, even from a hill; only a bridge in the road indicates their existence. These 
bridges are made of heavy trees1, upon which boards are fastened lengthwise to make 
tracks for the lorries that come to load produce. There is no railing. The further you 
go from the centre the more dilapidated these bridges become. Especially if the boards 
have come loose and have shifted somewhat, it is with some trepidation that you 
venture to cross them with a car. 
In the distance, standing out against the blue sky, He the mountains of the Serra do 
Mar, the range that, running parallel to the coast, has for centuries hindered access 
to the interior. In the municipality of Itaguai, in fact only a few kilometers from where 
you stand, this range curves outward to the coast. But the project does not extend to 
the mountains. As a stranger you must deduce this knowledge from a map, because 
in the field you often cannot discern where the settlement ends. In some places where, 
according to the map, there should be farms, you see nothing but empty fields covered 
with sparse grass, weeds and shrubbery; no houses, no people, often not even cattle. 
Because there are no fences or any other boundaries, and sometimes not even roads, 
it has decome impossible to trace the former farms. They have been absorbed into 
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bigger farms that were originally outside the settlement. One might say that the pro-
ject has already disappeared in these places. Elsewhere the process is still going on; 
big cattlebreeders, coming in from the outside, have bought a number of farms in the 
project. They begin by buying a farm here and another there, but they try to acquire 
the interlying plots and finally seek to connect this land with the land they have out-
side the project. 
The other, smaller section of the project, the section Santa Cruz, looks different. 
It was settled some fifteen years earlier, and it lies in another State, Guanabara, the 
former Federal District. This section appears to be more developed and more prosper-
ous than Piranema, partly, perhaps, because it is older, but mostly because the State 
of Guanabara is better off and its government services are better equipped. The 
posto agricola, the local branch of the Government agricultural assistance and exten-
sion service, plows land for a reasonable fee; agricultural credit is easier to obtain; 
the farmers can ask for and receive permission to sell their produce on one of the 
markets in Rio2; the dirt roads are kept in good repair; most farms have electricity. 
Regular, reasonably clean, cultivated fields are less of an exception than in Piranema, 
and the pastures, even if they consist of native grass, are seldom as overgrown with 
weeds. The crops are the same, though: oranges, coconuts, bananas, cassava, vegeta-
bles. Especially cassava is prominent. It is a regular cash crop here, and consequently 
is cared for. The plants are higher, and the foliage is dense and very green. Bananas 
too are grown on another basis: whereas in Piranema only a few farms grow them in 
any quantity, in Santa Cruz there are many farms with sizable banana plantations. 
Formerly the settlement was more of a unity. The two sections were connected by a 
bridge over the Sao Francisco River, and a regular bus service existed from Itaguai to 
Santa Cruz right across the project. But in 1954 exceptionally high water (according 
to the Administration, high because the turbines of the Rio Light Company at 
Porca-cava had just been put into operation) swept the bridge away. It was never 
rebuilt. A few hundred meters up-river a small private ferry operates now, but it can-
not support more than a horse-drawn cart. For a truck the banks are too steep any-
way. The busline from Itaguai took another route and did not traverse the section 
Piranema anymore. In fact, for two years this section did not have any public trans-
port at all. Only in 1956 the road from the old Rio-Sao Paulo highway to Itaguai, 
over which you entered the project, was bituminized, and thereafter became the main 
artery of the section Piranema. It was only then that Itaguai itself, the seat of the 
municipality, came to have some importance for the settlers of Piranema. There 
they buy the things that shops in the settlement do not carry but that are not impor-
tant or expensive enough to be worth a trip to Rio. They visit the doctor, the pharma-
cist, the prefecture. Some of their children attend the primary school in Itaguai, and 
since the only ginasio of the municipality is in the village, any children go there if they 
proceed to secondary school. 
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The settlers 
Sergio arose at five o'clock in the morning, when it was still dark. He was almost 
always the first to rise. He lit the oil-lamp and rapidly changed into his working clothes. 
It had rained hard during the night, and the roof had leaked so badly that they had 
had to get up, fold the mattress away and wait for the rain to slacken. The roof of the 
house was made of sap6 (imperata brasiliensis), and near the ridge beam you could 
see the sky. Sergio did not repair it, because the house stood at the side of a road, 
on land belonging to the municipality, and might be pulled down any time. He had 
already bought roofing tiles for a new house, which he hoped to build somewhat 
further down the road, on land belonging to the Church, but he did not want to use 
them on this house. Its beams were not strong enough to carry the weight of tiles, 
anyway. 
Sergio lit a fire in the brick oven and put water to boil for morning coffee. One by 
one, the others rose. Altogether eleven people slept in this house, that consisted of 
three small rooms, each about two meters square, and a kitchen. Sergio and Jenny 
had eight children, and the eleventh member of the household was Pedro, a negro 
boy who worked for Sergio. After they had drunk coffee Sergio went to the field with 
Pedro and one of his sons, a boy of ten. In the meantime his other labourer had arrived, 
a nortista, a man from the North-East, who had appeared in the project only recently. 
The man had left his wife and seven daughters behind in Rio Grande do Norte. From 
time to time he wrote them a letter and once he had sent them money, 5000 Cruzeiros. 
But where they lived a liter of cassava-flour cost 2300 Cruzeiros, or so he said. Sergio 
had the impression that the man would forget about his family in the long run; but 
maybe he only thought so because he, Sergio, would never have left his family; either 
they would have moved together, or nobody would have gone. 
The evening before, having asked and received permission, Sergio had cut some 
young trees and branches on the land of a settler down the road. They now carried 
these trunks and branches to the field where they were working. Today they would 
continue to reap and thresh the rice he had planted as sharecropper for Senhor Julio. 
It was less than a hectare; they should be able to finish the work today. 
Yesterday they had only reaped. It had rained a lot that year, and the field had been 
flooded repeatedly. Even yesterday the water had still been a foot deep in some places. 
There the grain in the ear had sprouted small white roots. This rice had, in fact, done 
badly from the very beginning. Senhor Julio had rented the land from the owner, who 
did nothing at all with it. It had been heavily overgrown with weed and grasses, but 
Senhor Julio had not really plowed it, as he should have done; he had only harrowed 
it twice (a couple of hours work) and had handed it over like that to Sergio. He in turn 
had not used any fertilizer, and had done nothing to improve the drainage. The lower 
parts of the field had lain almost continuously under water. 
With a Japanese farmer, Sergio had thought, all this would have been impossible. 
He had wanted to give up the rice long ago, but Senhor Julio had insisted on him 
weeding the field and now insisted on harvesting. The labour did not cost Senhor 
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Julio a penny; for him everything that Sergio could get off the land was pure profit. 
Sergio had already lost heavily on this rice, so much labour had been wasted on it. 
But the only result of his protests had been that Senhor Julio had allowed him to plant 
some rice on his own land. That rice looked better; the land had been plowed well 
and the drainage was better. 
After half an hour's walk they reached the field. The nortista started to reap. With 
a small sickle he cut the sheaves near the ground. Sergio's son put several sheaves 
together to make a bigger one and then carried it to the the threshing ground. Sergio 
and Pedro began to build a threshing chair. The chair resembled a crude throne; it 
was two meters high and had a seat of one meter square. The seat consisted of thin 
branches, not neatly fitted together but with slits between them. Against the back 
and under the armrests of the chair they nailed a piece of linen. They spread a piece 
of canvas on the ground and put the finished chair at one end. Sergio showed the 
boy how the threshing should be done. He took a big sheaf of rice in both hands, 
raised it as an axe, and brought down the heads with all his force against the seat of 
the chair. Through the slits in the seat, grains of rice showered onto the canvas. Sergio 
turned the sheaf a bit in his hands and again brought it down against the seat. Each 
sheaf had to be beaten from three to five times for most grains to come loose. 
It was now ten o'clock. Laerte's eldest son, Paulo, arrived on a bicycle with food, 
the first real meal of the day. The metal pans contained the usual rice and black beans 
as well as angu (maize flour boiled with salt), vegetables and fried eggs. Jenny kept 
a garden where she grew all sorts of vegetables and herbs, and she often exchanged 
foodstuffs with her sisters who lived in the neighbourhood; if their husbands cultivated 
tomatoes for instance, they would exchange them for okra grown by Sergio. It was 
more a question of reciprocal gifts than of barter, though. There was always produce 
that could not be sold because it was slightly damaged; it had to be thrown away, un-
less some relative could use it. 
Paulo, of course, had also brought coffee, not strong but very sweet. The household 
consumed about 10 kilos of sugar each week, and most of it went into the coffee. They 
all stopped working and settled down with their chow-pans. Sergio ate very little; 
he had ulcers and had to be careful with foods. He rolled himself a cigarette and drank 
some coffee. 
After a while his two eldest daughters arrived, Martha and Marlene. The first was 
a mulatto, the second white. Sergio's children differed remarkably in skin colour. A 
younger daughter had the long, lank hair and high cheek-bones of an Amerindian. 
They all had Indian blood for that matter, for his great grandmother had been Indian, 
"caught with a lasso in the forest", as he used to say laughingly. His mother's grand-
father had been Swiss; his own father a pure negro. He himself was obviously a half-
blood, but Jenny was practically white. It did not matter much, he thought. 
For some time already Martha considered herself engaged to be married. A young 
sharecropper from a farm in the neighbourhood had asked her to marry him, but he 
had not yet come to talk with Sergio and his wife. However, he seemed to be serious 
about it, and if he came to ask for her hand he would be likely to want to marry as 
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soon as possible. But Martha had no trousseau. Sergio hoped that the cabbage which 
he would soon plant on the farm of Chico, the Japanese, would do as well as it did 
last year, when he had been able to pay off all his debts and was still left with enough 
to buy a brand-new stove, that worked on cylinder gas. And it had been less than a 
hectare; less than half a hectare, allowing that Chico received half of the proceeds. 
This year, it was true, they were already deeper in debt than they had been last year 
at this time, but maybe the cabbage too would fetch more. All being well, they should 
be able to buy Martha a trousseau. After all, last year he had even planted okra be-
tween the rows of cabbage. He had done that to economize on his scarcest factor, 
land. He could not afford the luxury of fallow, so he had planted the okra before the 
cabbage had been cut. This year he would not do that, because he would hand the 
land over to Chico afterwards and go somewhere else himself. 
He called everybody back to work. His youngest son left with the dirty pans. In a 
few hours he would be back again with a second meal, more rice and some scraps that 
were left over from this meal. The nortista went on reaping; the two girls collected 
the sheaves as they fell to the ground; his son bore them to the threshing ground. 
Pedro and Sergio relieved each other at the chair. When Sergio noticed many grains 
falling off the canvas, he stacked some sheaves around the legs of the chair. 
They sweltered, although there were many clouds in the sky. The only relief came 
from a steady breeze off the sea. Everybody was working now. The girls slowly, 
talking with each other, and without enthusiasm. Sergio's son proudly carried big 
sheaves on his head, but he took no care how they fell. His father told him to rest 
the heads on the canvas (they were trodden upon so often, that they shed some grain) 
and in the same direction; otherwise, the thresher had to rearrange them before he 
could lift a sheaf, thus loosing time. Patient explanations were of Utile avail. The sheaves 
were too heavy for the boy; he could carry them but not control their fall. Sergio let 
him be, after some sarcastic remarks. 
Two hours later Sergio's other son brought the second meal. This time, however, 
the work was not interrupted; those who wanted drank some coffee or ate a bit of rice 
and then resumed working. Sergio doubted if they would be able to finish the rice 
that day. The nortista was still busy reaping. In some places the rice was hidden among 
grasses as tall as the man himself, so that he disappeared from view. However, he at 
least was likely to finish today. The threshing would probably take longer; they were 
still at work on the rice that had been reaped yesterday, and had not even touched 
today's harvest. The rice was sodden and the grains stuck stubbornly to the ears; the 
sun had dried only the upper sheaves. But then, maybe the field would produce more, 
after all, than the ten sacks which he had expected. Sergio started working again. 
In the afternoon it began to rain. Sergio sent his children home. The nortista had 
finished reaping. The man did not work badly, but it would be a long time before 
Sergio would trust him as he trusted Pedro, the boy. When it began to get dark they 
put the rice that had fallen under the chair in sacks. It had become a big heap, and 
they filled seven sacks with it. If they left it lying around, some of it could well be 
stolen during the night. Sergio decided to leave the sacks on the field, however. He 
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figured that it was not easy to lift sacks of fifty kilos. 
They were soaked to the skin when they got home. Jenny told him that Vazau, the 
leader of the Japanese farmers, had called. They were going to repair the road the 
following day and he had asked Sergio to warn the Brazilians in the neighbourhood. 
Although Sergio did not possess any land, the Japanese regarded him as a leader. 
This was not as preposterous as it sounds. Most of the Japanese knew him; he cur-
rently worked as sharecropper with three of them. But because he did not five on 
their farms, in a house provided by them, he kept a certain independence. Besides, 
many people in the neighbourhood were relatives or compadres of Sergio. His con-
tact with the priest from Itaguai (who distributed through Sergio's house part of the 
powdered milk received from the Food for Peace Programme) and with the agricul-
tural extension officer raised his prestige. The Brazilian farm-owners in the neigh-
bourhood did not really compete; those who were not absentees often kept to them-
selves, and preferred to be ignored. 
This invitation was inconvenient, but he could hardly shirk it. Sergio owed his 
relative independence, and the ease with which he could leave one Japanese farmer 
and get a piece of land with another, to the confidence that he inspired. He was reputed 
to be a hard, careful and diligent worker. It had cost him a great deal of effort to 
build up this reputation. He had begun to work with the Japanese after he had been 
forced to leave the farm of Machado. His first job had been cutting trees for Chico, 
at a rate so low that he could not afford to employ others to help him. Most people 
would have given up after a time, but Sergio had held out, suspecting that the low 
rate was only to test him. After four months one of Chico's sharecroppers had sud-
denly wanted to leave. The man had offered his benfeitorias to Sergio for 20 contos, 
but Sergio did not have that kind of money. Instead, he had talked with Chico, tel-
ling him that he had worked four months now for very little and had amply shown 
that he was not afraid of work. Chico had bought the benfeitorias for him (he had 
had to pay only fifteen contos; poor people are like that, said Sergio, they sell dear 
to a poor man and cheap to a rich man) and had taken him in as sharecropper. 
Sergio sent a message to his brother-in-law, whose wife was visiting Sergio. His 
neighbour, Senhor Goncalves, who owned two farms, was not home, but Sergio knew 
that he could order one of Goncalves labourers to go and repair the road; Senhor 
Goncalves would later pay him a day's wages for it. At least, he had done so last 
time. Perhaps he, Sergio, could do the same thing. He could send the Nortista to the 
Japanese and go on threshing rice himself. Further he could count on a number of 
relatives, who were sharecroppers with Japanese farmers. It was highly uncertain if 
any Brazilian settlers would show up. For instance, it was no use asking Correa, 
Sergio's compadre. Of course, except for Senhor Goncalves, only the Japanese settlers 
possessed trucks to take their produce to Rio. The Brazilian settlers, if they had 
anything to sell, sold it to middlemen, and if one of those broke an axle in a hole in 
the road, nobody was sorry. Sergio decided that it was too late to warn the other 
settlers along the road. He would do that first thing in the morning. After supper he 
went to bed early, before the others. 
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When we arrived, about half past nine in the morning, we found Henrique, in shirt-
sleeves, on the porch of his house, shaving himself. The day before it had poured with 
rain, but this morning the weather was fine. Henrique readily gave us permission 
to take some soil samples on his farm. Most of his land was under oranges, but he 
also had some cassava, on land that was higher than the rest, and some pasture. He 
sent his son along with us. Behind the house began the orange trees. They stood on 
small ridges, separated by furrows. The furrows were full of water, from a few centi-
meters to a foot or more deep. They were supposed to drain into a deep ditch at the 
end of the field, which Henrique had dug with the help of his oldest son who owned 
the farm on the other side. In the ditch, the water was indeed running, but on the 
field I could not detect any flow. The ditch across the road in front of the farm, con-
structed by the Administration, was too high to be of any use to Henrique. The orange 
trees showed traces of fumagina, but not much. Henrique later said that in some 
years they had suffered a lot from fumagina. He had sprayed but you got the stuff 
in your face, and after a while your arm ached from pumping. He had tried all sorts 
of concoctions: water and soap, petroleum, and also pesticides, but these he found 
dangerous; he had stopped using them. 
While we were filling our sample sacks we talked with the son, an intelligent lad of 
twenty. He had interrupted his cientifico (university preliminary course) which he had 
been doing at the nearby Agricultural University, because he had been drafted into 
the army. He had only recently returned home. He did not know yet what he was going 
to do. He was going to give the matter a good deal of thought, so he said. Unlike 
many settler's sons he was not dead set against agriculture, but he thought that it 
was a great disadvantage that a farmer could not go away once in a while, unless 
he had somebody to look after the farm, One of his brothers owned an adjoining 
farm, but another had gone to Sao Paulo and had become a taxi driver. His sister 
taught at the primary school down the road. While we were talking the young man 
noticed a wasps' nest in one of the orange trees. He told us to stand back. Stooping, 
he filled both hands with a bundle of dried grass that covered the ground between 
the trees. Darting up to the wasps' nest, he rubbed it between his straw-filled hands 
and ground it to pieces. 
When we had taken our samples we went back to the house and talked with Hen-
rique who had finished shaving. His was not a bad house; it was less spacious than 
the bungalows which some Japanese and city people had built themselves, and also 
older, but it contained three comfortable rooms, a big kitchen and the porch. A few 
large fruit-trees with tremendous crowns provided shade. He had almond, cashew, 
jackfruit and mango. A jackfruit was cut open in our honour; with our hands we 
worked the edible parts free. 
Henrique had already lived for seventeen years in the settlement, and had no plans 
to leave. His oranges and his nine cows provided enough for a living. Some years ago 
he had also bred pigs; he once had sixty of them, but they kept eating the oranges from 
the trees and he had sold them off. His oranges he sold sometimes on the tree, some-
times crated. Some middlemen brought their own pickers along, and then he had 
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only to count the number of crates afterwards. He was well aware that the settlers 
who had trucks bought cheaply from other farmers and made money, but what could 
one do? The attempts to organize a cooperative had failed, because the leaders had 
sought their own advantage. They could not bring it up again, the settlers did not want 
to hear of cooperatives any more. Marias (at that time an important official of the 
Administration) was the biggest crook of them all. He had been able to turn his job 
to good account and now owned five or six farms. Ten, according to Henrique's son. 
As to annual crops, his farm had only cassava. But on a farm across the road he had 
planted rice. It was a sharecropping arrangement. Since the tractors of the Admini-
stration had stopped working, it had become very difficult to find somebody to plow 
your land. Plowing with animals Henrique considered more tiresome even than clear-
ing land with the hoe; it simply could not be done. The thing to do was to plow with 
a tractor, brrrm and you are at the end of the field, but he had no money to buy one. 
Later his son showed us the house. The furniture was simple but not wretched and 
falling apart as in the poorer houses. In the kitchen stood a big new refrigerator that 
worked on paraffin, and a stove with a cylinder of gas next to it. Behind the house 
we admired an electric pump, installed next to the well from which they got their 
drinking water. The current for the pump was supplied by a second-hand generator, 
which also fed the light-bulbs hanging from the ceiling in each room. Henrique said 
that recently, during the construction of the high-tension cable from the old Rio-Sao 
Paulo road to the centre of the project the settlers in his neighbourhood had seriously 
thought of buying a transformer together and shunting the electricity from the main 
road to their houses. The plan had not materialized because the builders had run out 
of money and the high-tension cable had never been connected. In the past few months, 
moreover, considerable lengths of cable had been stolen, so that now they could not 
send electricity to the project even if they wanted to. 
Just as we were leaving, a big truck of the company that was building the water-
purification plant on the Guandu River turned into the farm. The driver wanted to 
buy a crate of oranges, of the Pera variety. Why he had driven so far to buy something 
which he could get at any other farm, I did not understand. 
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2 The history of the project 
The land-settlement project of Santa Cruz occupies the southeast corner of the 
Baixada Fluminense, the lowlands between the sea and the mountain range that runs 
parallel to the coast in the State of Rio de Janeiro. The settlement has been carved out 
of an immense latifundium, the history of which goes back for centuries. Only some 
twenty-odd years after the land had been given out as a sesmaria3 in 1567, it was partly 
bequeathed to and partly bought by the Order of Jesuits, which eventually managed 
to acquire a property of more than 180,000 hectares. Working with converted Indians 
and later with negro slaves, the Jesuits bred great herds of cattle, horses and sheep, 
and cultivated such crops as sugar-cane, cassava, maize and tobacco. In order to 
drain the flat marshy lands, they constructed numerous canals and diverted water 
from one river to another (Alonso, 1960, p. 400). For almost two centuries the 
'fazenda de Santa Cruz', as the exploitation came to be called, remained in the pos-
session of the Society of Jesus. Owing to the high prices given for sugar on the Euro-
pean market, sugar-cane gradually became the most important crop on the estate 
(Alonso, 1960). In 1759, however, the Jesuits were expelled from Brazil and then-
possessions confiscated. The fazenda became Portuguese Crown property. Under 
civil administrators it rapidly declined in prosperity. Repeatedly, in 1761, 1770, 
1773 and finally in 1804, orders went out from Portugal to subdivide and sell the 
fazenda, but only in 1806 two engenhos4 with surrounding lands were auctioned off. 
The administrator of the fazenda was against its dismemberment. The construction 
of the two engenhos and of cassava and coffee plantations, seems to have brought 
back to the region some of its former prosperity. But after a political conflict the 
administrator was put out and the sale or lease of lands became frequent (Tacsir, 
1952). The arrival of the Portuguese royal family temporarily called a halt to this 
process of fragmentation; the fazenda became its country seat. 
Coffee, introduced in the beginning of the 19th century, did not replace sugar-cane 
in the lowland. The hamlet of Itaguaf, however, developed into a relatively important 
commercial centre, owing to its situation near the coast and on the main road through 
the mountains to Sao Paulo. The coffee grown in the Paraiba valley was transported 
to Itaguaf on pack-animals and from there taken to Rio by boat (Alonso, 1960, p. 404). 
Also, it seems, attempts were made to develop the royal fazenda of Santa Cruz. 
Spix and von Martius, who passed through in 1817, met a compatriot of theirs who 
directed the recently installed charcoal works, and made mention of Chinese colonists, 
whose agricultural skills, it was hoped, would benefit the fazenda6. Most of these 
colonists, however, had become street vendors in Rio de Janeiro. The fazenda itself 
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they found to be in almost ijie same state of neglect as Mawe, another traveller, had 
described it many years before them. In spite of a multitude of slaves, the lands were 
badly drained and marshy, and were used mainly for raising cattle (Spix and von 
Martius, n.d., p. 114 et seq.). Kidder (1951, p. 135), who saw the fazenda twenty years 
later, says of it: "Up to the present, however, almost all its land is uncultivated". 
What development there was at Itagual did not last. Owing to the rapid exhaustion of 
the soil on the first coffee plantations and the consequent southward movement of 
the crop, as well as to the construction of a railway which reached Sao Paulo in 1875, 
Itaguaf lost its importance for the transport of coffee. With the advent of the Republic 
the fazenda became state property. Gradually many lands pertaining to the latifundium 
were leased. Through neglect of the extensive drainage system rivers became obstruc-
ted, and the marshes reappeared everywhere. Finally the region was almost abandoned 
by its population (Alonso, 1960, p. 405). 
In the twenties of this century the Federal Government began to envisage the recu-
peration of the marshy lowlands in the Baixada Huminense. Various commissions 
were created to study the technical problems (mostly drainage) of reclaiming the 
area. Until 1933 these studies and works which resulted from them remained pat-
chy. In that year, however, a new commission was set up that understood the neces-
sity of a more comprehensive approach to the planning and execution of reclamation 
works in the region. Upon its recommendations the Directorate for the Reclamation 
of the Baixada Huminense was created. 
Map of the State of Rio de Janeiro, showing municipal boundaries and centres. The area in black is the 
project of Santa Cruz. 
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A house under construction 
In the meantime the Federal Government had decreed6 the establishment of a so-
called Centro Agrícola on the lands of the Fazenda Nacional de Santa Cruz, within 
the boundaries of the Federal District. This Decree marks the beginning of the 
land-settlement project I have studied. 
Since the project has always been considered a Núcleo Colonial7 let me first expose 
the most important provisions of Decree 9801. This Decree defines a Núcleo Colonial 
as an assembly of plots of land, each sufficiently extensive to absorb the labour of the 
person who acquires itThe plots must be prepared for the establishment of immigrants 
as their owners8. A Núcleo Colonial has to contain: schools for primary agricultural 
education, demonstration fields, and workshops. It may contain: breeding bulls, 
installations for the processing of agricultural produce, machines and implements, 
and animals that the settlers may use during the first six months. 
The settlers will receive: upon arrival, three days food; during the first six months, 
employment in the labour force of the settlement in such a way that each adult will 
be employed about 15 working days per month; during the first year, free medicines; 
and until the date of emancipation9 of the settlement, free medical care. Seed, seed-
lings and publications may be distributed by the administration10. After consultation 
with the local authorities, a local market will be organized. 
The plots must be smaller than 25 hectares and normally shall include an already 
constructed house. The plots can be sold for cash or in instalments. Thirty per cent 
of the plots can be reserved for Brazilian nationals. 
The settler may not alienate his plot or his benfeitorias11 as long as he is indebted 
to the Colony. If, without valid reasons, he fails to cultivate his plot over three 
months, he shall be evicted. Only after having received definite title to his first plot 
a settler can buy a second plot. 
Not a word is said about which immigrant or Brazilian national can become a 
settler. 
The regulations covering the Centros Agrícolas differ in some ways from these 
provisions. A Centro is meant for national labourers domiciled in the state containing 
the Centro. The Government shall provide the same installations as in a Núcleo Colo-
nial, and with minor variations the settlers do receive the same benefits as the immi-
grants. There are some regulations over selection, but these are not exacting. The 
main condition is that the settler be an agricultural labourer. More important is, 
that his behaviour is subject to some prescriptions. Not only can he be evicted if he 
has failed to cultivate his plot for three months, he also has to live on his plot. He is 
not allowed to keep animals except on enclosed fields especially designated for this 
purpose. Finally he may not alienate his land or his benfeitorias nor conclude any 
other contract which impedes the free cultivation of his plot until such time as he has 
received permanent title to the land. After that date he may alienate his land only 
with permission of the Ministry, and to somebody who meets the conditions put 
forth in this decree. 
One can see that the legislator has tried to make the sale of land both more difficult 
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and less attractive than for the immigrant settlers. He also made an attempt to prevent 
the intrusion of non-labourers, for instance landowners. Benefits and obligations 
seem to be meant to prevent turnover and speculation. 
A short time before the colonization of the first section of the project began, the 
Government reduced, in a sense, the difference between the two decrees just mention-
ed. A decree (No. 19842) of 1930 limits immigration; establishes a special tax, the 
proceeds of which are to be used to promote the settlement of immigrants who have 
already arrived; and declares that the national settlers will from then on enjoy the 
same assistance as the immigrants already received. 
The first (and smallest) section of the project, the section Santa Cruz, in the former 
Federal District, was settled on the basis of these legal texts. Settlement did not wait 
for the completion of the drainage and reclamation works in the area, which consisted 
of the excavation or repair12 of three sizable canals and a number of smaller ones, and 
of the construction of dikes, bridges, roads and houses. In 1938, all the farms in this 
section had been handed over and provisions were made to extend the settlement to 
the other side of the Sao Francisco River into the State of Rio de Janeiro. The Federal 
Government decreed (Decreto-Lei 893 of 26 November) that all tenant farmers on 
lands pertaining to the Fazenda Nacional de Santa Cruz had to show, within three 
months, the documents upon which they based their occupation of the land. Many 
tenants could not do this (Tacsir, 1952). 
Lawsuits13 resulting from the expropriation of lands, and the construction of the 
necessary canals, roads and bridges delayed the next phase of colonization until 
1945. After some partial revisions of the law of 1911, in 1943 a new law (No. 6117) 
was passed on the organization of nucleos coloniais. A nucleo now had to contain 
medical and pharmaceutical services and cooperatives for purchase, sale and con-
sumption as well as schools, workshops and demonstration fields. Until the emanci-
pation of the settlement the settler needed permission from the administering agency 
if he wanted to alienate benfeitorias or land in any way. The law even prohibited 
public notaries from drafting contracts of this kind unless such a permission was 
shown. 
The benefits which the settlers were to receive were very similar to those stipulated 
in 1911: (a) Three days food; (b) Employment in the labour force of the colony; 
(c) Free medical assistance; (d) Medicines, seedlings, seed, fertilizers, pesticides and 
tools free during the first year; (e) Some implements and animals as a loan during the 
first year. After the first year, the services under (d) and (e) could be provided for a 
fee14. 
The settlers had to meet certain conditions. They had to be older than 18, could 
not be owners of agricultural land or of an industrial or commercial enterprise, and 
could not be public officials. The settler was obliged to five with his family on the 
plot he had received and to cultivate it personally. A settler was to be evicted if he did 
not cultivate his land for three months, or failed to bring a minimum area under 
cultivation, within the prescribed period, or limited himself to cutting the trees on 
his land and did not plant or reforest the clearings. 
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Also in the second section of the project, the section Piranema, settlement began 
before the projected drainage and reclamation works had been completed. In both 
sections the farms which were distributed measured about 10 hectares, and were 
rectangular. In the section Santa Cruz brick houses were built on practically all farms, 
but in Piranema only on about a quarter of the farms (Geiger, 1956, p. 156). Farms 
and houses had to be paid in ten (later thirteen) yearly instalments, of which the 
first was due two years after the arrival of the settler. In Santa Cruz a system of dirt 
roads was constructed to all farms, but in the Piranema section such a network, 
though planned, was not wholly executed.18 
In spite of the canals and ditches, drainage remained a problem in many parts of the 
project. The area was severely flooded more than once. Particularly during periods 
of heavy rainfall, much farmland is still flooded every year, for a few days or for 
months on end, especially in Piranema, where a number of deep and extensive ditches 
are needed that cannot be dug by individual farmers.16 
Although a government service enforced malarial control, the region was not de-
clared free until 1954. 
What happened in the project during the first years is little known and difficult to 
reconstruct. Although the settlers are fond of saying that they did not receive any 
assistance, there is little reason to doubt that the Administration provided them with the 
assistance required by law and more than that17. Apart from constructing and main-
taining drainage ditches, roads and bridges, the Administration distributed seeds and 
seedlings, and, when they were available, pesticides and fertilizers. Moreover the agency 
plowed and harrowed land for a small fee, and employed a considerable number of 
settlers on its labour force. In later years it also assisted in the sale of produce, by 
organizing a market especially for the settlers in one of the suburbs of Rio, and by 
providing transport. 
Incidentally also other assistance was given. But while Geiger (1956) thought the 
assistance still insufficient, Moreira (1962), writing about Tingua, a comparable land-
settlement scheme in the neighbourhood, is of the opinion that the aid was too easily 
given and encouraged the colonists to believe that it was not more than their right 
to receive aid. Though it is true that the servicing sector required by law was still 
rudimentary when colonization started, schools, workshops, storage buildings for 
a cooperative, and a small rice mill were eventually built.18 In 1950 a hospital was 
inaugurated by the President of the Republic. 
The few descriptions of the first years of the project that have come to our know-
ledge suggest that two phenomena have been especially important. 
Firstly, farming has always meant for the settlers the production of commercial 
crops rather than growing their own food and selling possible surpluses. The culti-
vation of perennial crops and even trees (Geiger, 1956, p. 156), the difficulties encoun-
tered in finding outlets for the produce (Moreira, 1962, p. 315), the forcible way in 
which many settlers describe the isolation of the project during its first years, all 
point to this phenomenon. This means, of course, that the deficient communications, 
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the isolation of many farms, and the absence of any marketing organization have 
been more harmful than was strictly necessary. 
Secondly the poverty of the settlers seems to have impeded development from the 
beginning. Many of them found their land upon arrival covered with trees. This was 
regarded as a blessing; by cutting the trees and selling wood or charcoal they could 
earn a living, so that forested farm land was in great demand. However, not a few 
settlers (and this accusation is frequent in the administrative documents) seem to have 
limited themselves to this extractive activity, not caring much for their plantations. 
Also it was rather common (and is still regarded as normal) for settlers to seek work 
on other farms or on the labour force of the administering agency19, in order to gain 
a living. "The lack of capital on the part of the settlers", says Geiger (1956, p. 154), 
"is the main reason why only sixty per cent of them work (on their own farm)". 
The sale of wood, and the possibility of employment elsewhere have somewhat 
disguised the fact that many settlers were unable to raise themselves by their own 
bootstrings. It is not easy to assess in how far a poor man really could have done so. 
But there is also little doubt that most settlers were easily discouraged by difficulties 
and setbacks, and had not the drive nor the persistence to develop their farm. "If 
you gave them credit, they ate it" said a former administrator, "and if you gave them 
seed, they ate that too". 
Almost from the beginning of the project farms were bought and sold. When ex-
ternal economies, especially improved accessibility, raised the value of the land, 
prospective buyers appeared. For the original settler, once he had exhausted the wood 
on his land and had found his production insufficient, the temptation to sell was difficult 
to resist. As long as he received the money he did not care that the sale was illegal; that 
problem he left to the buyer20. 
Some writers impute this turnover not to poverty on the part of the first group of set-
tlers, but to speculative motives on the part of their successors (Geiger, 1956, p. 159; 
Moreira, 1962, p. 318). This may be true if poverty is understood not in absolute 
terms, but as a relative, culturally determined phenomenon. The settlers saw farming 
as the production of cash crops for the market, for profit. To them poverty, or lack 
of ready money, meant failure and led to abandonment. A former administrator saw 
in the turnover a process of selection; the poor and ignorant were bought out by those 
who had more money, more education, more skill. 
Much confusion reigns over what instructions were issued on the cultivation of the 
farms and how far they were enforced. Geiger (1956) mentions directions of 1941, 
according to which the settlers were obliged to bring 50 % of their farm land under 
cultivation within two years (20% within the first six months, and 10% during each 
successive half-year period). But it is also said that the settlers were free to use their 
land as they saw fit, provided they cultivated at least 2 hectares annually (Faissol, 
1950, p. 163). Some say that the settlers, at least in the beginning, were not allowed 
to keep cattle, but that this prohibition was not enforced (Tacsir, 1952; Geiger, 1956). 
Elsewhere mention is made of an obligation (that remained unfulfilled) to keep a part 
of the farm under forest and to reforest it if necessary (Alonso, 1960). In a report of 
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Table 1. Mechanical soil preparation by tractors of the Administration in the section Piranema. 
Number of farms assisted Area plowed (in ha) Number of functioning tractors 
Source (where not mentioned otherwise): Adrninistration's report of 1960. 
1 Report FAO expert, 1953. 
2 Geiger (1956), p. 155. 
8 The Adrninistration's report of 1958 mentions only 98 ha. 
1953 by an expert of FAO, sent out to study how the settlement could be improved, 
a detailed account is given of the directions of land use then in force: 10% of farm-
land under forest, 20% in pasture, 20% under fruit-trees, 10% for poultry and small 
livestock, and the remaining 40% under annual crops. Somebody, obviously a high 
official, had, however, written in the margin that the expert had been misinformed; 
what he took to be directions were only suggestions. 
It can be assumed that some directions were given but could not be strictly enfor-
ced. Many farmers held other jobs to earn a living, and not all settlers had the same 
luck or misfortune. Differential application and a concomitant slackening of the 
rules will soon have become necessary. 
In spite of the difficulties and the turnover the settlement progressed. According 
to later administrators, in the period 1952-4 the agricultural production of the pro-
ject was quite high21. In the latter year a new National Institute for Immigration and 
Settlement (TNIC) was created, which took over from the Ministry of Agriculture the 
administration of the settlement schemes already in existence. The transition virtually 
left the Santa Cruz settlement without administration for some time. Moreover, INIC 
drastically reduced the budget of the new administration of the project, which became 
therefore unable to keep up the technical assistance and the other services to the 
settlers on the former level. Assistance became irregular and eventually ceased. 
Table 1 illustrates this gradual decline. 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
3981 
326 
348 
141 
182 
193 
57 
39 
51 
5971 
695 
713 
216 
298 
312s 
82 
46 
68 
122 
8 
8 
4 
5 
6 
2 
1 
2 
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3 The investigation 
Choice and reconnaissance of the area 
Though I was aware that the land-settlement project of Santa Cruz was not like 
the rest of Brazil or even like any single region of the vast country, I nevertheless 
decided to study it. Small, privately owned family farms might not be characteristic 
for any natural region, except for those areas in the south which had been settled by 
immigrants, but they did occur, covering a river basin here, filling in the spaces be-
tween large estates elsewhere. According to Queiroz (1963) they were much more 
numerous than the agricultural planners appeared to realize. And their number would 
increase; land reform was likely to be enacted sooner or later and would frequently 
comprise the creation of family farms on expropriated fazendas22. Even if land reform 
were delayed, land settlement would proceed, because that was one of the few measures 
to reorganize agriculture and combat unemployment at least locally that could be 
taken without raising controversy23.1 saw the project of Santa Cruz therefore as a 
precursor; an example of how Brazil could look after an agrarian reform. Much money 
and effort had gone into the reclamation, drainage and settlement of an area that, 
in theory at least, was close enough to a large urban centre to be able to find out-
lets for its produce24. Here the conditions had been created under which poor peasants 
and agricultural labourers could develop into smallholders earning a reasonable 
income on land that would become, or already was, their property. 
Had the efforts of the government been successful? If not, could I learn anything 
from the difficulties here for the benefit of future settlement projects? I thought so, 
if the results of a study were not regarded as undeniable facts but as suggestions. I 
realized that, statistically, no generalizations were allowed from any single settlement 
project to others, or to future smallholders on expropriated land. But the advantages 
of acquiring intimate knowledge of one area outweighed the disadvantage of not 
being allowed to generalize. 
Practical considerations led to the choice of this particular project. Of the older 
settlement projects around the city of Rio, it was the most extensive. It had been stud-
ed by others. It could be easily reached. It was near the Universidade Rural do 
Brasil, which could supply information and assistance and where I hoped to recruit 
interviewers. Having decided to study the Nucleo Colonial de Santa Cruz, I proceeded 
to investigate what had happened to it. In how far had these settlers really become 
owners of productive and remunerative family farms? Who had become good far-
mers? What consistent differences were there between those who operated productive 
22 
farms and those who did not? It was with these questions in mind, and armed with 
some introductory letters, that I set out to explore the area, in August 1963. 
The introduction I had to the Administration of the project was very good. I 
received all assistance I required and was allowed to examine its records at will. Since 
most of the employees had lived many years on the project, they knew it well and 
provided me with valuable information25. They also introduced me to several farmers. 
Other settlers I got to know by accompanying the extension officer of ACAR-RJ, 
the state agricultural extension and credit association. With his female home econo-
mics assistant, he used to visit several groups of farmers in the project once a month. 
On these occasions both of them gave short lectures on certain aspects of agriculture 
and housekeeping, and answered any questions. Once introduced, I visited some of 
these farmers on my own. Also simply by attending these extension afternoons, I 
became better acquainted with the people and their problems. 
The problem 
When I began the study, the main problem was the systematic differences (in terms 
of socio-economic status, education, urban contacts, use of extension services, etc.) 
between those settlers who ran productive farms and those who did not. In the 
circumstances, the productivity of the small farms clearly depended on the intensive 
use of the available land, and hence on the adoption of new, productivity raising, 
agricultural practices. I decided therefore to measure the efficiency of the farm-opera-
tors by the number of practices they had adopted. It did not seem wise to consider also 
the time the settlers had adopted each innovation, since they had arrived in the project 
in different years, some of them only recently, and did not hail from the same region. 
In other words, they progressed from different starting points in the adoption of new 
practices. 
The preliminary reconnaissance of the project revealed, that a certain practice, for 
instance the use of insecticides, could be relatively common for one crop, but an 
exception in the cultivation of another. Also, it seemed to occur not infrequently that 
some practice was dropped again after having been adopted28. 
According to Iutaka (1963, p. 19) who had done a rapid survey in the same area, 
the adoption of profitable crops and machines (e.g. labour-saving practices) encoun-
tered less resistance than the adoption of other practices. All this suggested that it was 
not as certain as I had been inclined to assume (on the basis of non-Brazilian diffusion 
theories) that the adoption of innovations implied a change in mentality and hence 
a guarantee of sustained agricultural development. To the first problem therefore 
another had to be added: could adoption in the project co-exist with traditional values 
and attitudes? 
This problem could be approached in two ways. On the one hand, I could ask 
questions about the circumstances in which, and the ends for which, some innovations 
had been adopted or discontinued, to find out if the high adopters were really more 
modern than the low adopters, or only richer. This was relatively easy to do, and 
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indeed a number of such questions found their way into the schedule. On the other 
hand, I could ascertain whether the adoption of innovations co-existed with traditional 
values and attitudes, i.e. whether innovativeness with regard to some practices could 
go together with traditional values in farming and agriculture in general. The latter 
approach implied that those traditional values and attitudes had to be identified 
first. That they were not extinct was suggested by phenomena like the rapid turnover 
of the settlers, the amount of uncultivated land, and the tendency to grow only one 
crop, evident on some farms. 
In principle, the survey might have been postponed until questions had been framed 
to allow for all relevant values and attitudes. But it turned out to be difficult to find 
interviewers once the summer holidays had started. Since I did not know whether 
other obligations would allow me to postpone the survey for a whole year, I decided 
to apply the questionaires in December and thereafter to continue the study with 
anthropological methods. 
A further reason why the survey did not probe deeply into all values and attitudes 
was that I prefered not to ask attitude questions, because I doubted the reliability 
of the answers. And I lacked the time to acquire that intimate knowledge of the 
history of the project that the ability to frame questions about factual indicators of 
values and attitudes presupposed. Therefore certain matters such as cooperation and 
manual labour could not be dealt with sufficiently. As to the presence of other values 
and attitudes, such as those to crop pattern, purchase of land, employment of outside 
labour, marketing and capital investment, the schedule provided indications but no 
indisputable evidence. 
The unfortunate consequence of this early application of the schedule is that 
my quantitative data cover only part, though a substantial part, of the problem. 
Consequently, in later chapters I cannot always be as positive and certain as I 
would like to be. 
The first months after the survey I further evaluated the traditional values and 
attitudes which I thought persisted in the project. I came to regard some of them as of 
little consequence to development, or even as beneficial. But others seemed incompati-
ble with the prerequisites of a viable system of family farms. The persistence of these 
values and attitudes even carried a certain threat to the long-term existence of the 
system27. I therefore concentrated on the behaviour that seemed incompatible with 
the continuation of smaË family farms, let alone their further development. 
During this second, anthropological phase of the investigation I tried to do three 
things: 
1. To recognize behaviour that was dysfunctional to the realization of the original 
aims of the project, i.e. the creation of viable small family farms. 
2. To indicate in which respects such behaviour was dysfunctional. 
3. To deduce from this behaviour a limited number of dispositions, relating these, 
wherever possible, to traditional culture and social structure. 
This second phase of the investigation, although intermittently interrupted for a 
month or two, lasted until I left Brazil in July 1965. 
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A theoretical interlude 
For a long time I have applied the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' to the problems 
mentioned above. In fact, I discarded them only after I had begun writing this book. 
In this section I will first explain why I ever came to use the terms and then why I 
rejected them after all. It is not only out of a desire to justify past errors, which ob-
viously have influenced the investigation, that I wish to deal with these concepts here, 
but also because I believe that others may yet learn from my mistakes. 
Many sociologists use the terms modern and traditional, or comparable polar 
terms such as sacred and secular, folk and urban, traditional and industrial, to con-
trast the two types of society which exist at the beginning respectively at the end of the 
process of change initiated by the industrial revolution in Europe and now embracing 
the whole world. The dichotomy sacred-secular is the sociologist's model for the 
process of change the economists call economic development, says Germani (1960, 
p. 261). Modernization affects all aspects of human life and implies a profound 
transformation of personality structure (Germani, 1965, p. 70). Several studies have 
been undertaken to prove that farmers who are economically progressing, that is 
adopting innovations, are modern (e.g. Copp 1956, Benvenuti 1961, Bergsma 1963). 
Modernization is most commonly approached in terms of economic development 
(Moore, 1963, p. 91). 
The literature creates the impression that the terms modern and traditional, when 
they are applied to persons and groups, connote respective personality traits, values 
and behaviour patterns which are or are not compatible with economic development. 
It is therefore not surprising that at first I thought that the terms were eminently suited 
for studying the characteristic differences between farmers who had availed themselves 
of the opportunities for economic advancement offered by the project and farmers 
who were still using traditional production methods. Later I investigated behaviour 
patterns at odds with the functional demands of a system of family farms and retard-
ing the development of the community. Again there seemed to be every reason to 
use the terms modern and traditional. 
The first objection that appeared was the difficulty of deciding which attributes 
of farmers should be regarded as traditional. What I soon noticed, when I explored 
the land-settlement scheme of Santa Cruz, was that the descriptions of traditional 
farmers given in the literature did not seem to apply closely to traditional farmers 
in the project. Van den Ban (1963, p. 22) mentions several characteristics of the cul-
tural pattern of the traditional farmer, such as frugality, unwillingness to borrow mon-
ey, the tendency to regard the farm as a security for the family rather than as a com-
mercial enterprise, the tendency to disbelieve scientific claims about the control of 
nature, the tendency to value manual labour but not intellectual labour, and the value 
attached to hard work28. Redfield (1963, p. 63 et seq.), comparing three peasant peoples 
of different periods and places,"seemed to find a cluster of three closely related attitu-
des or values: an intimate and reverent attitude to the land; the idea that agricultural 
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work is good and commerce not so good; and an emphasis on productive industry 
as a prime virtue". Elsewhere in the same book (p. 78) he slightly modifies and en-
larges his summary of peasant values:... "an intense attachment to the native soil; 
a reverent disposition towards habitat and ancestral ways; a restraint on individual 
self-seeking in favour of family and community; a certain suspiciousness, mixed with 
appreciation, of town life; a sober and earthy ethic". 
In the project, however, manual labour seemed to be despised, non-manual labour 
esteemed; the farmers did not seem to work very hard; changes in prices seemed to be 
followed promptly by changes in resource allocation; some opportunities for mone-
tary profit (the quick cruzeiro) were readily taken; the settlers did not concentrate on 
their own food but on cash crops; apparently little affection was felt for the farm or 
the land; frugality, if it existed, was a necessity rather than a way of life; saving for 
a rainy day, foresight, seemed rare (and thus also that particular form of prevision 
called depreciation allowance). Several authors have called attention to the diversity 
of traditional peasant culture and ethos. Redfield (1963, p. 17) admitted that more 
than one traditional culture seemed to exist, and tentatively suggested that that around 
the Mediterranean differed from that in the rest of Europe. However, he obviously 
found it difficult to discard the notion of one peasant culture: "Peasant society and 
culture has something generic about it. It is a kind of arrangement of humanity with 
some similarities the world over." Wolf (1955) recognized several types of peasant 
cultures in Latin America. Whereas his corporate (mostly Indian) community adheres 
to traditional values very similar to those described by van den Ban, the members 
of his open peasant community have something in common with the settlers I studied. 
Foster (1961, p. 1173) asserts that "most, and possibly all, non-Indian Latin American 
communities, when better studied, will be found to fall with the European Mediterra-
nean type". Gillin (1952, p. 199 et seq.) drew some relevant distinctions between the 
American Indian and Ladino peasant cultures: "Indians are interested in owning land 
so that they personally can work on it. Even those who own so much that they must 
pay other men to help them, invariably also work themselves. A man has not achieved 
his life's goal unless he personally, with his own hands, can work milpa.... No Indian 
ever tries to acquire wealth or skill so that he can retire from the land, but rather the 
reverse. The Ladino, in contrast, personally works the land only when all other means 
of livelihood are unavailable. The Ladino wishes to control land, the more the better. 
He wishes to own it, to have other people work it for him under his orders. Control 
of land is a subgoalfor itself for a Ladino; even if it is not financially profitable, it 
enables the owner to master the lives of his tenants and workmen, to exert influence 
in the town hall, and to bask in a certain prestige. If it is financially profitable, the 
return on the land places in the Ladino's hands the instrument for acquiring control 
in other fields". And referring to the Indians: "The weariness that comes from physical 
toil is one of the facts of life, not a resented punishment to be avoided at all costs, and 
one receives the approval of his fellows, rather than their derogation, for doing these 
things. Quite the opposite is true for the Ladinos. Labour in the field or in the house-
hold is, from the Ladino point of view, properly performed through the instrumental-
26 
ity of other men or women under one's control. Toil is not only unbearably wearisome 
but also disgraceful". Various social scientists who have done research among peas-
ants of the Mediterranean culture type noticed an unusual amount of mutual dis-
trust, jealousy, hostility and strife (Lewis 1951, Banfield 1958, Foster 1960, Lopreato 
1962), in sharp contrast to the "restraint on individual self-seeking in favour of family 
and community" suggested by Redfield to be a trait of traditional peasants. 
Initially, I intended only to show that in the project of Santa Cruz (as in many other 
regions of rural Brazil) a type of traditional culture is found that closely resembles the 
Mediterranean type, and that this culture had been unduly disregarded by diffusion 
research and theory. Indeed, this research seemed to acknowledge the existence of 
only one sort of traditional culture, non-Mediterranean29. Van den Ban even said 
in so many words that "it is possible to speak of the cultural pattern of the traditional 
farmer" (1963, p. 22). This assertion, no doubt, is partly due to the circumstance that 
most diffusion and adoption studies have been undertaken in two developed coun-
tries - the United States and the Netherlands - where this type of traditional culture 
was predominant. Probably it also follows from the assumption in these studies that 
modern rural culture is similar all over the world. Such an assumption at first does 
not seem to be implausible (the successful use of modern farming techniques presup-
poses the presence of certain cultural traits) but has not really been proved. Hoetink 
(1965) pointed out that such an assumption amounts to a new theory of evolutionism. 
The assumption of one type of rural tradition and of a single type of modern rural 
culture, seemed to lead to the postulate of one type of development process. This 
postulate, in turn, caused well-meaning foreign experts to recommend for Brazil 
much the same action programmes as had succesfully promoted development in their 
home countries. If it could be shown, I thought, that traditional rural culture in 
Brazil contained values and attitudes which were quite different from those ascribed 
to the traditional farmer in the literature but which still inhibited economic devel-
opment, then it could be argued that the process of development could not possibly 
be similar everywhere. This approach ultimately failed because the terms traditional 
and modern became burdened with too many meanings. Some of the traditional 
attitudes of the Santa Cruz settlers were almost the reverse of those which van den 
Ban attributed to traditional farmers. Moreover, it seemed that agricultural develop-
ment in the Brazilian project would be well served by the introduction of some of 
van den Ban's traditional values and attitudes. By regarding the behaviour of the 
majority of the settlers in Itaguai as traditional because it was old-established and 
obstructed economic development, I was assuming implicitly that the term traditional 
also meant development-obstructing. In reality, I should first have decided as a con-
scious preliminary whether the term covered a definite set of attributes (those men-
tioned by Redfield and van den Ban) or whether it denoted attributes incompatible 
with development. If I had argued from the modern end I would have soon noticed 
that the real dilemma lies in this choice. 
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The fact is that instead of pointing to the existence of two traditions, I should have 
argued either that : 
1. Even if all Brazilian 3 0 farmers are modern (i.e. possess the attributes ascribed to 
modern farmers in the literature) agricultural development does not necessarily 
ensue; 
2. Otherwise, modern (in the sense of development-promoting) attributes of farmers 
in Brazil do not so much relate to the adoption of new practices as, for instance, to 
solidarity, a sense of community, responsibility for the common good and the willing-
ness for sustained work over a long period of time. 
Either one posits that modern also means, by definition, development-promoting 
(the contents of the concept in Brazil are then different from those, for instance, in 
the Netherlands), or one defines modern as implying those attributes that modern 
people in some of the earliest industrial societies were found to possess, and then the 
correlation between modernity and economic development almost disappears in a 
country like Brazil. The reality of this either-or proposition in a country with a Medi-
terranean type of culture is substantiated by the results of a study by Rogers and van 
Es (1964). They compared the differences between opinion leaders and followers in 
three modern and two traditional communities in rural Colombia. They expected more 
modern communities to have a type of opinion leader different from that of more 
traditional communities (p. 2), since leaders would be inclined to conform to the norms 
of the community. The difference between the modern and the traditional communities 
themselves was defined in terms of innovativeness, exposure to cosmopolite commu-
nications, degree of functional role differentiation, evaluation of change, and cos-
mopoliteness (orientation external to the social system of the individual). 
These are characteristics of modern social systems such as have been found in the 
United States or the Netherlands. For short, I will call them 'modern Dutch'. Im-
plicitly, Rogers and van Es assume that modern, in this sense, means development-
promoting; that communities are more developed because they are more modern. 
A more modern community is one in which people five who conform to more modern 
norms (p. 8). The results of the study were highly interesting: the differences between 
opinion leaders and followers were wellnigh similar in the two types of community. 
Opinion leaders were more modern than their followers in the traditional and the 
modern communities. Either Homan's postulate that "a man of high status will con-
form to the most valued norms of his group as the minimum condition of maintaining 
his status" (p. 6) is not applicable in these Colombian communities, or the norms with 
respect to the variables in which leaders differed from followers in the same way in 
the two types of community (formal education, literacy, farm size, farm ownership, 
farm and home innovativeness, social status, low achievement motivation, mass 
media exposure, radio listening, newspaper reading, empathy and knowledgeability 
of public issues) are the same in the traditional and the modern communities. 
I believe that the norms are the same. The implication is, of course, that the differ-
ences in development between the communities cannot really be explained in terms 
of the above norms. These norms are 'modern Dutch'. In Colombia, the occurence of 
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economic development in a community has to be explained mainly in other terms. 
'Modern Dutch' is not synonymous with development promoting in Colombia31. 
The results obtained by Rogers and van Es show that the transfer of the concept mod-
ern from one culture to another poses a vexing problem. If modernity is always to be 
defined in terms of innovativeness, exposure to cosmopolite communications, func-
tional role differentiation, evaluation of change, and cosmopoliteness, then in some 
cultures the degree of modernity of community norms no longer explains differences 
in agricultural development. The concept is then of little use in dealing with develop-
ment. If modern behaviour is defined as behaviour that will promote economic devel-
opment (i.e. for farmers, agricultural development), the set of attitudes and values 
to be called modern will differ considerably between cultures. If so, the contents of the 
concepts modern and traditional will become very ambiguous. 
Having overstated the dilemma, I again admit that many studies have shown that 
economic development has coincided with the superseding of a traditional culture 
pattern by the modern one as described in the literature. This modern culture pattern 
is a prerequisite of development. I do not deny it, but I believe a qualification should 
be added: it is sometimes not the only prerequisite. It is a minimum requirement. In 
some culture areas, more is needed. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the 
high adopters in the project of Santa Cruz did indeed differ from the low adopters in 
terms of the variables mentioned by Rogers and van Es such as farm size, home inno-
vativeness, social status, education, literacy, urban contacts and exposure to extension 
sources. But these variables, the most important of which I believe to be social status, 
explain the differences between individuals, not those between communities. A stag-
nating community is not a community where people do not appreciate education, 
new appliances in the home, new practices on the land, a bigger farm or a higher 
level of income, although they may have obtained few of these good things. It is a 
community where the persistence of old-established culture patterns obstructs coope-
ration, directs the allocation of capital into the acquisition of new land rather than 
of productivity-raising practices, discourages manual work and has other unfortunate 
consequences. 
It is necessary, therefore, to discriminate conceptually, much more than has been 
done up to now, between modernity and the occurrence of economic growth, be-
tween tradition and economic stagnation. I am not the first to point out that the degree 
of modernity of the culture and the social structure does not account for the presence 
or absence of development. The implicit assumption that existed in many of the studies 
on modernization, namely that the less traditional a society is, the more it is capable 
of self-sustained growth, has been disproved, says Eisenstadt (1966, p. 145 et seq.). 
Constandse (1964) provided an actual example of the lack of association between the 
occurence of a modern culture pattern and that of economic growth in an industrial 
society, in casu the Netherlands. He described farmers who, although they ranked 
among the most modern of the nation, were found unwilling to sacrifice their indepen-
dence as farmers to improve efficiency and increase agricultural production by com-
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bining holdings or sharing certain capital goods. My reasons for recommending a 
clearer conceptual distinction between modernity and economic development are 
different. I believe that the traditional 'Mediterranean type' of culture pattern prevail-
ing in the project and in a large part of rural Brazil contains a number of elements 
which in the non-Mediterranean culture pattern are regarded as modern. The readi-
ness to consider and accept change, which according to many authors (Becker, 1957; 
Hofstee, 1962; Germani, 1965) is the main characteristic of the modern non-Mediter-
ranean culture pattern, is a case in point. Yet, agricultural development has been slug-
gish or entirely absentWhen it did occur, in the past, it did not last but was followed 
by a decline. At the same time, the Mediterranean type of culture pattern of the Santa 
Cruz settlers seems to lack certain elements which, although they are not among those 
considered as modern in the non-Mediterranean culture pattern, are nonetheless essen-
tial for development. I hold therefore that agricultural development in the project 
(and in many other regions of Brazil) depends not only on further modernization, 
(i.e. a convergence towards the modern non-Mediterranean culture pattern and social 
structure) but also on the 'adoption' of values and attitudes that in the earliest indus-
trial societies already existed before modernization began, and therefore might be 
called traditional. This refers to certain dispositions and values which do not bear 
directly upon production or productivity but which determine the structural and cul-
tural context in which economic behaviour works itself out and development is to 
take place. Cooperativeness, responsibility for the facilities and services one shares 
with others; self-reliance; solidarity with people to whom one is not related by 
kinship; the willingness to work hard and dirty one's hands in the process; a feeling 
of care for one's land; some appreciation for agriculture as a way of life rather than 
as just another way of earning one's keep; they all are attitudes whose absence consid-
erably obstructs development. For development to be beneficial to the society as a 
whole, the process of modernization must comprehend a change of ethos in Brazil. 
Without such a change, some individuals or groups may prosper temporarily but the 
society as a whole will remain stagnant. Booms have been rather common throughout 
the history of Brazil, but they have rarely contributed to permanent development, to 
self-sustaining growth. 
If true, the contention that economic development in Brazil also depends on the 
adoption of certain traditional non-Mediterranean values and attitudes, carries im-
plications for theory on the fdevelopment of societies now industrialized. The 
implication is that their development too was not only due to modernization, i.e. 
change, but also to the preservation of values, attitudes and behaviour patterns which 
existed already before modernization started. In other words, tradition may have been 
inimical to development in some respects, but has been beneficial in others32. 
It may seem strange that the beneficial role of some elements of the non-Mediter-
ranean tradition in economic development has not been observed more frequently. 
I believe the answer lies in the special drawbacks of the method sociologists have next 
turned to after speculation, in their study of the process of modernization: the sample 
survey. The danger is real that the researcher who must gain his knowledge mainly 
30 
from a survey, will loose sight of the actual groups to which his respondents belong 
and the episodes in which they are involved. Focusing his attention on the differences 
between two categories of people, he risks not noticing the particular manner in which 
the social structure and the culture affect these differences (cf. Hofstee, n.d.). When 
the researcher works in a foreign country, these drawbacks are even more severe, since 
he has not accumulated the everyday experience which in his own culture can help 
to replace prolonged observation and participation33. 
I have suggested that in the project of Santa Cruz, development depends not only 
on modernization but also on 'adoption' of certain values and attitudes which are 
not modern. But it cannot be assumed beforehand that the fanner who adopts new 
practices is also undergoing a change of ethos. A relation has as yet to be established. 
Until such time it would be prudent not to use the concept 'modern' at all. By tradi-
tional I shall mean, henceforth: of the past. 
The survey 
The schedule 
The reader will remember that the survey by questionnaire aimed at collecting in-
formation on the following two problems: 
1. The differences between adopters and non-adopters of productivity-raising prac-
tices. 
2. The similarities between the present values and attitudes of respondents about 
agriculture (as far as they appeared from the selection and discontinuance of adop-
tions and the allocation of resources in general), and the values and attitudes that 
were characteristic for traditional agricultural production in Brazil. 
The disinterest of the project's Administration in the first problem and the fact 
that discontinuance and selection of adoptions seemed to be rather common made 
it doubtful whether adoption of innovations was really an indication of a change in 
mentality. I hypothesized that, in the absence of a really thorough programme of 
agricultural credit, practice adoption would be first and foremost related to variables 
such as socio-economic status, income and wealth. Several authors have reported that 
the big proprietors in Brazil, once they saw the need for a certain innovation, readily 
adopted it (Medina, 1963; Prado, 1963; Geiger, 1956). Kahl (1965, p. 32) found that 
socio - economic status had more influence on a man's views about modern values than 
whether he lived in a metropolis or a provincial town. Bordenave (1964, p. 91) found 
in the North-East of Brazil that socio-economic status and education were much more 
important than other variables in explaining the variation in his dependent variable, 
the search for instrumental information. 
I also included questions in the schedule on many other variables, such as schooling, 
literacy, urban visiting, former geographic mobility, former urban residence, age, 
participation in cooperatives and other associations, contacts with various sources 
of extension and advice, participation in informal relationships with peers, and school-
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ing of children. Many of these variables had served as indicators of a modern culture 
pattern in countries with a non-Mediterranean type of culture (Bergsma, 1963). 
Influenced by a lucid article by Hutchinson (1956), who argued that an attitude was 
nothing more than a sort of greatest common denominator abstracted from overt 
behaviour and therefore should be established on the basis of repeated observations 
instead of on a few answers to questions, I decided not to include opinion questions 
in the schedule34. Also with respect to values and expectations, it seemed doubtful 
whether the verbal behaviour of the settlers would be a true reflection of their overt 
behaviour. Values like hard work, a cooperative disposition, responsibility and 
friendly relations with others in the locality were adhered to verbally but the obser-
vation of overt behaviour did not confirm these statements. Other values and expec-
tations were not readily acknowledged but certainly existed35. Observation, partici-
pation and informal interviews seemed to be more appropriate methods to study such 
values than a survey by questionnaire.38 
In some instances, however, I hoped that factual questions about past and present 
actions would provide indications, or at least illustrations, of certain values and 
attitudes bearing upon the settlers' agricultural performance. For that purpose ques-
tions were included on former and present land use, the state of certain machines, 
the use of specific innovations for various crops, the relative financial importance for 
the fanner of the crops he cultivated, production for the market and for home con-
sumption, rent, lease and purchase of land, and marketing behaviour. 
On family and kinship relations various questions were asked, for instance about 
the present occupation and abode of children. The employment of sons as reliable 
and cheap labour might show in the financial results obtained and hence in the adop-
tion of modern farm practices, whereas the absence of the grown sons could be an 
indication of their lack of affection towards the land. Likewise, questions were included 
about the presence, on the farm or on the project, of members of the extended family. 
Their mere presence could be an indication of the strength of kinship ties. Information 
was asked on the employment of sharecroppers and labourers on the farms, to see 
how much labour was employed in relation to the available land. 
Much attention was given to the farm-operator's professional and non-professional 
relationships. I was especially anxious to know how much social contact he had with 
other settlers and how far his non-professional and professional relationships over-
lapped. By asking not only the name of the persons chosen but also the number of 
their farms, it might be possible to identify the choices37. 
While the schedule was being put together, I began to train the interviewers. Several 
times I constructed small questionnaires around a certain problem, took the students 
to the project and, dropping them at random, told them to interview some settlers 
living in the neighbourhood. At the end of the afternoon we then discussed their 
experiences. A bit later, in November, we tested the entire schedule. On the whole it 
proved to be reasonable clear. 
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A settler's house 
I 
An informally recommended innovation. The cuts are believed to further fructification 
The sample 
Because the farms were numbered consecutively, a systematic sample was chosen. 
It included about a sixth of all farms.38 The intention was to interview farm-operators. 
This could be either the settler-owner, or a squatter (an occupant who did not have 
the official title to the plot) or, if the owner was absent39, a tenant or sharecropper. 
Sometimes an absentee owner left his farm in the care of an 'empregado', a salaried 
worker, but during the preliminary survey I found that often in such cases neither the 
owner nor the worker took any real decision about farming methods, the owner 
because he did not know what was going on or did not want to spend any money, 
the worker because he was not allowed to spend the owner's money and was not much 
interested anyhow. I therefore decided not to include such farms in the sample, but to 
replace them with neighbouring farms, unless the absentee owner visited it at least 
twice a week. 
No one knew how many farms were run by a salaried worker; they turned out to 
be more numerous than I had expected. Another difficulty arose with farms that had 
been illegally subdivided and sold as building plots, and farms that had been absorbed 
by larger estates, thus ceasing to be part of the project. Although people were aware 
that this had occurred, the number and position of the farms that had disappeared 
were not known. These farms also had to be replaced by neighbouring farms. 
During the field-work, some unexpected problems still cropped up for which 
solutions had to be found ad hoc. For instance, one farm was owned by a general's 
widow who lived on it but did not farm it. One settler had recently been admitted to a 
mental institution. Some farms turned out to be without an operator, and consisted 
of stretches of weed-covered land. In a few cases the next door neighbour could not be 
considered for interviewing either. Two interviews were discarded, three refusals 
were encountered, two farm-operators were away from home, and nine farms could 
not be replaced by others because no neighbours could be found nearby. 
Of the 186 respondents who consitute the final sample40, only 119 belonged to the 
original sample, 67 were substitutes. Obviously, this high rate of substitution might 
Table 2. Distribution of the respondents belonging to the original sample and the substitutes over the 
adoption-score quartiles1. 
Quartiles Totals 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Original sample 34 26 28 31 119 
Substitutes 15 20 20 12 67 
Totals 49 46 48 43 186 
X2 = 3.62 d.f. = 3 0.40 > p > 0.30 
1 See Annex II for a short explanatory note on the statistical tests employed in this and subsequent 
chapters. 
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Table 3. Distribution of non-Japanese respondents belonging to the original sample and non-Japanese 
substitutes over the adoption-score quartiles. 
Quartiles Totals 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Original sample 34 26 25 19 104 
Substitutes 15 19 19 10 63 
Totals 49 45 44 29 167 
Xa = 1.92 d.f. = 3 0.60 > p > 
have introduced bias in the sample. To assess its severity, the respondents belonging 
to the original sample and the 'substitutes' were compared for distribution over the 
adoption-score quartiles.jjThe rankordered quartiles will be used in later chapters as 
the dependent variable. Tables 2 and 3 show that the substitution has led to the in-
clusion of somewhat more respondents scoring in the second and third quartile. The 
chi-square values, however, do not indicate significant differences between the two 
categories. This is true for all respondents as well as for the Brazilians among them41. 
Interviewing 
The interviewing was done in the first three weeks of December 1963. Not all 
interviewers were available every day; sometimes they numbered five, sometimes seven 
or eight. A start was made at one end of the project and interviewers worked towards 
the other end. Each interviewer was dropped at the gate of a farm and picked up later. 
If the distance between one farm and the next could be covered on foot, the interviewer 
walked. Although later another car was put at our disposal, transport remained a 
problem. 
Strict supervision of the interviewers seemed necessary. I knew the names of most 
of the owners from the files of the Adnunistration; that was an easy check. I also used 
to return from time to time to a farm-operator who had been interviewed to ask him 
some of the questions again. The schedule itself was rather difficult to complete with 
invented answers anyway, because of the many cross references42. Each interviewer 
was only paid upon the completion of a number of schedules, so that I could have 
applied a heavy financial sanction if I had discovered fraud. Apart from some sloven-
liness with subordinate questions (such as: "What else do you grow?" following a 
series of questions about a number of specific crops) the interviewers did not do badly. 
Two of them were very good and could be trusted implicitly; the others needed en-
couragement to the end. 
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The anthropological stage 
After a preliminary analysis of some of the data collected during the survey, the 
investigation continued with anthropological methods. By this time I no longer be-
lieved that the settlers' unwillingness to adopt innovations was the greatest obstacle to 
agricultural development in the project. Some values, attitudes and expectations which 
influenced not only adoptions but all productive behaviour appeared to be much more 
important in this respect. I decided to concentrate first on a single small problem 
which obviously was related to these obstacles: the turnover of the settlers. The high 
turnover known to exist indicated that the project did not attain one of its main pur-
poses, that of inducing permanent settlement. Quite apart from the obvious fact that 
all eventual development programmes would be seriously impaired by this turnover, 
and that its causes should therefore be known, I believed that by studying the failures 
I would come to understand better the reasons for stagnation. The main results have 
been published elsewhere (Galjart, 1965a). 
As a result of this study on turnover, I came to see certain rather common values 
and behaviour patterns in agriculture and social relations as very important impedi-
ments to any development. This behaviour, the disposition to seek benefits from all 
formal, and some informal, relations, and the tendency to regard a family farm as a 
large holding in the bud seemed to prevent such apparently necessary developments as 
cooperatives and investments in depth and brought on other phenomena which in 
turn made these developments still less likely. To prove the existence and the harmful 
consequences of these values and attitudes, I afterwards concentrated on case histories 
and incidents; programmes which never came to anything; cooperatives which failed; 
the genesis of local physical improvements; political scheming (some still going on) 
and examples of cooperation. My main source of information at this stage was infor-
mal interviews with key informants, people who could be expected to know certain 
situations well or who had been active in specific historical events. I repeatedly visited 
a small number of farmers to inquire after current problems, results and developments. 
But I also tried to tap sources of relevant quantitative data, such as the documents on 
sales of farms kept by one of the public notaries in the municipality, and the atten-
dance register and minute books of cooperatives. 
In general, my informants were probably more innovative than a random sample 
of settlers would have allowed. But as hardly any of them have been interviewed for-
mally, a quantitative comparison with the respondents is impossible. My best infor-
mants belonged to groups with whom the extension officer was working; others had 
been key figures in a cooperative or a political alliance. Establishing rapport, moreover, 
was not seldom a question of mutual sympathy, and therefore conducive of bias in 
the selection of informants. Occasionally, when I found a man repulsive and he 
distrusted me, I tried in vain to establish a satisfactory relation. But although my 
informants may have been slightly more innovative and more thoughtful, I have no 
reason to think that the information they gave me, either about themselves or about 
others, was unreliable. 
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4 Farming in the project of Santa Cruz 
Introduction 
After putting the reader into the atmosphere of the place and describing the prob-
lems and methods of the study, we can now look at some salient features of agricul-
ture, animal husbandry, commerce and social relations in the land settlement. 
This chapter serves two purposes. It provides details of the circumstances in which 
the respondents work and live, necessary as a background against which the findings 
and assertions of later chapters have to be projected. It also contains illustrations 
of the existence and importance of some of the values and attitudes that will be exa-
mined in more detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
The crops 
A great variety of crops is grown in the project but they are not equally important. 
Many are grown in relatively minute quantities, or by only a handful of people. The 
1963 survey was confined to questions about those crops that seemed to be the most 
important, as to value of produce or number of growers, to wit: bananas, oranges, 
okra, gild, maize, cassava and pasture. The first two are perennial crops of long stan-
ding in the region; okra and gild are vegetables introduced fairly recently, which requi-
re some modern techniques of pest control and soil improvement; maize and cassava 
are traditional crops, sometimes planted primarily for home consumption, sometimes 
for cash. Part of the information on crops has been summarized in tables 4, 5 and 6. 
Table 4 shows that the two sections of the project differ in some ways. While oran-
ges and cassava are planted by more than two thirds of all respondents in both sec-
tions, bananas are more frequent on farms in Santa Cruz, okra and pasture more com-
mon in Piranema. Likewise 'other' perennial and annual crops than those explicitly 
mentioned in the schedule are found on relatively more farms in Piranema. 
More interesting than these general differences between the sections are the pro-
portions between crops within each section. If pastures are ignored for a moment, the 
tables show that cassava in Santa Cruz and oranges in Piranema are in various res-
pects more important than other crops. Both are planted by more farmers than other 
crops are; and both are planted, on the average, on more land than other crops. 
In both sections, the frequency order of the six crops is significantly associated with 
their mean area order (Kendall's T = 0.73, p < 0.03 in both sections). Why this is 
so is not very clear; the relation between the two variables is not easily recognized as 
36 
a cause and effect relation. It could be that both are associated in time, rather than 
that the one causes the other. The association indicates that, despite the great variety 
of crops from which a farmer can choose, some crops are popular, in that they are 
planted by many on sizable plots. 
One could argue that when many farmers grow a crop in relatively great quantities, 
that crop automatically becomes their most important cash crop, so that it is self-
evident that oranges in Piranema and cassava in Santa Cruz indeed are the most 
important cash crops. While the order of financial importance of the six crops is 
significantly associated with mean area and frequency order in Santa Cruz (T = 0.87, 
p < 0.01), in Piranema these associations are not significant. Maize and gil6 do not 
conform to the trend. Maize is planted by more than 60% of respondents on plots 
Table 4. Land-use in the land-settlement project of Santa Cruz (1963). 
Piranema Santa Cruz Entire project 
(AT = 137) (JV = 49) (N = 186) 
total No. of % of total No. of %of total No. of %of 
area farms farms area farms farms area farms farms 
(ha) (ha) (ha) 
Bananas 50.2 50 36 74 26 53 124.2 76 41 
Oranges 286.6 117 85 57.1 33 67 343.7 150 81 
Okra 150.6 88 64 15.2 13 26 165.8 101 54 
Gil6 29.2 37 27 9.5 9 18 38.7 46 25 
Maize 150.1 88 64 36.5 22 45 186.6 110 59 
Cassava 186.5 100 73 141.7 37 75 328.2 137 74 
Other peren-
nial crops1 - 55 40 - 18 36 - 73 39 
Other annual 
crops1 73 53 - 13 26 - 86 46 Pasture 703 83 60 148 17 34 851 100 54 
1 Only crops covering at least I ha per farm have been counted. 
Table 5. Areas (in ha) under various crops, per section? L 
Piranema Santa Cruz 
mean median range mean median range 
Bananas 1.00 0.5 8 - 0.1 3 I 26 - 0.1 
Oranges 2.47 2 20 - 0.1 1.73 1 13.5- 0.1 
Okra 1.81 1 12 - 0.1 1.16 1 3 - 0.1 
Gil6 0.81 0.5 3 - 0.1 1.19 1 2 - 0.1 
Maize 1.92 1 30 - 0.1 1.66 1.5 4 - 0.1 
Cassava 1.92 1.5 15 - 0.25 3.83 3 25 - 0.25 
Pasture 9.01 4.5 150 - 0.25 8.70 6 30 - 0.5 
1 Since the area of some fields was unknown, the mean has sometimes been computed from a slightly 
smaller number of observations than listed in the preceding table. 
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Table 6. Farm-operators' most important cash crops, in percentage of choices. 
Piranema (AT = 137) Santa Cruz (N = 49) Entire project (AT=186) 
first second first second first second 
Oranges 
Cassava 
Okra 
Bananas 
Coconuts 
Gil6 
Anguria 
Maize 
Pumpkins 
Rice 
Other perennial crops 
Other annual crops 
No answer1 
28 
11 
26 
4 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
15 
13 
13 
12 
3 
3 
11 
8 
1 
3 
4 
2 
6 
20 
12 
53 
2 
8 
6 
2 
0 
4 
0 
2 
0 
4 
6 
4 
20 
6 
14 
2 
4 
0 
10 
4 
0 
2 
0 
32 
24 
22 
20 
5 
5 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
12 
11 
15 
10 
6 
.3 
9 
6 
4 
3 
3 
2 
4 
23 
1 Includes those to whom the question did not apply, those for whom only one crop was important, 
and those who mentioned a collection of crops like 'vegetables' or 'citrus'. 
averaging almost two hectares but is unimportant financially; gjló is grown on a small 
area but is financially important. Although, at this stage, we do not know if the finan-
cial importance of a crop is simply thé result of the frequency and the mean area or 
not, we should well notice that the popular crops are cash crops and not, apparently, 
crops grown for home consumption. 
The three tables also show that one crop need not play the same role in the two 
sections. In Santa Cruz cassava is not planted much more frequently than in Piranema, 
but it is grown on plots which are, on the average, twice as large. Also, the percentage 
of respondents for whom the crop is financially important is three times as high in 
Santa Cruz. Cassava seems to be much more of a cash crop there. Much the same can 
be said of bananas. They are more often planted in Santa Cruz, plantations are three 
times as large as in Piranema, and bananas are an important cash crop for a percen-
tage of farm-operators three times as high. Oranges on the contrary seem to be more 
popular in Piranema. 
Why this should be so is not clear. Since the frequency with which these crops are 
planted is, except only for bananas in Piranema, fairly high, differences in soil qualities 
do not seem to be the primary cause, although recurrent losses from floods have led 
to the exclusion of bananas from many farms in Piranema (Corrêa, 1964). The prin-
cipal reason for the differences between the two sections probably Mes in the fact that 
they differ in access to the same market. 
There is a difference between farmers as well as between sections in the way in 
which certain crops are grown. While the majority of farm-operators grow various 
crops, others reserve a large part of their land for one crop. Most of these 'monocul-
turalists' are found among the orange-growers in both sections, and among the grow-
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ers of cassava and bananas in Santa Cruz, that is, among those who grow crops 
which are financially important and rather popular. 
The financial importance of the crops changed with time, as is apparent from table 
7. Although the data may not be very reliable43, the increase for oranges (13-6-3-2) 
is obvious, as is the decline for tomatoes (1-2-5-0), reportedly due to pests. Similar 
trends occurred for quantities alone: according to the reports the 1960 production of 
bananas was only a sixth of that in 1955, the production of tomatoes fell to a tenth. 
The increase in the production of oranges was very rapid: in 1958 twice as many were 
produced as in 1957, and in 1960 the production had again increased by almost 100 %. 
Between 1957 and 1960 okra production almost trebled. The estimates of production 
ofchickens and eggs seem particularly unrehable, notably in 1958: the number of eggs 
was said to have increased fiftyfold in five years, that of chickens twentyfold. But it is 
unlikely that these quantities are based on imagination only. There can be little doubt 
that the composition of agricultural production did change considerably in a short 
period. Table 8 shows that the number of farmers who planted particular crops also 
changed rapidly. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the increase in the production of crops that 
are obviously cash crops is a response to changes in price44, a response to opportuni-
Table 7. Order of the ten most important commodities according to the estimated total value of the 
production, section Piranema. 
Rank 1955 1957 1958 1960 
1 Tomatoes Okra Chickens1 Okra 
2 Cattle on the hoof Tomatoes Eggs Oranges 
3 Various vegetables Gil6 Oranges Eggs 
4 Milk Pork Okra Gil6 
5 Bananas Anguria Tomatoes Milk 
6 Okra Oranges Anguria Maize 
7 Beef Chickens1 Milk Chickens1 
8 Pork Red pepper Bananas Lemons 
9 Rice Sweet potatoes Cassava Anguria 
10 Cassava Eggs Pumpkins Cassava 
1 Including broilers 
Source: Administration's reports of 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1960. 
Table 8. Number of farms producing certain commodities in Piranema in 1958 and 1960. 
Bananas Oranges Okra Giló Maize Cassava Toma- Eggs Chickens Milk 
toes incl. 
broilers 
1958 115 248 165 73 120 115 55 91 110 46 
1960 95 426 315 138 517 400 8 112 123 57 
The total number of farms was the same in both years: 822. 
Source: Administration's reports of 1958 and I960. 
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ties for monetary gain.45 This is usually considered a modern phenomenon, an indi-
cation of progressiveness. But in Brazil it is behaviour'of long standing, intimately 
associated with traditional (in the sense of old) values in agriculture and land-use: 
agriculture as a means of acquiring rapid wealth46. 
Pastures and animal husbandry 
Table 4 shows that pastures cover much land: in Piranema about as much as the 
other six crops combined, in Santa Cruz about half as much. The mean areas per 
farm under pasture are large in both sections (table 5). In addition the difference be-
tween mean and median area under pasture indicates that the mean is raised by a 
number of farm-operators who have very large tracts of pasture: the 'big' owners are 
both 'bigger' and more numerous than is the case for any of the other crops. In both 
sections, 17% of the farm-operators who have pasture at all have more than 10 hec-
tares of it. This percentage is higher than for any other crop. Grassland, where it oc-
curs, often takes up more land than the other crops on the farm; it tends not to play 
a minor role as grazing for the odd dairy cow or a few oxen. 
That grasslands tend to be extensive is also apparent for farm-owners who possess 
more than one plot of ten hectares. After excluding farmers of Japanese descent (who 
do not go in for cattle), there is a significant relation in Piranema between the pos-
session of more than one 10-hectares plot and the presence of cattle on the farm. 
(X2 = 4.13; p <0.05). The Brazilian settlers in Piranema who own more than 10 
hectares more often have cattle than those with only one plot47. In Santa Cruz this 
relation is not significant (Fisher exact probability test; p — 0.17). The association 
between cattle and the ownership of more than 10 hectares of land expressed in 
Yule's Q is given in table 9. As the values for Q are very similar, the sections probably 
do not differ but the number of cases in Santa Cruz was too small to reach a signifi-
cant association. 
Again, it is not easy to distinguish cause and effect. Do farmers who own cattle 
tend to extend their herd and acquire more land, or do farmers who already have 
more than one plot take up cattle-raising more often than others, who possess only 
one plot? Judging from table 10, the former relation seems to prevail. The mean and 
median number of cattle held are quite high. Farms are overstocked, as only about 
a third of a hectare of pasture is available per head of cattle. Although some farmers 
Table 9. Association between kee\ ring cattle and ownership of more than 10 hectares of land. 
Yule's Q Significance 
(Fisher exact probability test) 
Piranema 0.53 /><0.05 
Santa Cruz 0.47 j»0.05 
Project 0.49 p<0.05 
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Table 10. Animal husbandry of respondents per section in December 1963. 
Number Number % of all Mean Median Maximum 
of of farms farms number of number of number of 
animals animals animals animals 
per farm per farm per farm 
Piranema (JV = 137) 
cattle 1,801 59 43 31 8 400 
pigs 973 82 60 12 3 450 
chickens 67,400 124 91 544 40 50,000 
Santa Cruz (N = 49) 
cattle 384 17 34 23 13 91 
pigs 99 20 41 5 4 16 
chickens 16,500 33 67 501 25 6,000 
buy concentrates or plant sugar-cane as fodder, more cattle are kept than the availa-
ble land really permits. Cattle-raisers might be expected to acquire more land to ac-
commodate the animals they already have, but if the ratio of pasture and cattle is 
computed for those settlers who own more than one plot, it appears that even they 
have less than 0.4 hectares of pasture per head of cattle. This means that almost every-
body who raises cattle overstocks and that, although the number of cattle held sti-
mulates the need for more land, there is never enough. 
Milk production was low; in December 1963, production ranged from 0 to 5.3 liters 
per day per cow; the mean yield was 2.5 liter. Even so, of those who had cattle, 55 % 
in Piranema and 71 % in Santa Cruz kept them, at least partly, for the production of 
milk for sale. 
I believe, therefore, that the relation between heads of cattle and acreage is almost 
fixed for the prevailing methods. Because of rapid inflation, the trend of prices to 
favour animal products and the greater independence from restive labourers, cattle 
raising had become more attractive, and the only way to make a living exclusively 
from this activity was by extending operations. 
Pigs were kept by many farm-operators, but mostly in small numbers. Only one re-
spondent raised them'on a large scale; he had 450. Not more than 20% of all raisers 
had more than 10 pigs. 
Poultry farming had similar characteristics. In Piranema almost all respondents 
and in Santa Cruz two thirds of them kept chickens, but most farm-operators had 
only a few. In both sections some settlers raised chickens on a large scale. 
Farming methods 
The 1963 survey provided some information on the occurrence of a number of 
modern agricultural implements and methods in the project of Santa Cruz. The find-
ings have been recorded in tables 11 and 12. 
41 
Table 11. Ownership of modern agricultural machines, in percentages of respondents1. 
Piranema (JV = 137) Santa Cruz (AT = 49) Entire project (AT = 186) 
Trucks or pickups 25 24 25 
Tractors 18 24 19 
Irrigation pumps 18 20 18 
Pesticide sprayers 43 63 48 
Sharecroppers and tenants were asked if the owner of the farm possessed one of the four machines. 
Such machines have been included in the table because it is conceivable that the owners would use 
them to render certain services to the respondents. However, one could argue that the table thus 
includes trucks owned by absentee landlords who use them for purposes quite different from carrying 
their tenant's products. If such trucks are excluded (4 in Piranema, 2 in Santa Cruz), the percen-
tages of those who owned trucks change from 25 and 24 to 23 and 20, respectively. 
Table 12. Percentages of respondents who used selected methods. 
Piranema Santa Cruz Entire project 
(N = 137) (N — 49) (JV= 186) 
Machine-plowed 65 75 68 
Plowed with draught animals 4 0 3 
Applied manure in 1963 44 45 44 
Applied manure in preceding years 54 53 54 
Applied fertilizer in 1963 12 20 15 
Applied fertilizer in preceding years 19 31 22 
Combated ants (once or more) 68 26 57 
Applied lime1 9 24 12 
Kept account of costs and returns 23 22 23 
Irrigated in 19632 9 21 12 
Purchased seed or seedlings in 1963 39 31 37 
Purchased seed or seedlings in preceding years 48 55 50 
Had soil examined 7 16 9 
Received credit from a bank in 1963 19 33 23 
Received credit from a bank in preceding years 38 33 37 
1 Generally the soils in the project are acid. Samples taken by Ir K. J. Beek on ten farms, wide apart, 
showed contents of exchangeable aluminium ranging from 0.40 m-equiv. to 7.93 m-equiv. Six of the 
soils were particularly high in aluminium. In Brazil, liming is generally recommended if this value is 
higher than 0.2 m-equiv. An earlier study (Mendes et al., 1954) of the soils in the municipality of 
Itaguaf recommended the correction of acidity for all soils in the section Piranema. 
2 TV was 89 in Piranema, 33 in Santa Cruz, 122 in the whole project. 
Quite remarkable is the number of trucks or pickups the respondents possessed, 
at least in comparison with the number of tractors and irrigation pumps. In the pro-
ject as a whole there are more trucks than tractors, and even more trucks than pumps. 
This disproportion illustrates how important a truck, that is the transport (and hence 
the control over commerce) of produce, is in the eyes of the settlers. Whereas the price 
of a tractor is about the same as that of a truck, a pump is of course much less expen-
sive. 
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Many farms in both sections border on canals or have other sources of sufficient 
water to irrigate some land. The necessity of irrigation has been officially recognized 
and in the fifties the Administration of the project even provided some settlers (80 
of them, according to a former official) with pumps. Yet in 1963, there were more trucks 
than pumps. 
Even those who had pumps did not all use them. In Piranema only a third of the 
pump-owners irrigated in 1963; in Santa Cruz 70 % did. This may have been due part-
ly to the dryness of the year so that many small canals would have dried up during 
the winter. Yet there were also farm-operators who had both pump and sufficient 
water and did not irrigate. 
In both sections of the project mechanical sprayers are more numerous than the 
other three types of machine, but in Santa Cruz sprayers are more common than in 
Piranema. In itself this is not so important: the question is, how much the sprayers 
are really used. This question was not put directly to the respondents, but a count of 
those who applied pesticides to oranges, okra or gil6 in 1963 showed that 73 % of the 
owners in Piranema and 51 % of those in Santa Cruz had actually used them. Since 
pesticides are also used for some other crops, the total percentages of users are pro-
bably higher. 
A considerable number of questions was included in the schedule on other modern 
practices in agriculture. Table 12 shows, for instance, that in 1963 two thirds (in Pi-
ranema) to three quarters (in Santa Cruz) of the respondents machine-plowed their 
land or had it machine-plowed for them. In Santa Cruz the percentage was higher 
because more farm-operators owned tractors and it was easier in this section to hire 
a tractor from the State Agricultural Service. Even so a quarter to a third of the re-
spondents had not plowed; a few, possibly, because they had mainly pastures and 
perennial crops (although all respondents declared that they had some arable land), 
but others, especially in Piranema, because they could not pay to hire a tractor. 
Plowing and harrowing by machine was indeed expensive: in 1962 it cost about 
800 Cruzeiros per hour, in 1963 some 1000 to 1200 Cruzeiros, and in 1965 it rose to 
4000 Cruzeiros48. A hectare was generally thought to take about ten tractor-hours. 
The government plow was cheaper: in 1965 a farmer had to pay 1800 Cruzeiros per 
hour plus petrol49. 
In spite of the high cost of hire, it was not easy to find someone to plow the land. 
The reason was that, when a tractor broke down, often no money was available for 
repair and spare parts. Not seldom a tractor stood for months. The same occurred, 
for that matter, with government tractors. 
It is all the more surprising, then, that so very few respondents plow with draught 
animals, especially because the land is flat and the soil not difficult to till, except when 
very dry. It is true that, if plowing is postponed, weeds may become an important 
obstacle because of their rapid growth. Nevertheless plowing with draught animals 
seems feasible, though it requires some foresight. In Piranema only a few farm-opera-
tors use animals; most of those who do not plow solely clear a corner of land with 
the hoe, or they do nothing at all. 
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When asked why they did not consider plowing with animals, farm-operators in 
Piranema gave contradictory answers: some said that it would be even more expensive 
than with a tractor, others said it simply could not be done because it was such hard 
work, others again confessed that they had been toying with the idea for some time, 
wondering if having a couple of mules might not be more convenient than hiring a 
tractor each time. 
Nevertheless in the project as a whole, machine-plowing was the most frequently 
adopted practice. But it should be remembered that the Administration had for many 
years rented tractors to the settlers, thus making adoption rather easy. Of the other 
practices listed in table 12, only the older ones, introduced in the distant past, had 
been adopted by more than half the farm-operators. At some time or other, many 
had applied manure, had done something against the ants, and had bought seed or 
seedlings50. More recent innovations have so far been adopted by only a minority. 
While some of the practices, such as manure and bookkeeping, and perhaps purchase 
of seed or seedlings and credit, were equally frequent in both sections, others were 
found more often in one of the two. It is true that seed purchase and credit differed 
between sections in 1963, but in preceding years the difference was reversed. The use 
of chemical fertilizers, the application of lime, irrigation and soil examination were 
more widespread in Santa Cruz. Only in ant control did Santa Cruz lag behind Pira-
nema. One reason for this curious lag was that ants seemed less common in Santa 
Cruz: while in Piranema only 6% of the respondents declared that they had no ants 
on their land, in the other section 14 % said they had none. On the whole, farm-opera-
tors in Santa Cruz seem slightly more modern than their colleagues in Piranema. 
The table is further interesting for the examples it provides of interruptions in the 
use of certain methods51. In the three practices under review, the use of manure, the 
purchase of seed or seedlings and the application of chemical fertilizer, 20 to 30% 
of former adoptions were discontinued. Even higher percentages (25 to 40%) of 
discontinuances appeared to occur in the application of pesticides to orange-trees 
(table 13). The reasons for such discontinuances are not always the same. The use of 
manure was interrupted mainly for financial reasons. One farmer explained that he 
did not use manure any more because he had sold his cattle. Another explained his 
recent adoption of manure: "Agora e" que tenho aves", "Well, I bought some chick-
ens". Two farmers did not use manure themselves but sold it to others. 
Table 13. Application of pesticides to various crops. 
Piranema Santa Cruz 
Entire 
project 
% N N 7. N 
Orange-growers who sprayed in 1963 
Orange-growers who sprayed in preceding year 
Okra-growers who sprayed in 1963 
Gilo-growers who sprayed in 1963 
30 
40 
38 
67 
115 
115 
86 
36 
31 
54 
54 
55 
26 
26 
13 
9 
30 
43 
40 
64 
141 
141 
99 
45 
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The inclusion of the seedlings in the question on the purchase of seeds probably 
caused some irregularity in the number of adopters over the years. However, I do 
not doubt that discontinuances did occur. There was a strong tendency to produce 
one's own seed. Only a minority of those who grew maize, grew a hybrid variety (14 %) 
in spite of a campaign undertaken in the fifties to promote hybrid maize. In fact, some 
complaints about a good first year but a very disappointing second year make one 
suspect that a number of settlers continued to produce their own seed. 
Only a few farm-operators had received detailed advice on the quantity and the 
kind of chemical fertilizers that should be applied. Of those respondents who had 
their soil examined (which is done free of charge by some government and educational 
institutions), at least five declared that they had never seen the results. Some others 
did get the results: a piece of paper with incomprehensible numbers and symbols. 
The small soil survey which Ir Beek kindly did for me showed that even the one Japanese 
farmer included, who diligently used chemical fertilizers, had applied far too much 
phosphate over the years. Because of this kind of ignorance52 and because other mis-
fortunes, such as droughts and pests, can still cause disappointing yields, the use of 
fertilizers is an expensive and somewhat hazardous investment, the returns on which 
can never be taken for granted. 
For very similar reasons many farm-operators in the project had stopped spraying 
their orange-trees with pesticides. The most common pest is a mould called fumagina, 
from which in the dry season as much as half the plantations may suffer to some 
degree. Some respondents said that pesticides did not work; the responsible insects 
just bode their time in the grass under the tree and climbed back when the danger was 
past. Others said that the pesticides did work but that spraying had to be continuous 
and so was expensive and boring. A few said it did not pay to spray, just as it did 
not pay, sometimes, to pick the fruit. If it rained enough in summer the pest vanished 
anyway. The extension officer of ACAR-RJ believed that many farmers were unwil-
ling to spray the few, isolated trees in which the insects survived or in which they 
first made their appearance. And in some years, he thought, orange prices did not 
make good the cost of spraying. However, not-spraying was already defended on 
technical grounds. According to some farmers, the best way to keep fumagina down 
was to allow the grass between the trees to grow quite high and cut it only once a year. 
This, it was rumoured, had been recommended by the University; anyway, farmer X, 
who was rich enough to defray the cost of spraying, if he wanted to spray, also fol-
lowed this practice. Table 13 also indicates that in 1963 the vegetables okra and gil6 
were sprayed on more farms than orange-trees were. That could mean that two relati-
vely 'new' crops are cultivated in a way more modern than an 'older' crop. In other 
words, it could be that suitable treatment is adopted with the crop itself. However, 
the farmer who does not apply pesticides to okra or gil6 incurs a greater risk of 
losing part of the crop than the farmer who does not spray his oranges. 
Table 14, in which the spraying behaviour of those respondents who grew oranges 
as well as one or both vegetables is analysed, shows that twice as many respondents 
sprayed only vegetables as only orange-trees. Yet the assumption of no difference 
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Table 14. Spraying behaviour of farm-operators who grew oranges as well as okra and/or gild, in per-
centages 
Piranema Santa Cruz Entire project 
(iV=76) (N —13) (iV=89) 
Did not spray at all 53 31 49 
Sprayed both oranges and veg etables 16 8 14 
Sprayed only oranges 8 23 10 
Sprayed only vegetables 17 38 20 
Sprayed only one vegetable, grew all three crops 4 0 3 
Sprayed oranges and one veget able, grew all three 
crops 3 0 2 
between spraying only oranges, only vegetables, or both oranges and vegetables 
cannot be rejected (chi-square one sample test; x 2 = 4.8; /> <0.1). It is possible that, 
other things being equal, vegetables are more often sprayed than oranges are. But 
other things are not always equal. It is well imaginable that other variables, such as 
the financial importance of the crop to the farm-operator, also play a role, in the 
sense that those who hope to derive a good part of their income from a crop will be 
more inclined to spray it. Indeed in 1963 significantly more farm-operators who de-
clared that oranges, okra or gil6 were of importance to them, financially, did apply 
pesticides to the crop, than farm-operators who did not declare so5 3. 
Table 14 clearly shows that an innovation, here spraying with pesticides, can be 
adopted selectively. One crop is sprayed, but not another. One sort of crop is given 
manure or chemical fertilizer, but another not84. One category of animals is vaccinated, 
but another not. For instance, of the 117 farm-operators in the sample who kept 
more than one species of animals (cattle, pigs and poultry), 8 % vaccinated all species, 
33 % vaccinated some species but not others, and the remaining 58 % did not vaccinate 
at all. 
Stated in another way: of those respondents who ever adopted the practice of 
vaccination, including the 18 farm-operators who had only one species of animals 
and vaccinated, at least 58 % selectively adopted this practice. The local extension 
officer, when I told him about my suspicion that vaccination was selectively adopted, 
supposed that chickens would be vaccinated more often than other animals, because 
a disease in the pen could wipe out the entire flock in a matter of days. But among the 
39 farm-operators who had selectively adopted vaccination, cattle were most often 
vaccinated (23 cases out of 30), than chickens (17 cases out of 39) and pigs least often 
(6 cases out of 27). The farm-operators' subjective estimate of the economic impor-
tance of the animals seems to be more important for the decision to vaccinate than the 
diseases which threaten them. Thus one farmer can decide to vaccinate his 600 chic-
kens, but not his 3 cows or his 20 pigs. Another vaccinates his 4 cows and 4 pigs but 
not bis 50 chickens. In most cases it seems that the animals that bring the farmer the 
greatest monetary returns have been singled out for vaccination rather than others. 
Table 15 brings some proof of this assertion. It is a cross-tabulation of the animal spe-
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Table 15. Instances of vaccination and destination of animals. 
Destination of animals Total 
market market home 
and home consumption 
consumption 
Cases in which species was vaccinated 
Cases in which species was not vaccinated 
27 
6 
4 
9 
15 
32 
46 
47 
Total 33 13 47 93 
ties kept by the 39 respondents who had selectively adopted vaccination, according 
to the purpose for which the animals were kept and to whether the animals were 
vaccinated. The relation between vaccination and production for the market is 
highly significant (x 2 = 21.3;/» <0.001). 
However, I do not think that the farm-operator who does not vaccinate a certain 
species of animals always takes a rational decision. Rather, it does not seem worth 
the trouble, for a few animals, to go out of his way to obtain the vaccine. Like one 
informant said: "When the vet calls to vaccinate the cows, and he has got chicken 
vaccine with him, we vaccinate the chickens. If he does not have it, we do not vaccinate 
them". This respondent did not know what diseases his cows had been vaccinated 
against. The impression is that, if one were to offer to vaccinate all animals, free of 
charge and on the farm, practically no respondent would decline. 
In 1952 some 150 settlers were given dairy cows on the occasion of a new land-use 
scheme, the Piano Granjeiro. In a report the supervising technicians state that on every 
farm they visited they found that the settler gave the cows concentrates, bought in a 
shop, though often in deficient quantities. Again it seems that, when the stakes are 
high (settlers who obviously maltreated their animals ran the risk of having to surren-
der them again), innovations are adopted at Hghtning speed. 
The conclusion seems justified that many adoptions are discontinued or interrupted, 
and that innovations applicable to various crops or animal species are often adopted 
selectively. There are strong indications that the financial importance of the crops 
or the animals and perhaps also the amount of risk incurred by not adopting the 
innovation influence the selection. Real expenses rather than opportunity costs (in 
the sense of forgone benefits) seem to determine the outcome of the consideration 
whether to adopt or not. An exception to this tendency may be the ready adoption 
of a 'new', profitable, crop. 
The ease with which innovations are adopted and dropped again, and the ease with 
which one crop is substituted for another suggest that the settlers have little trouble ac-
cepting change. If this acceptance is an indication of modernity, they are modern. 
There seems to be little mental resistance to technological innovations. Still, it can 
hardly be said that agriculture was highly developed in the project. Summing up, 
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I believe that the backwardness of agriculture in Santa Cruz, despite the easy accep-
tance of change, supports the earlier assertion that modernity consists of the inter-
nalization of other values and norms than just the readiness to accept new farming 
methods. 
Land tenure 
The respondents in the project of Santa Cruz did not all own the land they farmed 
but most of them did. Although legally these owners belonged to several categories65, 
in practice they could all be regarded as owners. 
Besides owners some squatters, tenants and sharecroppers were interviewed. 
Squatters were farm-operators who, without concession from the Administration, 
had settled on an otherwise abandoned farm and had begun to cultivate the fields. 
Most squatters were on land still subject to legal squabbles between the former 
owner and the State. Six squatters were included in the sample. 
Nine respondents were tenants (i.e. they had rented a farm or part of it from the 
owner for a fixed sum)68. Rent contracts were usually in writing and valid for a num-
ber of years. If only a small part of a farm was involved, oral contracts also existed 
(mostly for pastures, which otherwise would remain unused). 
Another category of farm-operator was the sharecropper. He often farmed only 
part of a 10 hectare plot. Although some variation did occur, most contracts stipula-
ted that the owner plows and harrows the fields, and provides the seed. The share-
cropper plants, weeds and harvests, after which the produce is divided equally. Ma-
nure, chemical fertilizer and pesticides were covered by various arrangements, inclu-
ding no arrangement at all. Usually sharecroppers were given free lodging on the 
owner's farm, on the understanding that they would occupy themselves exclusively 
with their fields and in slack periods would be willing to work for a wage on that 
farm. The 18 sharecroppers who were interviewed took care of an entire farm in the 
absence of the owner. In their case the owner not seldom reserved the proceeds of the 
orange plantation or of animal production for himself, leaving the sharecropper with 
most of the proceeds of any annual crops he cared to grow. 
The institution of sharecropping serves several functions. Traditionally, it served 
to keep labour which was needed in certain periods of the year tied to the farm for at 
least one entire year (Prado, 1960, p. 215). This function possibly explains why 11 of 
the 12 Japanese farm-operators who were interviewed in Piranema employed share-
croppers, whereas none of their seven compatriots interviewed in Santa Cruz did. 
But the latter employed more wage workers than the former. It could well be that 
the Japanese settlers in Santa Cruz did not need sharecroppers because they could 
easily find labourers in the nearby suburb of Rio de Janeiro, whereas the farmers in 
Piranema, who did not live near an urban concentration, resorted to sharecropping 
to secure labour. The Brazilian respondents in the two sections differed less in this 
respect, but in the same direction: sharecroppers were more frequent in Piranema, 
wage earners in Santa Cruz. 
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Not only the proximity of a population centre57, but also the kind of crops grown 
influenced the need for labour. The okra-growing Japanese farm-operators in Pira-
nema needed more labourers and for a longer period than their cassava-growing com-
patriots in Santa Cruz. Also, vegetables require more care than cassava, so it is under-
standable that in Piranema they preferred to give their labourers a stake in the pro-
duction (i.e. preferred to employ sharecroppers instead of wage earners). 
As well as retaining labour on the farm, sharecr opping allows a farmer to cultivate his 
land without paying out any cash for wages. While the opportunity costs of sharecrop-
ping may be high68, cash outlays can be kept to a minimum. Therefore some costs 
(e.g. manure, fertilizers and pesticides) are often not explicitly covered by the agree-
ment between owner and sharecropper. One informant explained that he preferred 
to be sharecropper with a Japanese farmer, who always kept a stock of fertilizer and 
pesticides. All he had to do was go to the shack where these things were stored and 
take what he needed. Half of these costs were later duly discounted from the share-
cropper's part of the harvest, but the main point was that everything was available. 
A Brazilian farm-owner, even if willing to pay the cost of manure, pesticides and the 
like, had to be asked time and again to buy it, hardly ever bought enough, and never 
had a stock when it was needed. The interview schedules of the sharecroppers showed 
that the decision to use manure, fertilizers or pesticides was taken somewhat more 
often by the sharecropper than by the owner, but that the owner paid for the pur-
chases as often as did the scharecropper. 
In other words, the one who could pay did not particularly Want to use these re-
sources, and had to be convinced of the necessity by the one who could not pay for 
them. The Japanese farm-operators made sure their sharecroppers used manure, fer-
tilizers and pesticides but advanced the sharecroppers' half of the costs. This form of 
sharecropping, with the owner residing on the farm, is widespread only among the 
Japanese settlers in Piranema. If those respondents are excluded who were themselves 
sharecroppers, about 10% of the remaining Brazilian respondents had sharecroppers 
on their farms in December 1963. 
Many more farm-operators employed wage earners at that time: 58 % of the Japa-
nese settlers and 41 % of all other respondents. These wage earners could be perma-
nent or temporary. Permanent workers often lived on the farm where they worked 
and received monthly wages; temporary workers mostly lived elsewhere and were 
paid daily. Wage labour, unlike sharecropping, appeared to be most frequent on 
farms run by the owner himself. Sometimes, however, absentee owners left their 
farm in the charge of a salaried worker. This occurred most often on farms under a 
perennial crop (coconuts, for instance) or used for milk production. To keep the wages 
and hence the monetary costs low, such a worker was sometimes allowed to plant 
some food crops for his own consumption. 
Since a few years the pattern of land tenure in the project has been changing through 
farm amalgamations. There are settlers who have acquired a second, a third, and 
even a fourth 10 hectare plot. One settler has even bought nine farms! But more 
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important has been the intrusion by outsiders, who have set themselves up as big 
landowners. As yet they are few. One already owned a fazenda outside the project 
before he started buying land in the section Piranema. He raises cattle of the Nelore 
race for sale as breeding stock. According to some, he has the best Nelore herd in 
Brazil; he uses very modern techniques and invests considerable sums of money in the 
improvement of his farms. He has bought about 18 farms in the north-eastern corner 
of Piranema, though not all in his own name. He keeps aloof from the settlers, who 
have heard of him but do not know him. A second landowner, operating in the same 
part of the project, over the years has reputedly acquired some 30 farms59. He too 
raises cattle, but in the traditional manner without much investment, although he 
knows what his colleague is doing and thinks of imitating him on some points. This 
man, too, does not have any influence in the project. He may help some neighbours 
and approach others with offers to buy their land, but that is all. One informant sug-
gested sarcastically that he may have set a style: a number of small settlers nearby 
had begun to keep cattle too, as though they hoped to become big landowners that 
way. 
A third landowner, more industrialist than farmer, has already bought seven or 
eight farms. His main activity is breeding chickens, which he does as a member of a 
three-men firm. The firm has 50,000 hens. The sale of chickens is well organized; 
eggs go to the Cotia Cooperative, of which the man was one of the very few local 
Brazilian members. He takes more interest in what happens in the project, and in 
return is considered by the colonists as somebody who belongs. By some respondents 
he was mentioned as a good farmer or as adviser, unlike the other two. 
The traditional process of concentration of land into the hands of a few owners 
seems to have started. It is already advanced in the north-eastern corner of the pro-
ject, where the farms are more often flooded than elsewhere, and where communica-
tions are poorest. On such lands, large scale cattle raising was less hazardous than 
small scale farming, especially when, as in the recent past, the prices of milk and meat 
were remunerative and fairly stable. Since the first two landowners also own land 
outside the boundaries of the project but ^contiguous fwith their farms inside, it can 
be said that in this corner of Piranema the project has already started disintegrating. 
In other areas of Piranema the concentration occurs solely within the boundaries of 
the project. 
Curiously enough, in the section Santa Cruz the concentration of landed property 
is less pronounced. I did not come across, or hear of, any big landowners like those 
in Piranema. The interview schedules also show a difference: in Santa Cruz the pro-
portion of owners who possessed more than one 10-hectare farm, 27 %, was slightly 
higher than in Piranema, 22 %. But, the owners of more than one farm owned on 
average 2.2 farms in Santa Cruz, 2.8 farms in Piranema. To exclude the possible in-
fluence of a few big owners, the owners of more than one farm were classified in a 
2 x 2 teble,?distmguishing between those who owned two farms|and those who owned 
more than two farms, in each of the two sections. Fisher's exact probability test with 
the Tocher modification60 was computed which [showed that the observed difference 
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between the sections is probably significant (p = 0.075) That is: settlers who buy 
more land are liable to buy more of it in Piranema than in Santa Cruz. 
Why this difference exists is not immediately clear. The section Santa Cruz was 
emancipated long ago, and the legal restrictions on the sale of farms consequently 
have been even less important there than in Piranema. Moreover, the difference be-
tween the sections is entirely due to the Brazilian settlers, not to the Japanese. A 
Fisher exact probability test on only the Brazilian owners of 2 and of more than 2 
farms in the two sections shows a significant difference (p < 0.05). Probably the 
explanation of this difference in the concentration of landed property between Santa 
Cruz and Piranema must be sought in the occurrence of badly drained, rather inac-
cessible, and hence cheap lands in Piranema. Even if cattle raising is traditionally 
extensive, and therefore encourages the acquisition of more land to accommodate 
existing herds in both sections, the possibility of buying land cheaply is greater in Pirane-
ma. In Santa Cruz land is generally better drained and more accessible and conse-
quently also suited to other uses than grazing. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that most of the really large farms in the project are situated in the north-western 
corner of Piranema, where the problems of drainage and access have received least 
attention. 
Marketing 
Farm-operators in Piranema are almost unanimous in saying that the middlemen 
who buy their products are only interested if they can make at least 100 % commission 
on the deal. In Santa Cruz a more modest figure of 50% is sometimes mentioned as 
the lowest limit a merchant will accept. For several reasons it is rather difficult to 
substantiate such statements. Apart from similarly indignant remarks, the literature 
contains few clues. Price fluctuations are often so rapid, that a specific lot of a cer-
tain product would have to be traced from the farm to the consumer to estimate the 
profit made by the various merchants. In addition, little is known about the true cost 
of transport. It could well be high, considering the high price and the short life of 
trucks. Finally, it is often hardly possible to speak of one market or one market price 
for certain commodities. What do exist are monopsonies, or oligopsonies. 
Price fluctuations can be both rapid and extreme. Sergio, whom we met in chapter 
1, received 150 Cruzeiros per kg for his first cabbages in June 1965, but within a few 
days the price started to fall, and at the end of the month was down to about 70 
Cruzeiros. Another informant sold his first oranges in 1965 for 2000 Cruzeiros and 
even more per case but a month later the price fluctuated between 500 and 700 Cru-
zeiros. Yet, simultaneously in another corner of the project, where the rains had made 
the road impassable for trucks, the farmers let their oranges rot on the trees, because 
the price offered, 300 Cruzeiros per case, was considered unremunerative. This price 
was indeed low; two years before, when the Cruzeiro had been worth three times as 
much, oranges already sold for 300 Cruzeiros per case. 
Wholesale and retail prices are considerably higher than farm prices. In July 1965, 
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fruit and vegetables on one of the weekly markets in Rio de Janeiro were about four 
times as dear as the price then offered by middlemen in the project. According to 
Chacel (1963, p. 4), the discrepancy in Brazil between farm and wholesale prices for all 
agricultural commodities produced for the internal market has tended to increase sin-
ce 1955. That is, the margin for transport, processing and commerce has widened. 
In view of the general improvement in communications, this is strange. Chacel ascri-
bes it to speculation by merchants in the periods between harvests. 
Although no precise quantitative data on the economics of commerce were available, 
the profits from transport and commerce could undoubtedly be considerable. One 
middleman, owner of 90 hectares in the project of Santa Cruz, said in his innocent way 
that he earned more with his two trucks than with his farming. 
Middlemen are of several categories, and work in different ways. Some live outside 
the project and visit the farms regularly. Others are settlers. Some middlemen buy 
produce offered to them on the spot; the purchase is by cash and irrevocable. Others 
offer to transport the produce to the wholesale market in Rio and sell it there at pre-
vailing prices. Which form of commerce prevails mostly depends on the amount of 
cash the middleman has and on the risk he cares to run. If he pays on the spot, he has 
to dispose of the produce at his own risk. If he only undertakes to transport the 
produce to the market, for a fee, he cannot lose, but may gain less. Even though he 
often claims that the price, after all, turned out to be a little lower than the farmer and 
he expected, the farmer generally profits more this way than by selling for cash on the 
spot. But the farmer may have some trouble collecting his money; sometimes a month 
passes before he is paid. Immediate cash is important to most farmers. 
Some middlemen living in the project also provide credit to the farm-operators. 
While bank credit is only forthcoming a fortnight or month after it has been requested, 
and obtaining it is fraught with considerable bureaucratic snares61, a middleman, 
if he is at all willing to give credit, will give it immediately. Normally the debtor is 
expected to repay with his produce. Theoretically he could sell to his creditor only 
enough to pay off the debt; in practice, however, he usually sells most or all of his 
produce to him. The middleman then over a period withholds payment on the sum 
that had been lent. The function of this form of credit clearly is to bind the farm-
operators to the creditor. The latter in this way creates his own market, a monopso-
ny62. He does not cheat his suppliers outrageously, but a little bit. As an official of 
the project explained, when the price is, say, 2000 on the market in Rio, the mid-
dleman will not tell the settler that it was 1000; he will say that it was 1700 or 1800. 
Otherwise the settler would refuse to sell him anymore. But when he is not cheated 
too brazenly, the settler will think of next year's credit, and stay with the same middle-
man. The middleman quoted earlier saw it as a point in his favour that he "per-
mitted his debtors to sell to others also". 
Although it would seem of great importance for sellers of agricultural produce to 
avoid the middleman, table 16 shows that the majority of farm-operators in the 
project of Santa Cruz are not able to avoid him entirely63. Theoretically there are 
four ways in which a farmer could try to control the sale of his products. He could 
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Table 16. Outlets for farm produce, in percentages of farm-operators resorting to each outlet. 
Piranema 
N — 132 
Santa Cruz 
AT = 47 
Entire project 
N = 179 
Middlemen 
Retail market (feira) 
Wholesale market (mercado) 
69 
23 
22 
6 
20 
2 
72 
19 
17 
8 
15 
6 
70 
22 
21 
7 
18 
3 
Cooperatives 
Consumers 
Other outlets 
Total 142 137 141 
bring his produce to one of the weekly markets (feiras) in and around Rio de Janeiro. 
About 20% of the respondents did this. Surprisingly the percentage was higher in 
Piranema than in Santa Cruz, in spite of informants' assertions that many settlers 
in Santa Cruz were 'feiristas'. This unexpedted result was partly due to the respondents 
living in one small area of the project called Gamba, which geographically belongs to 
the section Santa Cruz, lying as it does to the south of the Sao Francisco River, but 
politically is in the State of Rio de Janeiro, and hence in the section Piranema. In this 
area, five of the seven respondents were feiristas. One of them - and there is no reason 
to suppose him an exception - had wrangled a licence from the State of Guanabara 
to sell on the weekly markets in that State, though he was not a citizen. Another 
informant in Gamba, who was not included in the sample, confessed that he did 
not have such a licence but went anyway, hoping for the best. Excluding these people 
the percentage of feiristas in Piranema decreases to 20M. 
Selling agricultural commodites in a retail market is time-consuming and often 
rather risky. The quantities one can expect to sell in half a day are small; moreover, 
vegetables that are not sold must often be thrown away, unless one goes again the 
next day. In the Gamba area some farmers indeed went three or four times a week to 
a feira. In these circumstances marketing becomes a full-time job, that cannot be 
reconciled with farming. The settlers in Santa Cruz (inhabitants of the State of Guana-
bara) have access to more weekly markets than their Piranema colleagues and it is 
easier for them to go often. Again in Gamba, there were farmers who did not go 
themselves to a feira but sold some of their produce to settlers who went. Such a sale 
was not really covered by the schedule which distinguished between 'selling to mer-
chants calling at the farm' and 'taking to a feira'. The idea had been to estimate the 
degree of control of the farmer over the marketing of his produce; it is clear that even 
the inclusion of a further possibility: 'selling to settlers who take the produce to a 
feira', would not have made this control explicit. It depends upon the personal rela-
tion between the farmer and the feirista, whether the feirista charges the farmer for 
transport only or will appropriate a percentage of the sales. In all observed cases the 
relation between the settler and the feirista appeared to be a friendly one. 
A second possibility of contiolling the commerce of one's production is to sell it 
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oneself in wholesale quantities, which means taking it to the wholesale market (mer-
cado) in Rio. But this needs a truck. Buying one is beyond the means of most farm-
operators; in theory renting one would be easier. There certainly were a few farm-
operators who used the truck of a brother or friend to take their produce to the mer-
cado. To hire a truck from a stranger is too expensive for many, and such truck-
owners soon find out that there is more money to be made as middlemen. This possibi-
lity then is limited. It is therefore understandable that so many colonists have acqui-
red a truck: to escape the restricted markets and low prices that go with the middle-
men. Some, but not all, of these settlers who owned trucks could not resist the temp-
tation of making a fast Cruzeiro and have become middlemen. For that matter, the 
phenomenon that the landowner, or the big farmer, also engages in the commerciali-
zation of agricultural commodities is common in Brazil65. But not all the 40 respon-
dents who owned trucks took their produce to the wholesale market: only 35% of 
them did, against 15% of all other respondents. (This difference is statistically signi-
ficant: x 2 = 6.08, p < 0.02). Since a truckowner can of course also sell on the weekly 
retail markets, or directly to consumers, the truck-owners were also compared with 
all other respondents for the numbers of those who said that they sold exclusively to 
middlemen calling at the farm: 13% of the truck-owners, against 49% of all other 
farm-operators, depended entirely on middlemen for the. sale of their produce, a 
difference which proved to be highly significant (x z = 15.24; p <0.001) 6 8. 
The possession of a truck undeniably increases the number and variety of outlets 
for the farm-operators in the project87. 
A third possibility of controlling commerce is the cooperative sale of produce. A 
later chapter will deal with cooperatives and cooperation in more detail; here let it 
alone be said that at least three attempts to organize cooperatives in the project have 
failed. At the time of my investigation only a local branch of the large, originally 
Japanese cooperative of Cotia existed, whose headquarters are in Sao Paulo. With 
only two exceptions, the members of the Itaguai branch were all Japanese. In Pira-
nema, most Brazilian settlers no longer belonged to a cooperative. For a number of 
reasons even the Japanese sold only a small part of their produce to the local Cotia 
branch. For one thing, many of them owned trucks and sold their vegetables on the 
wholesale market. For another, the Cooperative required that the produce it recei-
ved be graded. The Brazilian farmers, and not a few of the Japanese, found this 
too troublesome. They were used to picking big and small vegetables without dis-
tinction; to sort them out afterwards was too much work. Okra, producing three 
pickings a week for six months or longer, makes for laborious sorting. 
A final possibility of control is to sell directly to consumers or users. A surprising 
high number of farm-operators did so incidentally or often68. Milk, for instance, was 
often retailed by farmers. Sometimes its sale was organized more or less cooperatively. 
Many farmers spoke of 'um rapaz', a guy who took their milk and that of others to 
the factory or to retailers in Itaguai and Santa Cruz (the suburb) for a fixed fee. Milk 
was one of the few products not subject to the intervention of middlemen; the farmers 
knew to the Cruzeiro what they should receive for a liter. 
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I expected to find that the farm-operators in Santa Cruz, where agriculture in 
general seemed slightly more developed, depended less on middlemen than their col-
leagues in Piranema, but most evidence is contrary. Even though the differences from 
Piranema are not great, more respondents in Santa Cruz sell only or partly to middle-
men, while less sell on the weekly markets, on the wholesale market, or direct to 
consumers. Several circumstances (i.e. easier access to the feiras in Guanabara, near-
ness to a population center, and readier credit) make it easier for the Santa Cruz 
settlers to avoid the middleman. The survey results can only be explained if it is 
assumed that the farm-operators in Santa Cruz have less need to avoid middlemen. 
This implies that the middleman cannot exploit farmers there as much as he does in 
Piranema. 
Relations with other farm-operators 
The questionnaire included a number of questions about some professional and 
non-professional relationships of the respondents with their colleagues. Which farm 
did you visit during the past year to see how the other settler had done things? Which 
of the other settlers do you usually talk to? Do you have intimate friends among other 
settlers? If so, who are they? Do you ask advice from other settlers when you face 
a problem on your farm? From whom? Which other settlers have come to you for 
advice? Who are good farmers in the neighbourhood? Whom would you ask for a 
temporary loan of 30,000 Cruzeiros (at the time, about US$25), if you needed this 
sum? 
In table 17 and in the text these relationships are henceforth called visited farmers, 
conversers, friends, advisers, advice-seekers, good farmers and money-lenders. 
Since the respondents constituted a sample of the total population, it was not pos-
sible to locate the opinion leaders, or to record the various relationships in sociograms. 
The aim was, rather, to investigate how certain relationships had been established in a 
locality where most people had been initially complete strangers and also to what 
extent these relationships overlapped. Were friends and conversers also the people the 
respondents turned to for advice, or did they seek advice from others, for instance 
the good farmers in the neighbourhood? 
In table 17 the relations have been cross-tabulated in the following manner. If a 
respondent mentioned one and the same farmer as his friend, his adviser and his 
money-lender, his relation with this man has been counted six times, twice as friend 
(under adviser and money-lender), twice as adviser (under friend and money-lender) and 
twice as money-lender (under friend and adviser). If it could be ascertained that the 
person mentioned was also a neighbour or kin, the relation was counted once more 
under neighbours or family-members. Neighbours were taken as settlers living in the 
two farms to the left or right of the respondent's farm, on his side of the road, or in 
the three farms nearest the respondent's farm on the opposite side of the road. Per-
sons who were mentioned only once and who could not be identified as neighbours 
or kin, were counted in the row 'other persons'. Finally the numbers in each row 
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were converted to percentages of the total number of choices, mentioned in the penul-
timate row. 
Table 17 shows once more that the two sections of the project differ from each 
other. In Piranema, neighbours form a higher proportion of all professional and 
non-professional relations than in Santa Cruz. The same holds true for kin. Also, 
the percentage of respondents who said they would seek advice or a loan from an 
official institution was much higher in Santa Cruz than in Piranema. If the evidence 
presented earlier on the difference between the sections is taken to mean that the San-
ta Cruz section is more modern, the table indicates that 'more modern', in terms of 
relationships, means that neighbourship and kinship become less important and that 
more use is made of the services of official institutions. But this can also be due to the 
better functioning of these institutions in Santa Cruz. Chapter 5 will return to this 
question. 
If the various relationships are considered separately, the importance of neighbours 
for all relationships in Piranema and most relationships in Santa Cruz is striking. 
Not surprisingly, neighbours are most frequent among conversers and friends. The 
table shows that the professional relationships differ only in degree from the non-
professional. Advice and visits are often exchanged with neighbours, conversers and 
friends. Some farm-operators, in fact as many as 30 % in Piranema and 20 % in Santa 
Cruz, said that they did not go to anybody in particular for advice. This seems to 
indicate that asking advice did not, to them, imply a specific relationship with someone 
else. And indeed, the percentage of good farmers, contrary to what one would expect, 
is hardly higher among the visited farmers and advisers than among friends and con-
versers in Piranema and not higher at all in Santa Cruz. Yet a considerable number of 
respondents said that they would go to the extension service or to the Administration 
of the project for advice. It appears then that asking advice can mean going to some-
body specially capable of giving it as well as to friends or acquaintances. Inversely, 
the relationship between the respondents and the farm-operators who asked them 
for advice holds the same ambiguity: whereas most of these advice-seekers were 
informal acquaintances and neighbours, one third were 'other persons', with whom 
no other relation was recorded. 
Van den Ban (1963, p. 183) reconciles these rather conflicting tendencies by sup-
posing that farmers who consciously seek advice will go to somebody specially capable 
of giving it, and hence having a higher adoption score, and that the advice handed out 
among neighbours and friends is of an incidental nature. My data allow some further 
remarks on this point. 
Of those respondents who declared that they were asked for advice, the mean adop-
tion score was higher than that of all respondents together. This remained true after 
excluding the Japanese farm-operators, most of whom had high scores. This differ-
ence between non-Japanese self-designated advisers and other non-Japanese res-
pondents was highly significant statistically (Mann Whitney U, not corrected for 
ties, p <0.0001). This could indicate that in spite of their informal relations with 
their advisers and thus supposedly of their equality of status, advice-seekers selected 
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Table 17. Professional andnon-professional relationships among farm-operators in % of choices. 
Those chosen as: Visited Conver- Friends Advi- Advice- Good Mone 
are: farmers sers sers seekers farmers lendei 
Neighbours Pir 27 51 45 33 40 29 15 
s t c 23 39 33 9 7 22 0 
Pro 25 48 42 27 30 26 11 
Family members Pu- 8 5 3 7 0 3 23 
StC 0 0 2 3 0 2 6 
Pro 4 4 2 6 0 4 18 
Visited farmers Pir 12 8 17 0 13 6 
s tc 28 16 24 33 22 6 
Pro 16 10 19 10 16 6 
Conversers Ph- 48 51 43 37 41 21 
StC 54 56 33 60 40 17 
Pro 51 52 40 44 41 20 
Friends Ph- 25 39 32 28 28 11 
StC 18 32 27 20 30 8 
Pro 22 37 31 26 28 10 
Advisers Ph- 31 19 20 17 22 14 
StC 21 15 21 13 18 6 
Pro 26 18 20 16 21 12 
Advice-seekers Pir 0 6 6 6 5 4 
s tc 13 12 7 6 6 0 
Pro 5 8 6 6 6 3 
Good farmers Ph- 29 22 20 26 17 10 
StC 28 27 35 27 20 8 
Pro 29 23 23 26 18 9 
Money-lenders Ph- 12 10 7 14 11 9 
StC 5 8 7 6 0 6 
Pro 9 9 7 12 8 8 
Other persons Pa- 29 18 26 16 34 32 24 
StC 31 19 18 6 33 30 11 
Pro 30 18 25 13 34 31 21 
Official Ph- n-a.1 n.a. n.a. 22a n.a. n.a. 35 s 
institutions StC n.a. n.a. n.a. 48 n.a. n.a. 66 
Pro n.a. n.a. n.a. 29 n.a. n.a. 43 
Number of Pa- 52 207 156 96 35 112 100 
choices (100%) StC 39 75 43 33 15 50 36 
Pro 91 282 199 129 50 162 136 
Non-choosers in % Ph- 66 20 39 40 77 31 29 
of numbers of StC 49 27 47 41 79 31 27 
respondents Pro 56 23 41 40 78 31 28 
1 Not applicable 2 Extension service or Administration of the project 3 Bank or cooperative 
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people who were to some extent better than average farmers to advise them. There 
was no statistically significant difference in adoption scores between those self-
designated advisers who had been approached by 'other persons' and those who had 
been approached by friends, neighbours or conversers. That means that the high score 
of the respondents who said they had been asked for advice was not only due to 
those who had been asked by 'other persons', supposedly consciously seeking advice. 
It could still be contended that only the better farmers asked advice, and that, even 
if they approached only their equals, the latter would have a higher mean adoption 
score than all respondents together. The data, however, do not support this supposi-
tion. Indeed the mean adoption score of the respondents who said that they would 
ask for advice was slightly higher than the mean score of all respondents, but this 
difference was not significant (Mann Whitney U, not corrected for ties; p — 0.33). 
Likewise, at first sight there seemed to exist considerable differences in mean score 
between various categories of advice-seekers, in the sense that those who would go 
to an official institution had the highest mean adoption score, those who would go to 
'other persons' by far the lowest, and those who would go to persons with whom they 
had also other relationships an intermediate score, that did not differ much from the 
mean score of all respondents. However, these differences were not significant68. 
If those respondents who said that they would ask advice from another respondent 
were separated, pairs of advice-seekers and advisers were obtained whose adoption 
scores were known. There were 26 such pairs. A comparison of scores per pair showed 
that in 18 cases the adviser had the higher score, in 5 cases the lower. Three ties 
occurred. According to the sign test, there is only a probability of p = 0.013 that 
these (or more extreme) systematic differences between adviser and advice-seeker are 
due to chance, even if the Japanese advice-seekers are not considered. (N = 21; x=5). 
The test establishes beyond reasonable doubt that these advice-seekers chose better 
farmers to advise them70. 
To cross-check the above result, I compared the score of those respondents who 
said that they had been asked for advice by other respondents with the adoption 
scores of these advice-seekers, but there were only 11 such pairs. In 6 cases the adviser 
had a higher score, and in 3 cases a lower. Two ties occurred. This result was incon-
clusive. 
The data do not contradict van den Ban's hypothesis that the more specific the 
relationship between adviser and advice-seeker, the greater the difference in adoption 
scores between them. But they also suggest that, despite frequent informal relations 
between a farmer and his adviser, the latter often has the highest adoption score of 
the two71. 
As to the farm-operators mentioned as good farmers, about a third of them were 
'other persons', the others were often acquaintances, friends or neighbours. At first 
it seemed that people had been chosen as good farmers somewhat mdisaiminately, 
since some settlers with very low adoption scores had been included. But when the 
mean adoption score of those good farmers who had been interviewed was compared 
with the mean score of all respondents, I found that the good farmers' mean score 
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was higher. This remained true even if the Japanese farm-operators were excluded, 
who in general had a higher score than their Brazilian colleagues and who made up a 
quarter of the interviewed good farmers72. Among those chosen as good farmers, 
the number of people who received more than one choice was also considerably high-
er than among those mentioned in other relationships. This indicates that there was 
a certain consensus as to who were good farmers. 
One of the open-ended questions asked was how the respondents could tell if 
somebody was a good farmer. The most important characteristics that could be culled 
from the answers were the following four: a farmer's knowledge and skill, (visible 
proofs of) hard work and dedication, the use of modern methods, and the quantity 
of produce. The inclusion of hard work and dedication among the characteristics 
of the good farmer indicates that, at least in the eyes of the respondents, these 
were no common traits for all farmers. 
How strong were the relationships with friends and acquaintances? It is remarkable 
that the one relationship that implied a real sacrifice by the other, namely borrowing 
money, suddenly brought kinship into its own, at least in Piranema. And although 
kinship did not seem to count for so much in Santa Cruz, there also family was more 
important as a money-lender than in any other relationship. Many respondents said 
they would go to a bank or another credit institution, even though the question had 
been worded in such a way as to ask for persons. Also 'other persons' were mentioned 
as money-lenders, not a few of whom could be recognized as, or were said to be, 
middlemen or shopkeepers. Some of the latter lived outside the boundaries of the 
project, in Rio and its suburbs. Neighbours, friends and conversers are less numerous 
among those mentioned as money-lenders than among those chosen in other rela-
tionships. In fact, of the 110 respondents who said that they had intimate friends among 
the settlers, only 14 would ask these friends for a loan. The sudden importance of 
kinship, the widespread acceptance of official institutions and the decrease in impor-
tance of other informal relationships for loans, all lead to the conviction that relations 
of friendship and neighbourliness among our respondents did not necessarily imply 
mutual help and protection. For this there were the bank, some specific money-
lenders including several middlemen, shopkeepers and local politicians, and in Pira-
nema, at least, the members of one's family. Perhaps not really, as will be shown later, 
so étonnés de se trouver ensemble. 
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5 Attributes of innovative farmers 
The adoption scale 
Whereas chapter 4 described the context in which the farm-operators in the settle-
ment project of Santa Cruz lived and worked, whatever their innovativeness, this 
chapter will deal with some pertinent differences between high adopters and low adop-
ters. Respondents were apportioned between these categories by the percentages of 
affirmative answers they gave to a series of questions on the use of new farming 
practices. I decided to use an adoption scale consisting of fifteen items (table 18)73. 
To check the internal consistency of this scale, the method of item analysis was used 
(Goode and Hatt, 1952, p. 275). 
Table 18. Adoption-scale items and results of the item analysis. 
Number of adopters 
highest lowest 
quartile quartile 
# = 46 AT = 46 
1. Owned tractor 24 0 
2. Owned sprayer 44 2 
3. Plowed with tractor or animals1 43 20 
4. Applied manure in 1963 36 3 
5. Applied manure in previous years 42 8 
6. Applied fertilizer in 1963 21 0 
7. Applied fertilizer in previous years 29 2 
8. Applied lime 20 0 
9. Kept written accounts of costs and benefits 17 6 
10. Had irrigated in 19632 11 1 
11. Bought selected seed or seedlings in 1963 25 5 
12. Had soil tested 11 0 
13. Received credit from bank in 1963 23 5 
14. Applied pesticides in 19633 35 2 
15. Had vaccinated at least one species of animals1 29 4 
1 On condition that they had some arable land. All respondents had. 
2 On condition that they had water. In the highest quartile 34, in the lowest 31 respondents had. 
3 On condition that they had oranges, okra or gilô. In the highest quartile 44, in the lowest all 46 
respondents had. 
* On condition that they kept animals. In the highest quartile 41, in the lowest 42 respondents did. 
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The highest and lowest adoption-score quartiles were compared for the numbers of 
adopters of each single item. An item was only maintained, if the highest quartile 
contained at least twice as many respondents who had adopted it as the lowest quarti-
le. Since Rogers and Rogers (1961, p. 335) showed that the effects of unequal weighting 
are negligible, all items were given unity weights. The analysis caused one item, 'com-
bated ants', to be dropped, since it did not distinguish at all between the quartiles. 
Socio-economic status 
I expected that the adoption scores of the respondents would be associated first 
and foremost with socio-economic status, income and wealth74. Almost all innovations 
cost money, so richer farmers could be expected to have adopted more innovations. 
Chapter 4 already mentioned how some adoptions were discontinued because their 
relative cost had increased. In general it was found that farm-operators in the pro-
ject gave more weight to monetary costs and benefits than to opportunity costs of new 
farm practices. I thus expected to find that farmers with more ready cash would have 
adopted more new practices. This expectation was strengthened by Kahl's finding 
that men of high socio-economic status who live in rural areas are nevertheless rather 
full participants in modern life, whereas people of lower status are more influenced 
by their local environment (1965, p. 33). Two scales were drawn up to measure aspects 
of socio-economic status, a scale of possessions (mostly durable consumer goods) 
ranging from 0 to 6, and a scale of sanitary installations in and around the house, 
ranging from 0 to 5 7 5. The scores of the respondents on these scales were cross-tabu-
lated against their ranked adoption-score quartile76. As a measure of association 
Kendall's T c was computed (cf. Blalock 1960, p. 322 and Spitz, 1965). 
Practice adoption was indeed significantly associated with both aspects of socio-
economic status, as table 19 shows. It might be supposed that the two status scales 
measure one and the same aspect of socio-economic status but that proved not to be 
true. Although the association between the two aspects was highly significant (TC = 
0.44; p <0.001), it was not unity. Especially those farm-operators who did not own 
their farm and hence were subject to some uncertainty of tenure, tended to score 
higher on the possessions scale than on the sanitary installations scale. For them the 
association between the two scales was weaker, although still significant (T c = 0.27; 
p <0.03). Moreover, the behaviour of the two scales towards other variables was not 
always similar, as will presently be shown. 
Table 19. Associations between practice adoption and measures of social status. 
Socio-economic status (possession scores) xc = 0.50 N = 185 p <0.001 
Socio-economic status (installation scores) Tc = 0.40 N = 183 p <0.001 
Income rc = 0.34 JV = 136 p <0.001 
Area of land owned1 ?e = 0.28 N = 162 p <0.001 
1 Farm-operators of Japanese descent were excluded. 
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Table 20. Partial associations between present and former status per adoption-score quartile. 
Lowest quartile 
Second quartile 
Third quartile 
Highest quartile 
T„ = 0.14 
TE = 0.22 
Tc = 0.26 
Tc = 0.02 
# = 49 
JV = 46 
iV = 46 
# = 4 3 
not significant 
not significant 
not significant 
not significant 
Simple association TE = 0.30 # = 1 8 4 p <0.01 
Although I did not expect their answers to be very reliable, the respondents were 
asked to estimate their monthly income from farming. Categorized in income classes, 
their estimates were found to be significantly associated with their adoption-score 
quartiles. As to the variable area owned I distinguished between those farm-operators 
who did not own land in the project at all, those whojowned one 10-hectare plot and 
those who owned more than one plot. The Japanese farm-operators, practically all 
of whom had high adoption scores and many of whom owned more than one plot, 
were excluded, since they could have caused a significant association all by themselves. 
Clearly the area of land owned is not exactly the same thing as the 'size' of operations 
with which innovativeness has been found to correlate in many earlier studies (cf. 
Havens, 1962). The amount of land the respondents owned was not necessarily equal 
to the amount of land they farmed, although it usually was. Here however I have used 
it as a measure of property and as such of wealth. Table 19 shows that area owned is 
significantly associated with practice adoption. 
The foregoing associations leave no doubt that high adopters tend to have high 
social status. But where did this status originate? Did wealthy respondents arrive 
wealthy or did they grow rich in the project? I asked the respondents whether they 
had enough money to live on for some time after they had arrived in the project. 
Those who said they did not can be supposed to have been poor when they arrived. 
A cross-tabulation of their answers against their adoption-score quartiles shows that 
there were indeed significantly more who had some money when they arrived with 
high adoption scores than with low scores (x 2 = 11.95; p <0.01). 
The association between the two variables, expressed in T C , was 0.21. Still, 39% of all 
respondents who scored in the highest quartile, and 30 % of all non-Japanese respon-
dents in that quartile, said that they had no money when they arrived. This could 
indicate that their present status is the result of what happened to them in the pro-
ject, at least if there are no systematic differences in present status between them and 
the high-scoring adopters who had some money when they arrived. To ascertain 
whether such a difference existed, the partial associations77 were computed between 
present status and former status, measured in possession scores and the disposal of 
money at the time of arrival, respectively, per adoption-score quartile. The results 
are presented in table 20. They suggest that practice adoption affects the relation 
between former and present status as an intervening variable, that is, like B in the 
chain A -> B C, since the partial associations are all smaller than the simple associa-
tion.78 The conclusion must be that, especially in the highest quartile, some respon-
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Table 21. Former condition of respondents and their fathers, per adoption-score quartile, in percentages1. 
Owned farm Worked in agri- Worked outside iV 
culture but did agriculture 
not own farm 
informant father informant father informant father informant father 
Lowest quartile 
Second quartile 
Third quartile 
Highest quartile 
17 
40 
20 
33 
49 
50 
57 
64 
59 
29 
32 
22 
38 
34 
33 
14 
23 
31 
48 
44 
13 
16 
10 
21 
47 
45 
44 
27 
47 
44 
42 
28 
1 Respondents of Japanese descent were excluded. 
dents have reached their present high status after their arrival in the project, by 
adopting innovations. In general, however, those who adopted innovations were 
those who had money when they arrived. 
The data assembled in table 21 allow something more to be said about the former 
status of the respondents. The percentages of fathers who owned farms are directly 
proportional, and the percentages of fathers who worked in agriculture but did not own 
land, inversely proportional to the adoption-score quartiles of their sons, the re-
spondents. However, these farm-owning fathers were apparently unable to provide 
all their sons with farms: in all quartiles the percentage of sons who owned farms 
before coming to the project was lower than the percentage of fam-owning fathers. 
Some of the sons who did not receive a farm stayed on the land, but others sought 
employment outside agriculture, which often implied migration. The data suggest 
that especially those respondents who would later score low on the adoption scale 
(probably the poorest) remained employed in agriculture, and that many of those who 
would score higher left agriculture before they came to the project. Since I did not 
assess the status of the non-agricultural professions taken up by the respondents, I 
do not know whether their transition to such employment implied a rise or a fall in 
status. However, assuming that a farmer owning his land has a higher status than one 
who does not, table 21 indicates that many respondents in the lowest adoption-score 
quartile had lower status than their fathers. 
Education and literacy 
A second set of variables expected to be associated with practice adoption was 
education and literacy. Education was measured by the number of years at school 
(from 'less than one' to 'five or more'). But as schools are rare in rural Brazil, some 
farmers may be self-educated. Other people may have lost the ability to read and write. 
Therefore also literacy was measured. All respondents were asked whether they 
could read and write well, somewhat, or not al all. Their answers were not tested but 
I gained the impression that they were truthful. Practice adoption turned out to be 
significantly associated with both variables (table 22).79 Education and literacy, how-
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Table 22. Association of practice adoption with education and literacy. 
Table 23. Associations between various measures of socio-economic status and measures of education. 
Literacy Education 
Possessions Tc = 0.25 N = 185 p <0.001 xe = 0.26 N = 182 p <0.001 
Sanitary installations Tc = 0.43 N = 183 p <0.001 T6 = 0.38 N = 180 p <0.001 
ever, also were associated with socio-economic status, as table 23 shows. 
To inquire further into the relation between education, status and practice adop-
tion, partial associations (T c) between practice adoption and the two measures of 
education were computed, controlled for status in three ways. The results are compiled 
into table 24. It appears that the aspect of socio-economic status measured by the 
possessions scale does not affect the association between practice adoption and 
education or literacy: the partial associations do not differ much, nor are they all 
smaller than the simple associations. But the aspect of socio-economic status measured 
by the sanitary-installations scale, alone or in combination with the possessions scale, 
does seem to affect the association between practice adoption and education or litera-
cy: not only are the partial associations smaller than the simple association, but they 
also differ considerably from each other in magnitude. The first phenomenon can 
mean one of two things: status may be an intervening variable between education 
and practice adoption (as B in A -> B -> Q , or the association between education and 
practice adoption is spurious and only due to the association of status with both of 
these variables (A«-B-*C), depending on whether education precedes socio-economic 
status as measured by the sanitary-installations scale. In reality, of course, both 
relations seem reasonable: the high status of the father may have led to the schooling 
of the son, and the schooling of the son may have helped him to attain high status 
later in life. In the present case the second relation seems to have been more important. 
If status had led to education, one would expect a comparable relation between the 
status aspect measured by the possessions scale and education. If education led to 
high status, it is understandable that it led to high status as measured by a sanitary-
installations scale rather than to high status as measured by a possessions scale. 
This inference, and the inference that can be drawn from the second phenomenon, 
the discrepancy in magnitude between the T c values, obviously hinges on the difference 
between the status aspects measured by the two scales. Possessions as well as sanitary 
installations imply the past expenditure of money. The difference between purchasing 
possessions or sanitary installations seems to be twofold. The installation of sanitary 
fixtures implies a decision of the farm-operator to remain on the farm. A man who 
plays with the thought of leaving is less likely to invest in fixed installations than a 
man who has decided to stay. Also, an investment in sanitary installations implies a 
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Practice adoption and education T« = 0.39 JV = 183 p <0.001 
Practice adoption and literacy xc = 0.33 N = 186 p <0.001 
A monument left by the ants 
A modem broiler farm 
Table 24. Partial associations between practice adoption and measures of education, controlled for 
socio-economic status1 
Scores Practice adoption Practice adoption 
and literacy and education 
Association N Level of Association N Level of 
(value of xe) signifie. (value of T E ) signifie. 
Sanitary installations 0-1 0.002 62 n.s. 0.01 60 n.s. 
2-3 0.04 33 n.s. 0.30 33 p <0.05 
4-5 0.24 70 p <0.03 0.23 70 p <0.03 
Possessions 0-3 0.25 71 p <0.02 0.26 69 p <0.02 
4 0.31 42 p <0.03 0.31 42 p <0.03 
5-6 0.26 53 p <0.04 0.34 53 p <0.01 
Combined possessi- 0-2 0.12 30 n.s. 0.05 28 n.s. 
ons and sanitary 3-5 0.16 37 n.s. 0.12 37 n.s. 
installations 6-8 -0.04 50 n.s. 0.18 50 n.s. 
9-11 0.29 47 p <0.03 0.24 47 p <0.05 
Simple association 0.30 165 p <0.001 0.34 163 p <0.001 
1 Farm-operators of Japanese descent were excluded from the calculations after it was found that 
their inclusion tended to make the partial associations stronger. 
certain understanding of the basic facts of hygiene, whereas the purchase of consumer 
goods need not imply anything more than the desire to enjoy them. But the same sort 
of understanding that is necessary to appreciate sanitary installations is also necessary 
to judge the value of new agricultural practices, and the farmer who adopts new 
practices is also likely to have decided to remain on his farm. That the sanitary-in-
stallations scale, more than the possessions scale, implies some insight of this kind, 
can be inferred from the fact that the possessions scale is less strongly associated with 
both literacy and education (see table 23). It appears, then, as if basically two relations 
obtain between the variables: 
1. Education may lead to high status (characterized by insight, some means, and a 
wish to stay on the farm) which in turn may lead to the adoption of new practices: 
(A -> B -> C). 
However, education obviously does not automatically lead to high status (as measured 
by the sanitary-installations scale) nor is it the only possibility of access to this aspect 
of status. As important therefore seems to be the following relation: 
2. Education (or literacy) leads to the adoption of new practices primarily among 
persons who not only can afford them but also can understand (or be convinced of) 
their utility, and who apparently want to remain on their farm. In other words, if 
education does not go together with insight and the wish to stay on the farm, it does 
not lead to practice adoption. But perhaps this means no more than that only effec-
tive education leads to adoption. The availabiUty of some money alone, if the status 
aspect measured by the possessions scale may thus be interpreted, is not sufficient to 
affect the association between education and practice adoption. Wealth in itself 
65 
may lead to practice adoption80, but if of two equally wealthy men one is more 
educated than the other, the former will be more likely to adopt innovations. 
Urban contacts 
It is generally assumed that since most changes, in mentality as well as in material 
culture, originate outside rural locality groups, the amount of contact a farmer has 
with the outside world will be related to the change which he has accepted. This rela-
tion may hold because he learns of the existence of new practices earlier than do 
farmers who have less contact with the outside world, as well as because he may be 
more inclined to look favourably upon change in general. The association of contact 
with the outside world with practice adoption has often been found to exist (cf. van 
den Ban, 1963, p. 264). The schedule contained several questions about the life his-
tories of the respondents prior to their arrival in the project. Cross-tabulating the 
adoption-score quartiles against the kind of work which the respondents formerly 
did (agricultural and non-agricultural) a significant association was found (T c — 0.25; 
p <0.02) between practice adoption and non-agricultural jobs before arrival81. 
Likewise, urban residence was significantly associated with practice adoption (T C = 
0.2%;p <0.01). However, one should not accept these findings at face value. The 
associations could be primarily a question of socio-economic status: those who had 
worked outside agriculture could have earned and saved more money and thus, upon 
arrival in the project, could be in a better position to finance new practices. Indeed, 
considerably more farm-operators of high status (as measured by the sanitary-in-
stallations scale) previously resided in cities than did low status respondents. The 
association between socio-economic status and urban residence was i e = 0.34 
(p <0.001). To ascertain the influence of status upon the association between urban 
residence and practice adoption, the partial associations between these two variables 
were calculated controlling for status (sanitary-installations scale)82. Table 25 
shows the results. Again, it is not known whether the (high) status of the respondents 
preceded urban residence or originated in the city. But the spuriousness or relevance 
of the relation between urban residence and practice adoption depends on the answer 
to this question. Again, both sequences may have occurred, though with different 
persons. Those of high status may have more often taken up urban residence, as 
table,21 indeed suggests. However, some originally low-status people may have pros-
pered in the city. But the discrepancy in value between the partial associations sug-
gests that another relation may also hold between the variables, to the effect that 
Table 25. Partial associations between urban residence and practice adoption controlled for socio-eco-
nomic status (sanitary-installations scale). 
For respondents with sanitary-installation scores 0-1 re = -0.13 JV — 61 n.s. 
For respondents with sanitary-installation scores 2-3 Tc = 0.14 N = 34 n.s. 
For respondents with sanitary-installation scores 4-5 T„ = 0.22 N = 70 p < 0.05 
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urban residence promotes practice adoption differentially, according to the status of 
the farm-operators. Only if that status was high did urban residence lead to practice 
adoption. For the poor, urban residence apparently did not have any effect on their 
eventual adoption of new agricultural practices. 
Not surprisingly, farm-operators with high adoption scores proved to visit a city 
more often than those with low scores. The association between urban visiting and 
practice adoption was stronger for visits to Rio de Janeiro (T c = 0.25; p <0.001) 
than for visits brought to the suburban town of Campo Grande, nearer the project 
( T c = 0.13; p <0.04). But this association too might be mainly due to status. There 
was a significant association between status (as measured by sanitary-installation 
scores) and visiting Rio (T 6 = 0.31) indicating that visits there were more frequent 
the higher the status of the farm-operator. When controlled for status the partial 
associations between visiting frequency and practice adoption given in table 26 were 
found. They differ considerably among themselves. Although the partials in the higher 
status categories vary according to the way socio-economic status is controlled, in gener-
al the conclusion seems warranted that status affects the relation between the other 
two variables conditionally: contact with the outside world (i.e. visits to Rio de 
Janeiro) only leads to increased practice adoption with farmers of higher socio-econo-
mic status. 
Geographic mobility was not itself associated with practice adoption. The respon-
dents were asked where they were born and where they had lived most of their lives 
before they came to the project. If those who mentioned two different municipalities 
were considered to have been mobile, the association between mobility and adop-
tion-score quartile was T c = - 0.04. 
Unlike Fliegel (1966) and Fiiegel and Oliveira (1963) in Southern Brazil, in the 
project I found no association of practice adoption, literacy or education, with cur-
rently having non-farm jobs. As the Santa Cruz respondents included some people 
who had recently left non-agricultural work to take up farming, whereas Fliegel and 
Oliveira studied farmers of long standing, this discrepancy may not amount to much. 
Table 26. Partial associations between frequency of visits to Rio de Janeiro and practice adoption 
controlled for socio-economic status. 
Controlling variable Value of TC N Level of significance 
Sanitary-installation scores 0-1 0.02 58 n.s. 
2-3 0.08 34 n.s. 
4-5 0.25 64 p <0.03 
Possessession scores 0-3 0.10 68 n.s. 
4 0.32 40 p <0.03 
5-6 0.19 50 p <0.1 
Combined scores 0-4 0.004 52 n.s. 
5-8 0.17 61 p <0.1 
9-11 0.23 43 p <0.04 
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However, among those respondents who had farmed before they came to the project, 
there is no association between currently doing non-agricultural work and literacy, 
education or practice adoption, either. 
Use of extension sources and cooperatives 
The effects which past and present extension services have had on practice adop-
tion in the project of Santa Cruz88 are not easy to assess. Some of them were poorly 
financed and rather inactive, so that the effects of their work were due not so much 
to a programme as to chance personal contacts and relationships. Also, there were 
some agronomists around, not attached to any extension service, who were adminis-
trators or settlers and could be approached for advice. 
In such a situation, the statistically significant association found between practice 
adoption and having had contact with an agronomist or veterinarian in 1963 (T C = 
0.42 ;p <0.001), most probably means that these contacts were due to an initiative of 
the farm-operators rather than to unsolicited visits by extension officers. The number 
of contacts (0,1 and more than 1) with agronomists or vets in 1963 was likewise as-
sociated with practice adoption (ze = 0.25; p <0.001). Had the frequency of contact, 
in some cases where there had been contact, been known, this association would 
probably have been stronger. Practice adoption proved to be significantly associated 
also with having been visited by an agronomist or veterinarian in former years (r e = 
0.47; p <0.001).°That is, also in the past farm-operators with high adoption scores 
had had more contact with extension sources than their low-scoring colleagues. But 
it is interesting that in all adoption-score quartiles the number of respondents who 
had been visited in former years exceeded the number of those who had been in con-
tact with an agronomist or vet during the year in which the survey was held, 1963. 
In table 27 the percentages are shown. For two reasons these percentages are not direct-
ly comparable. The length of the period covered by 'former years' is unknown; hence 
it may not be concluded that more farm-operators have been in contact with an adviser 
in each former year than in 1963. Also, visits do not necessarily exhaust the number 
of contacts that have formerly taken place. Yet it seems that quite a number of farm-
operators, in all quartiles, did not think they had profited sufficiently from earlier 
Table 27. Percentages of farm-operators who had been in contact with extension sources in and before 
1963. 
Adoption-score quartile Received visits 
in former years 
Had contact in 1963 N 
lowest 
second 
third 
highest 
22.4 
30.4 
58.3 
76.7 
10.2 
26.1 
27.1 
58.3 
49 
46 
48 
43 
all respondents 46.2 30.1 186 
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visits by agronomists or veterinarians to continue such contacts during 1963. This 
phenomenon is similar to the discontinuance of adoptions encountered in the preceding 
chapter. If one year may be considered a sufficiently long period, one may say that 
in 1963 a third of those who were visited by an extension officer in former years, had 
discontinued that contact. 
Contact may lead to advice, but is not synonimous with it. The respondents were 
asked whether they ever had received advice from agronomists or other personal 
sources. The results, per adoption-score quartile, are presented in table 28. Several 
inferences can be drawn. It is again confirmed that the higher the adoption-score 
quartile of a farm-operator, the more likely he is to have received advice from 
either an agronomist or a veterinarian (columns 1 + 3 and 2 + 3, resp.), or from both 
sources (column 3). Of particular interest is column 6. For all adopter categories 
other settlers are a very important source of advice, in fact, the most often mentioned 
single source. Whereas in the lowest quartile other settlers give advice to more re-
spondents than the agronomist and the veterinarian together, in the second and third 
quartiles this difference is less, and in the highest quartile the order of these sources 
is reversed. Even so, other settlers had advised more people in the highest adoption-
score quartile than in the lower quartiles. Markedly fewer of the low-scoring respon-
dents received advice from extension sources or other settlers than of the better farm-
operators. They appear to be more isolated: more than half of them reported that 
they had not received advice from any source. Curious is the fact that so many farm-
operators in the highest quartile had received advice from middlemen, from their 
children and from 'other persons'. If the three first quartiles, which do not seem to 
differ much in these respects, are combined and compared with the highest quartile, 
three 2 x 2 tables emerge (table 29). Chi-square was computed only for the middle-
man (x8 = 6.7; /><0.01) but it is obvious that the difference between the highest 
quartile and the otherjthree are even more significant for the advice received from chil-
dren and from 'other persons'. This finding indicates that the better farm-operators 
either actively seek advice from all possible sources, or are more conscious that con-
versations with other people often imply advice. 
Table 28. Percentages of farm-operators who received advice from various sources, per adoption-score 
quartile. 
Adoption-score Source of advice N 
quai lue agron- veteri- agron- middle- chil- other other received 
omist narian omist 
+ vet. 
man dren settler person no ad-
vice 
lowest 12.2 4.1 2.0 10.1 4.1 28.5 10.1 57.1 49 
second 4.3 13.0 10.8 6.5 2.1 32.6 0 43.5 46 
third 18.7 10.2 16.6 14.6 8.3 54.2 6.2 27.1 48 
highest 30.2 16.3 34.9 27.9 32.6 67.4 27.9 9.3 43 
all respondents 16.1 10.8 15.6 14.5 11.3 39.8 10.8 34.9 186 
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Table 29. Use of various sources of advice by the highest and the three other adoption-score quartiles. 
Quartiles Sources of advice N 
middleman children 'other persons' 
received received received received received received 
advice no advice advice no advice advice no advice 
1 + 2 + 3 15 128 7 136 8 135 143 
4 12 31 14 29 12 31 43 
Table 30. The effects of advice, in number of farm-operators per quartile. 
Adoption-score quartile Changed something Did not change anything 
lowest 10 11 
second 9 17 
third 12 23 
highest 23 16 
But receiving advice does not mean acting on it. The respondents were asked wheth-
er they had ever changed anything through advice. When their answers were cross-
tabulated against their adoption-score quartile, as in table 30, the resulting association 
was weak (T c = 0.14) and not significant. In line with previous findings, the table 
suggests that the highest quartile may differ from the three other quartiles in being 
more ready to act upon advice. After rearranging the figures in a 2 x 2 table this is 
found to be the case (x 2 = 3.97; p < 0.05). One of the main aspects in which the high-
est quartile differs more from the other quartiles than the first three quartiles differ 
among themselves, is socio-economic status. The mean possession scores of the farm-
operators per quartile are, from below upwards, 2.6, 3.3, 3.8 and 5.1. Willingness 
to follow advice proved to be significantly associated with socio-economic status, as 
measured by the possessions scale (T c = 0.28; p <0.003) M . It seems that only above 
a certain level of prosperity farm-operators tend (or are able) to follow advice. 
With respect to membership of cooperatives, the respondents were ranked in three 
categories: those who were still members at the time of the survey; those who had 
been members but were not anymore; and those who had never been members. The 
association between practice adoption and membership of cooperatives, was T C = 
0.26 (p <0.001) for the project as a whole86. The two sections differed somewhat: in 
Piranema the association was weak (though still significant: T c = 0.18;/> <0.03), 
in Santa Cruz it was fairly strong (T c = 0.45; p <0.002). Table 31 shows the frequen-
cies these associations are based on. It is obvious that the innovation of joining a 
cooperative has frequently been discontinued. Discontinuances were not entirely 
due to resignation of individual members but also to the collapse of cooperatives. 
Nevertheless, many of those from collapsed cooperatives had decided that once 
bitten, twice shy. The percentage of discontinued membership was highest in Pirane-
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Table 31. Membership of cooperatives by non-Japanese farm-operators, per quartile and per section. 
Never a 
member 
Once a 
member 
Still a 
member 
Total 
Section Piranema lowest quartile 
second quartile 
third quartile 
highest quartile 
27 
23 
20 
7 
11 
6 
12 
7 
3 
1 
2 
6 
41 
30 
34 
20 
Section Santa Cruz lowest quartile 
second quartile 
third quartile 
highest quartile 
7 
8 
4 
1 
1 
4 
4 
3 
0 
3 
2 
5 
8 
15 
10 
9 
ma, where more cooperatives have collapsed. Although not more than 24% of the 
non-Japanese respondents in Santa Cruz were still members, the proportion is signifi-
cantly lower in Piranema (x 2 = 4.37; p <0.05). 
Relations with other farm-operators 
As the reader will recall, the respondents were asked whether they maintained cer-
tain specific relations, professional or not, with other settlers or persons. 
Table 32 shows which relationships were found to be significantly associated with 
practice adoption and which were not. At first sight the results are disappointing. 
Only one relationship is associated with practice adoption in the project as a whole 
as well as in both sections. The better farm-operators were more often asked for 
advice, a fact already known. In two instances, maintaining a certain relationship is 
associated with practice adoption in Santa Cruz but not in Piranema. Two observations 
must be added here. Firstly, the significant associations refer to professional relation-
ships. The better farmers are no more likely to maintain informal relationships than 
those who scored low on the adoption scale. The association between practice adop-
tion and the number of relationships, significant in Santa Cruz, is entirely due to the 
number of professional relationships. Secondly, the question arises why these asso-
ciations do not appear in Piranema. Perhaps the number of different relationships 
which a farm-operator maintains also depends on the duration of residence in a com-
munity. In Santa Cruz there was indeed a significant association between practice 
adoption and length of residence in the project (T c = 0.23;/» <0.05), whereas in 
Piranema this association did not exist (te = 0.08). Yet it is unlikely that this factor 
alone accounts for the difference between the sections. Perhaps this difference should 
be looked at from another angle. If Santa Cruz is really the most developed of the 
two sections, the difference between adopter categories in the number of professional 
relationships may tend to increase as the locality they live in develops. I will come 
back to this possibility presently. 
According to sociological theory modernization is associated with increasing speci-
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Tabel 32. Associations (T E ) between practice adoption and maintaining various relationships.1 
Description of relationship Piranema Santa Cruz Project 
Visited other farm this year 
Often talks with other farmer 
Has friend(s) 
Has friend among settlers who left 
Asks advice in case of difficulty on farm 
Consults with other farmers when planning innovation 
Mentions good farmer in neighbourhood 
Mentions money-lender 
Has been asked for advice 
Number of relationships maintained (max. 7) - 0.23 
1 Only those associations have been included which differed significantly from zero at the 5 % level 
of probability. 
Table 33. Associations (T C ) between practice adoption and the number of different persons and institu-
tions mentioned per relationship1. 
Description of relationship Piranema Santa Cruz Project 
Visited other farms this year 0.24 -
Often talks with other farmer - - -Has friend(s) - - -Asks advice in case of difficulty on farm - 0.34 0.17 Mentions good farmer in neighbourhood - - -Mentions money-lender - - -Has been asked for advice 0.12 - 0.17 
Total number of different persons 0.122 0.28 0.14 
Total number of different persons and institutions 0.19 0.32 0.22 
1 With one exception, only those associations have been included which differed significantly from 
zero at the 5% level of probability. 
2 Significant at the 6% level (p = 0.0559). 
ficity of social relations. Since it is possible, for instance, to ask advice from a friend, 
the number of relationships which a respondent maintains is not an accurate indica-
tion of their specificity. Strictly speaking, neither is the number of separate persons 
and institutions involved in these relationships. A respondent may visit seven farms of 
other settlers but not have any other relationship. Nevertheless, this number tells 
something of the farm-operator's isolation. In table 33 I have brought together the 
significant associations between practice adoption and the number of different people 
and institutions mentioned for seven specific relationships88. It appears that the few 
instances in which the adopter categories differ, again refer to professional relation-
ships. Any difference in the total number of persons and institutions mentioned, is 
due to these professional relationships and not to the informal. In retrospect it can 
be argued that the findings presented in tables 32 and 33 are tautological. For some 
0.35 0.16 
0.32 
0.30 0.42 0.33 
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professional relationships the quartiles differed in the number of choosers, so they 
can be expected to differ in the number of choices, when each chooser mentions only 
one choice. Yet, the tautology is not complete. Whereas in Piranema and in the pro-
ject as a whole the number of choosers, for the seven relationships of table 33 taken 
together, was not related to their adopter category, the number of choices was. This 
suggests that the number of choices per chooser may be higher the higher his adoption 
quartile. To find out whether this is true the quartiles were arranged according to the 
mean number of choices per chooser, for each of the seven relationships. The rankings, 
from lowest (1) to highest (4), are shown in table 34. To determine whether there is 
any significant agreement between the rankings, I calculated Kendall's coefficient of 
concordance, W, which varies between 0 and l 8 7 . For the project as a whole W was 
0.76,differentjfrom'0atthe 1 % level of probability.fThe quartiles tend to rank in their 
own order (lst-2nd-3rd-4th) when they were compared for mean number of choices 
per chooser. This result was mainly due to Piranema. When only that section was 
considered W was 0.69, significant at the 1 % level of probability; the order of the 
quartiles was their natural order from lowest to highest. In Santa Cruz W — 0.39, 
not significant at the 5 % level. This suggests that the associations listed in table 33 
may be due to number of choices per chooser in Piranema, but perhaps not in Santa 
Cruz. 
The specificity of professional relationships was measured by counting the number 
of different persons (not institutions) mentioned as visited farmer, adviser, advice-
seeker or good farmer, who were not also listed as friends or acquaintances of the 
respondent. That is, the number of those with whom the farm-operator had profession-
al but no other relations was counted. Table 35 shows the associations between 
practice adoption and the number of purely professional relations the respondent 
maintained. The difference between the two sections is striking: in Piranema the 
Table 34. Ranks of adoption-score quartiles according to the mean number of choices per chooser in 
each quartile, for seven relationships. 
Choice Quartiles for 
Piranema Santa Cruz entire project 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th • 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Visited fanner 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 2 3 4 
Converser 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Friend 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 4 2 1 3 4 
Adviser 2 1 4 3 14 14 4 3 2 1 4 3 
Advice-seeker 14 14 34 34 _ _2 _ - 14 14 3 4 Good farmer 2 1 3 4 3 1 2 4 2 1 3 4 
Money-lender 1 3 2 4 24 24 24 24 1 3 2 4 
Total 94 13J 20* 26i 12 11 15J 214 104 114 21 27 
1 1 = lowest rank. 
2 In second quartile, no choosers. 
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Table 35. Associations between practice adoption and specificity of professional relations. 
Piranema Tc = 0.12 N = 124 p <0.08 
Santa Cruz -re = 0.40 N = 42 p <0.003 
Entire project Tc = 0.16 N = 166 <0.01 
Taftfe 36. Choices falling on neighbours in percentage of all choices per quartile. 
Choice Piranema Santa Cruz 
quartiles N quartiles N 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th all 1st 2nd 3rd 4th all 
Visited farmer 14 40 20 33 27 48 100 37 9 9 24 33 
Converser 51 54 49 47 51 196 60 44 38 33 42 65 
Friend 50 44 48 27 44 135 60 38 30 20 34 38 
Adviser 37 27 28 44 34 89 33 0 12 10 11 27 
Advice-seeker 50 20 54 27 39 33 0 - 17 0 8 13 
Good farmer 30 30 17 33 27 106 33 25 18 12 20 45 
Money-lender1 9 15 4 33 13 94 0 0 0 0 0 30 
1 Not included in calculation of Wîoi Santa Cruz. 
association hardly exists, in Santa Cruz it is quite strong. Once more, this suggests that 
the difference between innovative and less innovative farm-operators in specificity 
of professional relationships is a function of the development of the locality in which 
they live88. 
In accord with this inference it was found that in Santa Cruz the percentage of 
choices falling on neighbours decreased as the adoption score of the chooser rose 
(table 36). This decrease was often small but it occurred in five of the seven relation-
ships, and the overall agreement in order of the quartiles was significant (W = 0.77; 
p <0.01). In Piranema this concordance was entirely lacking. Since in Santa Cruz 
the order also occurred for the two non-professional relationships included, there is 
reason to argue that innovative farm-operators in a developed locality also begin 
to choose their friends and informal acquaintances with more care. 
The difference between the sections was rather consistent and did not seem due to 
chance or measurement errors. If it is permitted to interpret the difference between the 
section Santa Cruz and the section Piranema in terms of economic and institutional 
development, the findings suggest that in less developed surroundings (i.e. Piranema) 
the innovative farm-operators differ from their low-scoring colleagues primarily in 
the somewhat greater number of persons and institutions with which they have some 
relationship, rather than in whether they maintain a certain relationship at all. 
The only exception is that the better farm-operators are more likely to have been 
asked for advice. The low-scoring farm-operators maintained as many kinds of rela-
tionships but with a smaller number of persons and institutions. In a more developed 
locality (i.e. Santa Cruz), innovative farm-operators differ from their less innovative 
74 
colleagues in their tendency to have professional relations with more specific people 
with whom they have no informal relations. They also more often maintain professio-
nal relationships at all. They seem to have started to associate with other people for 
specific reasons. This attitude also seems to affect informal relationships. 
Family and kin 
In societies where family and kin relations entail mutual assistance and protection 
(cf. Leeds, 1964, p. 1331) and where strangers are still regarded with mistrust, there 
is reason to expect that succesful, innovative farmers will make more use of the colla-
boration of family and kin than less innovative farmers, and will have stronger family 
ties, and more contacts with relatives. Azevedo (1962, p. 21), quoting from an unpub-
lished paper by Wagley, states that an analysis of seven community studies carried 
out in Brazil showed that extended nets of kinship were especially characteristic for 
the higher social strata in these communities. But in the project of Santa Cruz, the 
aversion to farming said to exist among the sons of the respondents could have resul-
ted in migration of the better educated, presumably the sons of the more innovative 
farm-operators. Unfortunately, the survey allows only a few conclusions on matters 
relating to family and kin. 
There is a weak but significant negative association between family size and adop-
tion-score quartile (xe = -0.13; p <0.03) 8 9. As I did not find any association between 
practice adoption and age (T c = -0.04), this result indeed means that innovative 
farm-operators tend to have somewhat smaller families. Soares (n.d.) found in the 
farm population of Piranema a negative association between status (measured by 
education) and family size. 
How do the settlers see their children? Are they sent to school or employed on the 
farm? The older sons and daughters90 of high adopters had more often completed 
primary school than those of low adopters. The association between father's innova-
tiveness and children's education was xe = 0.26 (p <0.04) for the older sons and 
T c = 0.21 (p <0.03) for the older daughters. It is unlikely, however, that the reason 
why many older children of low adopters did not complete primary school, lies with 
some hypothetical attitude towards education on the part of their fathers. No signifi-
cant association between a father's innovativeness and his children's school attendance 
was found for the sons and daughters who were still of schoolgoing age in December 
1963. Most likely, past school attendance is linked with the former urban residence of 
many of the innovative respondents and with their greater wealth. At the time of the 
survey the low-scoring farm-operators were as aware, or had become as aware, of the 
advantages of education for their children as their more innovative colleagues. 
As regards the present employment of sons on the farm, the adoption-score quar-
tiles do not differ appreciably. For the younger sons, there was a weak, negative and not 
significant association (T c = -0.13); for the sons who were at least 18 years old, a 
weak but positive association (T c = 0.15; p <0.1) between their employment on the 
farm and the adoption-score quartile of their fathers. If this level of probability be 
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accepted, innovative farm-operators employ their older sons slightly more often 
than do low-scoring farm-operators. Although the association is admittedly very 
weak, the important thing is that it runs counter to expectations. Since more older 
sons of innovative respondents had received at least primary education, I expected 
that they would be employed less often on their father's farm (instead of somewhat 
more often) than the sons of low-scoring respondents. I assumed that agriculture 
was so much depreciated that those sons who could leave would do so. Fliegel and 
Oliveira (1963) found that the innovative farmers in Sao Sebastiao do Cai less often 
preferred farming for their sons than farmers who were less innovative. If my finding 
is not due to chance, it suggests that agriculture is regarded as a business like any 
other: a thing worth doing as long as it is remunerative but not if it is almost certain 
that one will remain poor. It is the poor who are most likely to leave the project91 and 
by imphcation, the sons of the poor. Table 37 illustrates the suggestion. In the lowest 
quartile more younger sons and less older sons are employed on the farm than in the 
higher quartiles. Sons seem to be employed as long as they depend on their parents 
and can be ordered to work on the farm. They tend to leave when they become adults, 
often after their military service which obliges them to leave temporarily anyway 
(Galjart 1965 a). Although not equally strong, this urge to leave the farm exists in all 
quartiles. As a result there are, except in the second quartile, more farms on which 
wage labourers are employed than farms on which older sons work. This may imply 
that many farms will be up for sale sooner or later for lack of heirs willing to continue 
farming. Together, these findings impart the impression that Brazilian farm-operators 
(and their sons), at least in the project, consider farming as only one way of making 
Table 37. Percentage of farm-operators employing sons and wage labourers, per adoption-score quartile. 
Quartile Sons < 18 years old Sons > 18 years old Wage labourers 
% N % N % N 
Lowest 60 20 29 21 33 49 
Second 59 17 48 25 38 45 
Third 44 9 42 24 48 44 
Highest 43 7 42 12 52 29 
Table 38. Percentage of farm-operators who have relatives on the farm or in the project, by quartile. 
Quartile Relatives on the farm (no sons)1 Relatives in the project (no sons 
or father) 
% N % N 
Lowest 14 49 40 46 
Second 16 44 35 41 
Third 26 44 43 43 
Highest 24 27 45 27 
1 Number of fathers 4, one in the lowest, three in the highest quartile. 
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a living among many others, and that the high adopters value it more than the low 
adopters. The latter certainly do not seem to regard it as a way of life hallowed by 
tradition. 
The presence of relatives on the farm or in the project is not associated with prac-
tice adoption. Table 38 shows the frequency of relatives. For a settlement scheme 
both percentages seem rather high. The table shows that there is certainly no negative 
association between the innovativeness of a settler and the presence of relatives. This 
is in line with the finding of Wilkening, Bosco and Pastore (1967, p. 14) in the State 
of Goias that people of higher status are more likely to maintain ties with relatives 
of all types than people of lower status. 
Some aspects of resource use 
Credit 
The settler who invests in new agricultural practices is likely to be better off than 
the settler who does not. In theory, the settlers can obtain credit from banks or other 
sources. In practice, it remains to be seen whether they are willing to accept credit 
and thus go into debt. Van den Ban (1963) calls the reluctance to accept credit one of 
the characteristic traits of traditional farmers. 
To avoid tapping their repulsion from bureaucratic delay and red tape, I did not 
ask the respondents whether they would request credit but whether they would accept 
a certain sum (the equivalent of about 500 US dollars) if a credit bank should offer 
it to them. Somewhat surprisingly, no association at all was found between practice 
adoption and the acceptance of credit, mainly because so many farm-operators in 
the lowest quartile would accept it. Table 39 shows the frequency of acceptance. It 
could be that in the lowest quartile, credit would imply a liberation from debts to 
shopkeepers and middlemen. Although the highest quartile seems to differ from the 
three others, when a Chi-square was computed on the corresponding 2 x 2 table it 
turned out that this difference was significant only at the 10 % level. The use of credit 
(an item of the adoption scale), however, was associated with practice adoption. This 
Table 39. Percentage of farm-operators who would accept bank credit equivalent to 500 US S, by 
quartile1. 
% N 
Lowest quartile 59 49 
Second quartile 53 45 
Third quartile 51 43 
Highest quartile 73 29 
Total 58 166 
1 Farm-operators of Japanese descent were excluded. Their inclusion would not greatly alter these 
percentages, however. 
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means that for the more innovative farm-operators it was easier to get credit. The 
low adopters wanted it as much, but could not get it as easily. I also asked the re-
spondents what they would do with this credit, and classified the answers into three 
categories: a) those who would begin something new, b) those who would extend 
existing operations (i.e. buy more animals of a species they already had, or plant 
more of a crop they were already planting), and c) those who would do both. After-
wards categories a and c were combined, thus separating those who would solely 
extend existing operations from all others. Although the association ( T c = 0.20) 
between practice adoption and the extension of existing operations was not significant 
at the 5 % level (p <0.09 when not corrected for ties), the more powerful Mann Whit-
ney U test showed that there was a significant difference in adoption-score quartile 
between the two categories (z = 1.85; p <0.04)9 2. The difference is that those who 
scored in the highest quartile would, with few exceptions, apply their credit exclusively 
to something they were already doing, whereas the respondents scoring in the three 
lower quartiles were about evenly distributed over the two categories. This result, too, 
is intriguing. It may mean that a farm-operator, once he has adopted some modern 
methods and machinery, tends to expect a further rise in income from extending his 
operations, that is, from using more land, rather than from an increase in productivi-
ty. He envisages investments in width rather than in depth. For cattle breeding, a need 
for more land to accommodate the existing stock has already been mentioned. The 
result could also mean that the extension of existing operations does not become 
remunerative until some investments have been made in productivity-raising machi-
nery and methods. Results to be reported in chapter 7 make the latter interpretation 
more likely. 
The tendency among the high-scoring respondents to use credit for the extension 
of existing operations does fnot imply that they are less innovative than their low-
scoring colleagues. Apart from the obvious fact that the former had adopted more 
innovations, there was also a significant association between practice adoption and 
'having tried a crop that failed', an indication of having taken a risk, though possibly a 
small one, trying out an innovation. The association, which concerned only the non-
Japanese frespondents93, was T c = ¡0.20 (p <0.03). This result shows that the high 
adopters in the project are not entirely unwilling to try out something new. However, 
unless it pays, it is dropped. The criterion against which most adoptions are judged 
seems to be short-term profitability. 
Lease and rent 
In line with the finding that high adopters want to extend operations, practice adop-
tion was significantly associated with the lease and rent of land ( T c = 0.45 with the 
Japanese respondents included, and 0.41 without them;/?<0.03 and < 0.05,respect-
ively). Those who leased land tended to score in lower quartiles than those who rent-
ed it. In the highest quartile land was only rented, not leased. 
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Labour 
There was no association between practice adoption and the presence of sharecrop-
pers on the farm. Sharecroppers occurred in all quartiles.94 Neither was farm size 
(i.e. area owned) associated with the presence of sharecroppers. Paid labourers, howe-
ver, were employed somewhat more frequently as the adoption score of the farm-
operator rose. When the Japanese respondents were excluded, the association between 
practice adoption and the occurrence of wage labour on a farm was weak (T C = 
0.16; p <0.06) but, if we are willing to take 1 % more risk, significant95. When all 
outside labour (i.e. both sharecroppers and paid workers) was considered together, 
there was still only a weak association between practice adoption and the employ-
ment of such labour fre = 0.16; p <0.06). Table 40 shows the frequency of employ-
ment for the Brazilian respondents. The farm-owners among them turned out to 
employ outside labour significantly more often than others (x2 = 5.25; p <0.03). 
Among the farm-owners, in their turn, those who owned more than one farm (and 
thus presumably cultivated more than 10 hectares) employed outside labour more often 
than those who owned only one 10-hectare farm (x 2 = 5.72; p <0.02). Expressed in 
Yule's Q the association between the two variables was Q = 0.62. Area owned, which 
probably means farm size, seems to influence employment more than practice adoption. 
Table 40. Percentages of non-Japanese respondents employing outside labour (sharecroppers and wage 
labourers). 
For all respondents For all owners 
V 
/ o 
N % N 
Lowest quartile 43 49 55 33 
Second quartile 49 45 50 36 
Third quartile 62 44 62 37 
Highest quartile 62 29 64 28 
Total 53 167 57 134 
Use of middlemen 
Relative to the sale of produce, I had expected to find a strong association between 
practice adoption and avoidance of the middleman. But when the respondents were 
classified into those who sold all their produce through such people and those who 
sold only part of their produce or none at all that way, no association between selling 
through middlemen and practice adoption was found. Table 41 shows the frequency 
distribution. As can be seen, the two higher quartiles depend markedly less on middle-
men than the two lower, but in the highest quartile a number of exceptions occur that 
reduce the association. It is possible that the relation between the manner of selling 
and practice adoption is affected and obscured by other variables, such as the posses-
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Table 41. Percentages of non-Japanese respondents de\ 
produce. 
l ndent on middlemen for the sale of their 
Sold only through Sold partly or not N 
middlemen at all through 
middlemen 
Lowest quartile 54 36 46 
Second quartile 49 51 43 
Third quartile 35 65 43 
Highest quartile 39 61 28 
Total 45 55 160 
sion of means of transport, the location and accessibility of the farm (Santa Cruz or 
Piranema), and the kind of produce sold (milk or vegetables). Chapter 4 indeed show-
ed that these variables were important. Finally, it is also possible that the more able 
a farmer is to circumvent the middleman, the less need there is for him to do so because 
the less the intermediary can (or is inclined to) take advantage of him. 
Nationality and ethos 
In this last section of the chapter some of the available quantitative data on nation-
ality and ethos are brought together. They anticipate the post-survey stage of the 
investigation to be dealt with in the following chapters. Here it is not so much the 
intention to explain differences in practice adoption as to suggest, and if possible 
prove, that agricultural activities in the project are indeed characterized by certain 
cultural values and goals. To achieve this, the differences between farm-operators 
of Japanese descent and others will be used98. 
The Japanese did indeed have higher adoption scores than the other respondents. 
Table 42 presents the relevant data; a distinctly significant value for the association 
was found ( T c = 0.25; p <0.01). They also owned significantly more often than the 
others more than one plot often hectares. But when only the respondents who scored 
in the highest quartile were considered, this difference disappeared. This could imply 
that, if Japanese respondents are likely to own more than one plot, it is because they 
score in the highest quartile, not because they are Japanese97. 
More than other high adopters, the Japanese seem to allow for the small size of 
their farms. Perennial crops generally cover only a small part of their land. They are 
market-gardeners, producing huge amounts of vegetables on small plots, whereas the 
Brazilian's ideal is frequently still the old one of farming large tracts of land. The Japa-
nese mentioned an annual crop as their most important product, financially, signifi-
cantly more often than other farm-operators (x 2 = 8.60; p <0.01). And this difference 
was not due to their high scores. When the comparison was again restricted to those 
respondents who scored in the highest quartile, a Fisher exact probability test (p < 
0.01) showed that the difference persisted. When the fields 9 8 under annual and those 
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Table 42. Distribution over the adoption-score quartiles of Japanese and other respondents. 
Number of Japanese Number of non-Japanese 
Lowest quartile 0 49 
Second quartile 1 45 
Third quartile 4 44 
Highest quartile 14 29 
Total 19 167 
Table 43. Land-use by farm-operators of Japanese descent and by others. 
Number of fields 
under annual crops under perennial crops 
Japanese farm-operators 53 19 
Other farm-operators 404 277 
under perennial crops were added for the Japanese and for all other farm-operators, 
the frequency distribution shown in table 43 appeared. A Chi-square showed that 
the Japanese had less fields under perennial crops than the other respondents (x 2 = 
4.98; p <0.05). Although the Brazilians in the highest quartile did not differ in a 
statistically significant way from all other Brazilian respondents, they reported slightly 
more often that a perennial crop was of financial importance to them and they had 
slightly more fields under perennial crops. Anyhow the conclusion seems justified 
that if the Brazilians in the highest quartile differ at all from their less innovative 
compatriots it is in a direction away from that taken by the horticultural Japanese. 
A further indication that the Japanese in the highest quartile cultivate their land more 
intensively than the other innovative (i.e. highest-quartile) farm-operators was that 
they more often employed sharecroppers (x 2 = 4.23; p <0.05). The difference in the 
employment of paid labourers was not significant statistically but in the same direc-
tion. 
The Japanese have other traits which enhance their chances of success. One is their 
community sense. In table 44 the Japanese are contrasted with the Brazilian farm-
operators in the highest quartile for membership of cooperatives. Although the diffe-
rence is only significant at the 8 % level (Mann Whitney U), which means that the 
Japanese could be members of cooperatives because of their high scores, it is in the 
predicted direction. When the same two categories are contrasted for memberships 
of all other associations (e.g. farmers' associations, sportclubs) the Japanese are 
ahead, significantly so (x 2 = 4.49; p <0.05). This is chiefly due to memberships in 
farmers' associations ; for other associations the differences are not significant. The 
greater community spirit and cooperation among the Japanese finds expression in 
various activities and accomphshments. As examples can be cited the monthly reun-
ions in the section Santa Cruz, during which professors of the Agricultural University 
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Table 44. Membership of cooperatives by Japanese and by other farm-operators scoring in the highest 
quartile. 
Never a member Once a member Still a member N 
Japanese farm-operators 14% 21% 64% 14 
Other farm-operators 28% 34% 38% 29 
often deal with technical problems; their own primary school in Piranema, with a 
community building attached to it; cooperative working parties to repair roads in 
their neighbourhood, also in Piranema; periodic feasts (the one thing of which their 
Brazilian neighbours speak with envy); a sort of 4-H Club for youngsters, affiliated 
to their cooperative; the establishment in Itaguai of a branch of the huge Cotia 
cooperative, which was itself originally an entirely Japanese affair; and the election 
of a Japanese councilman to the Itaguai municipal council. Although their sense of 
community also has its worse side (discouragement of mixed marriages for instance; 
withdrawal of support from some who marry Brazilian girls) there can be no doubt 
that it has enabled them to overcome difficulties that would have been insurmountable 
for a lone individual. 
Another trait which has helped the Japanese to reach their present position in the 
project (but which cannot be illustrated by quantitative data here) is thrift". For 
long years many Japanese settlers lived in poor hovels, some of which were still in 
use as sheds in 1963. The contrast with the brand-new, well-equipped bungalows in 
which most of them now five was so great, that a less ambitious improvement in living 
conditions would have been clearly possible much earlier but was postponed until 
after acquiring the tractor and the truck. Although I have no proof of their thrift, it is 
clear that the Japanese farm-operators are less afraid of incurring recurrent costs 
Table 45. Use of manure and fertilizer by farm-operators scoring in the highest quartile. 
Used manure Used fertilizer 
1963 former years 1963 former years 
yes no yes no yes no yes no 
Japanese farm-operators 11 3 13 1 12 2 13 1 
Other farm-operators 22 7 27 2 8 21 13 16 
Table 46. Use of lime and pesticides by farm-operators scoring in the highest quartile. 
Used lime Used pesticides 
yes no yes no 
Japanese farm-operators 10 4 12 1 
Other farm-operators 10 19 22 6 
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than their non-Japanese colleagues. The four frequency distributions in table 45 
show the use of manure and fertilizers by Japanese and non-Japanese respondents 
who scored in the highest quartile. As far as the use of manure is concerned, the two 
categories did not differ nor had done so in the past. But then, many Brazilians in the 
highest quartile kept cattle, as was shown in the preceding chapter, so they could use 
manure without having to buy it, whereas only one of the Japanese high adopters kept 
cattle. Although the manure could also be from their own chickens, many of the 
Japanese probably had to buy manure. Be that as it may, it is certain that fertilizer 
had to be bought for cash. The table clearly shows that Japanese farm-operators, in 
1963 and in former years, were much more willing than their Brazilian colleagues to 
make these costs100. Table 46 shows the use of lime and pesticides by the same catego-
ries of respondents. The difference in lime use was significant (/ 2 = 3.80; p <\ (0.06), 
that in pesticide use was not significant at the 5 % level (Fisher exact probability test) 
but in the same direction. More than the Brazilian high adopters, the Japanese seem 
willing to use capital in cultivation. 
A last Japanese trait that should be mentioned in connection with their success in 
the project is their resilience. Many of my Brazilian informants attached great impor-
tance to this trait Time and again I heard how a Brazilian settler was soon inclined 
to fret and give up when a crop failed, whereas a Japanese simply plowed it under and 
planted something else. He was not afraid, it was said, to go deep into debt to treat 
a crop properly with fertilizer or pesticides. There are no quantitative data to corro-
borate their resilience, but it is certainly true that the Japanese had, in fact, less often 
given up (i.e. sold their farm and left the project) than the Brazilians. 
To see whether other cultural differences led to differences in adoption score, I 
compared the Brazilian respondents who were born outside Brazil of non-Brazilian 
parents with those born inside the country of Brazilian parents101. A Mann Whitney 
U showed that the difference in scores was not significant at the 5% level (p < 0.06; 
corrected for ties). Neither did I find an appreciable difference in adoption scores or in 
socio-economic status between Roman Catholics (70% of the respondents) and Pro-
testants102. Willems (1955) mentioned that in the Sao Paulo region where he studied 
them, Protestants differed markedly from Roman Catholics in some ways, Protestant 
farmers showing "an unusual degree of progressiveness, manifest in technological 
achievements and level of living" (p.330), and also a higher degree of participation 
and group cohesiveness. In the project, however, I found no indications that religious 
afiiliation affected cooperative membership, but it should be born in mind that Willems 
referred to members of one denomination, whereas in the Santa Cruz project at least 
six Protestant churches and sects operated. In the sample, the numbers of respon-
dents who belonged to the same Protestant church were exceedingly small. 
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6 Ethos and social relations 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next will be concerned with the cultural reasons why so few 
settlers in the project did what had been expected of them, that is, did become efficient, 
productive farmers. The analysis of the differences between high and low adopters 
has repeatedly led to the conclusion that innovativeness was primarily associated 
with high socio-economic status. Other factors appeared to be less important, anyway 
less closely associated with practice adoption, or proved to be of importance only 
in conjunction with high status. In the conditions prevailing in the project, there 
seemed to be few exeptions to the rule that only those who had money could progress. 
Most of those who scored in the highest quartile (61 %) indeed had some money when 
they arrived. If Japanese respondents were excluded, this majority increased to 70 %. 
The remaining 30 %, it is true, arrived without funds and still made good. But it should 
be remembered that these people, who progressed by their own efforts, made up only 
5 % of all non-Japanese respondents. What are the conditions that must be met if 
farmers of low socio-economic status are to modernize their farms and to earn a 
reasonable income from farming? An indication is given by the success of the Japa-
nese farm-operators, a success that has been noticed elsewhere too 1 0 3. As has been 
demonstrated, they differ in two important respects from their Brazilian colleagues. 
Firstly, they do not pin their faith to large farms but to the intensive cultivation of a 
small area. Secondly, they can do certain things together. This chapter will deal with 
this ability to cooperate; the next will discuss the respondents' attitudes and values 
about agriculture. 
One of the most essential conditions for the success of any rural development pro-
ject attempting to improve the general standard of living, is the presence of soUdarity, 
of willingness to act jointly, of feelings of responsibility for mutual interests. Only 
joint action in the purchase of seed and fertilizer, the use of machines, the marketing of 
produce and the maintenance and amelioration of facilities such as roads and drain-
age, can overcome the stagnation and impotence stemming from the poverty of 
isolated individuals. The only substitute for joint action of this sort is massive govern-
ment assistance until the farmers earn enough to sustain their own progress individu-
ally. Even then, of course, they will have to miss some of the advantages of coopera-
tion, such as the price support that cooperative marketing implies, or the indepen-
dence of outside assistance when, for instance, additional large drainage works be-
come necessary. Naturally, government aid on such a scale would be extremely ex-
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pensive and would restrict the allocation of funds to a few regions. Therefore, if 
agriculture is carried out by smallholders some form of cooperation is necessary if the 
community is to develop as a whole. 
In the project of Santa Cruz considerable government assistance has been provided 
for a number of years and several attempts were undertaken to establish a cooperat-
ive. Nevertheless, when I left the project in mid 1965, in Piranema at least these 
attempts had come to nothing104. Since the Administrative Agency had then termi-
nated its interference in the project and was preparing to depart, a later appearance of 
cooperation seemed unlikely. How did this happen? Why did so many attempts to 
establish cooperatives fail? In the following pages I shall describe certain aspects of 
the Brazilian rural ethos which, in my opinion, are inimical to the emergence of cooper-
ative attitudes and joint action by social equals. For reasons of clarity, I will not 
follow the sequential order in which observations and insights succeeded each other 
during my stay in the field. At first, I saw no relationship between the various phenom-
ena which I observed in the project; only much later could they be assembled as a 
syndrome. Although this synthesis derived much from the literature and from discus-
sions with colleagues, it only grew upon me after most of the field data had been col-
lected. I did not enter the project looking for a syndrome. Yet, in the following sec-
tions I shall first present the values and attitudes assembled into the syndrome. Sec-
ondly I shall show that these cultural elements, although not the syndrome, have been 
reported before in the literature. The purpose here is to convince the reader that the 
syndrome is part and parcel of a traditional culture. Thirdly, I shall present and ana-
lyse incidents and case histories that show, qualitatively, that the syndrome still oper-
ates in the project of Santa Cruz, and that it obstructs development in various ways. 
A final section will consider how the syndrome may be circumvented. 
The paironic syndrome in traditional culture 
The cultural elements that are incompatible with cooperation seem to occur togeth-
er rather than in isolation but this circumstance alone is not the only justification for 
speaking of a syndrome. It is mainly for reasons of convenience that I use the term 
patronic syndrome105: to avoid repeatedly using several terms instead of one. I do not 
suggest that I know the cause of the interrelation between the elements of the syn-
drome: I cannot even demonstrate that the elements are interrelated. The syndrome 
is an abstract construction, a generalization deduced from the observation of concrete 
acts, which clarifies the apprehension, and hence facilitates the observation, of cer-
tain categories of behaviour. The Brazilian farm-operators in the project behave as 
if they hold the values and attitudes subsumed under the term patronic syndrome, 
and it is only in this sense that their behaviour will be explained. 
Three elements may be distinguished in the patronic syndrome: 
1. The assumption that any real improvement in one's socio-economic situation 
depends not so much on one's own efforts as on favours granted by secular or super-
natural powers, or on a stroke of luck. 
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2. The disposition to seek to establish patronage relations with people who are, or in 
the future may be, able to do one a good turn. 
3. The absence of feelings of solidarity towards people with whom one is not related 
by kinship, friendship or patronage. This absence is associated with a disbelief in the 
presence of such feelings in others. 
Let us take a closer look at each of these three aspects of the syndrome separately. 
It should be noted at the outset that a man's belief in his dependence on others may 
rest upon a rational evaluation of an objective situation. In the past, the slaves on the 
plantations depended absolutely on their masters. Even today, many poverty-stricken 
peasants and labourers depend to a considerable extent on the benevolence of their 
employers. This sort of dependence would be recognized as such in any culture. There 
are also situations which in other cultures would not be considered as characterized 
by dependence of this kind, but which in Brazil may rightfully be. Take for example 
the government-employed clerical worker who knows that his eventual promotion 
does not hinge upon the quality of his work, but upon the recommendation of (and 
hence his personal relationship with) some superior. He is not far wrong if he con-
siders himself dependent on that person. In another culture, where his promotion 
would be contingent on the quality of his work, he would not feel, and in fact would 
not be, dependent. In Brazil, it is not easy to distinguish between situations in which 
dependence is a reality and situations in which it is not. 
To complicate matters, the dispositions and expectations which constitute the 
patronic syndrome repeatedly act as self-fulfilling prophecies and create dependence. 
However, there can be little doubt that in Brazil the belief in one's dependence on the 
favours of others or on a stroke of luck, persists in situations where the dependence 
itself no longer exists. This belief does not mean that people will wait, arms crossed, 
for fortune to knock at their door, although in the past it has, apparently, meant just 
that. It means that they are inwardly convinced that without luck or assistance from 
others there is no point in making a hard effort. It implies the absence of that indomi-
table, but also unscrupulous, almost cruel will to succeed that pioneers sometimes 
display108. 'Going it alone' is deemed an unattainable ideal; it is thought wiser to 
solicit the assistance of others before embarking on an undertaking or in the face of 
difficulties. 
"All local success stories of economic and social mobility", writes Wagley, "relate 
how a successful young man was successful elsewhere, but not in Ita, through the help 
of a benevolent godfather, relative or employer, or by some other stroke of luck". 
And: "The difficulties of economic and social advancement reinforce the belief, so 
common throughout Brazil, that only a stroke of luck can lead to economic success" 
(Wagley, 1953, p. 127). Rosen, who carried out socio-psychological research in two 
Brazilian cities found evidence corroborating the statement that "Brazilians tend to 
think of success and failure as originating outside of the individual" (1964, p. 349). 
Marvin Harris, who studied a small town in the State of Bahia, made similar obser-
vations. "In the eyes of the townspeople the principal duty of all government is to 
produce 'progress'. But for basic improvements in the general welfare, the people 
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look beyond the local authorities. The prevailing attitude is, 'we are to weak to help 
ourselves. O Governo tern que dar impulso (The government has to give us a push). 
O Governo, in this case, refers to something beyond the county, but to no specific 
bureau or agency. What the townspeople have in mind is the 'boss' of super propor-
tions embodied in the state and federal governments. Everyone, from mayor and 
councilman to artisan and store-keeper, is firmly convinced that herein lies the solu-
tion to Minas Velhas's troubles" (1956, p. 183). 
What among the lower classes is a belief in one's dependence on outside assistance, 
among the higher classes often becomes a disposition to use public funds, whose 
allocation they can influence, for private ends. Illustrative of this dispostion is the 
ease with which planters and industrialists have traditionally looked to the govern-
ment for relief in times of crisis. Taunay (1945, chap. 20) tells of several attempts, 
undertaken at the turn of the century by coffee-growers, to secure the support of the 
government. Various laws which were proposed at the time endowed the federal gov-
ernment with a purchase or export monopoly of coffee, but none envisaged a cur-
tailment of production. Stein (1955, p. 443 et seq.) described similar attempts by 
groups of textile manufacturers to get government regulations enacted. Even when there 
was no crisis, entrepreneurs often preferred to be on the safe side. Perhaps it was 
because of their thoroughly politicized view of economic development, writes Dean 
(1966, p. 147), referring to the industrialization of the state of Sao Paulo in the early 
twentieth century, "that the planters restricted themselves largely to undertakings 
that the state government could concede as monopolies, such as railroads, utilities 
and emission banks and to projects that could be strongly assisted through govern-
ment favouritism... if a particular project of the planters proved unprofitable, the 
government could be induced to buy them out". 
The traditional Brazilian disposition to consider oneself dependent on the support 
from more powerful sources can also be seen from the following contrast. Whereas 
in the Netherlands the traditional and conservative smallholders who are being for-
ced out of agriculture because they cannot keep up with the rapid pace of agricultur-
al development tend to blame the government for interfering in agricultural affairs 
(Houttuyn Pieper, 1962), in Brazil farmers who are faring badly are apt to put the 
blame on the government's inactivity. In the one culture traditional farmers believe 
that they could improve their lot if only the government would leave them alone, 
while in the other culture traditional farmers declare themselves unable to improve 
matters unless the government helps them. 
Many contemporary students of Brazil, instead of postulating this unbelief in the 
results of prolonged individual effort, have deduced another attitude from the same 
overt behaviour, namely the dislike of hard work, especially manual work (cf. Moog, 
1954; Queiroz, 1957; Candido, 1964; Hutchinson, 1966). Formerly this dislike of 
work seems to have given rise to spectacular demonstrations of indolence, apathy 
and laziness, as witnessed by numerous travel-stories by European visitors to Brazil107. 
Nowadays resources are less plentiful in the rural areas and the number of competitors 
has grown enormously, so that extreme inactivity has become impossible in all but 
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•he remotest parts of the country108. According to the Dutch historian Romein (1964, 
p. 61 et sqq.) the aversion to work, the lack of enthusiasm for work for its own sake, 
was formerly a common trait of what he calls the 'general human culture pattern'. 
It was in Europe that a departure from this pattern occurred, a deviation which in 
our time is gradually being adopted in other cultures too and is thus becoming the 
norm in its turn. Be that as it may, a European intellectual certainly should be careful 
to avoid the fallacy of equating work with life. Many people work to provide their 
basic needs, and if their provision is assured for the next time period (a day, a season) 
they can think of more agreeable things to do than working. Yet it is doubtful whether 
that lack of enthusiasm for work so often observed in Brazil is due only to the concep-
tion of work as a necessary evil and to a lack of ambition, as Candido and Queiroz 
suggest for subsistence farmers. There can be other reasons, such as an enervating 
climate109, ill health and inadequate diet. Besides, the lack of an ethos of work does 
notnecessarily meanthatpeople willnot work. Brazilian historical accounts abound with 
examples of people who did work very hard in certain circumstances, when there was 
a real possibility of considerable returns. Some observers have remarked on both the 
aversion to work and the slumbering hope for rapid riches in the hearts of Brazilians 
(e.g. Moog, 1954). It is especially when this hope is absent that work is regarded as a 
drudge, to be avoided if possible. But this is the same as saying that sustained effort 
will only be called forth by this hope and for as long as it is entertained. Nowadays the 
discovery of new sites of gold or precious stones is unlikely; the source of rapid wealth 
must be a stroke of luck, like winning the lottery, or a 'golpe', a shrewd, not neces-
sarily honest deal or manoeuvre, some successful speculation, or a favour granted 
by more powerful persons. The dislike of work and the disposition to look for rapid 
wealth, taken together, are not very different in their effects from the trait posited 
before: the belief in the necessity of outside help for any basic improvement in wel-
fare. Very few people, after all, are in a position which allows them to acquire wealth 
rapidly without any outside assistance whatsoever. Especially for the poor the most 
likely source of wealth is a benefit granted by a more powerful person or organiza-
tion. The belief in one's fundamental dependence on favours is a sort of justifcation 
of the inactivity that ensues when the situation does not allow people to entertain 
the hope that a substantial rise in welfare can be achieved without sustained effort. 
Although it remains uncertain which dispositions better fit as interpretations of overt 
behaviour, there is one advantage in positing, as I did, the belief in the indispensability 
of some sort of assistance instead of the attitudes relating to work and rapid wealth. 
The reader is led to expect what in fact happens, namely that people will try to elicit 
such assistance. People strive to obtain patrons. This quest is the second aspect of the 
patronic syndrome. 
The patron-client relationship can be defined as a dyadic contract between persons 
unequal in social status, according to which the person of superior status dispenses 
protection, recommendations and favours in kind, money or opportunity, in exchan-
ge for prestige and support, given him by the lower ranking person. Although Foster 
(1963) is right in arguing that the patronage relationship in principle operates between 
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two persons, this does not mean that a dyad cannot, on occasion, become part of a 
chain, A-> B and B-> C forming A-> (B)-> C . u 0 Patronage relationships have also 
been found between one person and a group of people, and between organizations 
(Galjart, 1964; Palombara, 1964). 
The predominance of vertical over horizontal relationships, and hence the impor-
tance of patronage, has been manifest throughout the history of Brazil. Ever since 
the Colony was founded, land was mostly allocated in large tracts of thousands of 
hectares, to encourage the enterprise of the private individuals on which the Portuguese 
Crown depended for the settlement of the huge country, but also because the planters 
of what was to be for centuries the most important crop, sugar, had to be rich men, 
in order to defray the cost of the refining process (Antonil, 1963, p. 10; Freyre, 1946, 
p. 252). According to Viana (1933, p. 74), this custom of granting large tracts of 
land excluded the poor and less fortunate classes from landed property. All those who 
asked for a grant of land always took care to stress the fact that they were not without 
means. In fact, they requested land because they had monetary resources. In other 
regions of the country, which were settled at a later date, the emergence of a profitable 
crop often led to conflict and htigation between squatters, who occupied and cultiva-
ted small pieces of land without benefit of title, and the persons who had obtained the 
official title to the same land. As a result, the squatters were often forced off the land 
or were otherwise subordinated to the neighbouring big landowners. Stein, who 
gave a historical account of coffee-growing in the municipality of Vassouras, which 
formerly adjoined that of Itaguaf, says: "Once the advantages of coffee cultivation 
became apparent, the only possible remaining source of free labour, squatters and 
other smallholders, were eliminated. Without adequate funds to hire lawyers, un-
able to proceed to the town of Vassouras to defend their lands before the local 
judge, without connections - official or social - in the capital, the squatters and 
smallholders became hangers-on of the planters. They lingered as agregados, who 
lived isolated from the plantation centers, less often as renters on small plots where 
they could raise subsistence crops and a little coffee, as overseers of the ever-growing 
slave gangs of men and women, as hired hands, and as artisans in the town" (1961, 
p. 67). 
It may be said, then, that the actual allocation of the land gave rise to dependence; 
the dependence of peasants and labourers on an owner who, until rather recently, in 
fact was little less than the absolute ruler of a fief. It came as something of a shock 
when in the 18th century the police, instead of stopping at the gate, dared to enter 
the plantation of a proprietor who harboured a fugitive from justice (Freyre, 1961, 
p. 16). Even in those areas where smallholders managed to hang on to their land, 
they were well advised to stay on good terms with neighbouring plantation owners. 
Apart from the harm that such powerful neighbours could do them personally, if 
mutual relations were bad, the smallholders also needed the protection which the 
big landowners could provide111. All this meant that even small family farms were 
often to some extent dependent. 
A second and most important cause of dependence was the employment of slave 
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labour. By definition, slaves depend on their master. It seems that in Brazil the rela-
tionships between household slaves and their owners were not seldom rather personal 
and friendly (Freyre, 1946,| p. 369) and that slaves who were treated well were not 
particularly anxious for liberty (Freyre, 1961, p. 523 et sqq.). This intimacy, however, 
implied that the slave could win or lose a lot according to how far his master trusted 
him. Any improvement in his situation was a favour and therefore depended on the 
quality of his personal relations with the owner. Even after the Abolition of slavery 
in 1889 this pattern continued. A sharecropper, labourer or agregado could not nor-
mally improve his situation except through favours obtained from his employer. To 
obtain them, he had to be on good terms with the latter. 
A third factor making for dependence was the traditional patriarchal organization 
of the family, which did not encourage individual independence. Freyre (1961, p. 70) 
has very vividly described the manner in which a paternal authority, bordering on 
despotism, was maintained in the 17th and 18th century. Although this authority 
has undoubtedly grown much weaker since, Rosen (1962) recently found that, even 
in a city like Sao Paulo, the patterns of independence and achievement training of 
boys still reflected the traditional authoritarian, father-dominated family structure. 
One informant in the Santa Cruz project imputed the departure of grown sons to the 
existence of discord between them and their fathers; they had been beaten and scolded 
too often and preferred to leave when they could1 1 2. Agreeing with this suggestion, 
the son of another informant said that his relationship with his father was good. He 
respected Mm, and did not, for instance, smoke in his presence as the sons of other 
fathers did. Paternal authority, in its turn, was intimately connected with the tradition-
al importance of family and kinship ties. To maintain itself and to prosper, a family 
had to operate as a unit. So as to preserve status and economic goods in a society 
filled with mixed breeds and adventurers, says Candido (1951, p. 297), marriages were 
contracted in line with a policy designed to strengthen the parental groups. Unions 
within the same group occurred frequently. The solidarity among relatives constituted 
the greatest guarantee in a patriarchal society, permitting the undertaking of new 
enterprises and assuring the stability of existing ones. Networks of related extended 
families were further strengthened by the custom of creating relations of godparent-
hood either within or without the family, and by the attachment to the household of 
many more members than the kin of the pater familias: servants, retainers, slaves 
and the children of all. The importance, in Brazil, of kinship relations as a means of 
estebfishing new connections and of obtaining assistance of every sort even now, is 
stressed by Leeds (1964, p. 1331). 
Accounting for the persistence of patronal relationships in Brazil, some authors 
also implicate the religious beliefs of the rural population. "Contrasting sharply with 
Protestant teaching emphasising self-reliance and the guidance of the individual 
conscience, popular Catholicism... presupposes the helplessness of mankind in the 
face of the problems that constantly beset it. To search for a protector is a logical 
response to such an assumption; the closer the patron's powers approach to omnipo-
tence, the better for the supplicant" (Hutchinson, 1966, p. 10). Hutchinson goes on to 
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say that the relationship with the divine is not direct. Intermediary patrons (the saints) 
are sought, who will intercede with God on one's behalf. However, according to 
Willems (1961, p. 137) rural popular belief holds that the saints do not intercede so 
much as act on their own behalf, that is, are self-reliant patrons rather then mediators. 
In earlier centuries, this belief was not restricted to the humble. Referring to the sugar 
planters and their private chapels, Bastide (1951, p. 336) says that "the Catholic 
saints who were adored received that worship only to the extent that they also inte-
grated themselves in the domestic life and took on the character of protectors of the 
family.... The chaplain was less the representative of Rome than a servant of the sen-
hor do engenho (plantation owner)". 
There are several indications that saints are indeed often regarded as patrons, of 
whom one may become a sort of client. In the region around Ita, on the Amazon 
river, "the cult of the saints provides the caboclo (peasant) with the means of attaining 
welfare in general, good harvests, good health and the security of the collectivity as 
well as of the individual" (Galvao, 1955, p. 188). It is important to stay on good terms 
with the saints, therefore. Whereas adultery and murder are judged by secular stan-
dards, and do not constitute religious offences, properly speaking, "to go back on a 
saint is the sort of sin that preoccupies people and of which they talk" (Galvao, 1955, 
p. 89). The belief that a saint will punish someone for not fulfilling a promise but not 
for infringing any of the commandments, is almost general among lower-class rural 
and urban people all over the country (Azevedo, 1962, p. 73). However, the patron saint 
in his turn is expected to do his bit. Not long ago his image was often punished when 
he failed to intervene in a person's favour as he had been requested to do (Bastide, 
1951, p. 345; Azevedo, 1962, p. 73). It even seems to have happened that the saint 
was forced by other means than promises to 'deliver': by beating his image, by tying 
it up, or by hanging it by its feet down a well113. The urban newspapers carry many 
paid announcements of promises made to a saint that will be fulfilled if he grants 
such and such a favour. The promise will be kept only after the favour has been be-
stowed upon the client. Referring to the rural communities he studied, Willems (1955) 
stated that the greatest obstacle to the conversion to Protestantism was the implicit 
loss of the saints as sources of assistance "from whom security could be obtained in 
exchange for small sacrifices. The compacto (contractual relation with the saint) and 
all related phenomena are expected to disappear from the religious activities of a 
true crente (Protestant)". However, it had been replaced by a compacto with Jesus 
and the Holy Ghost. Despite the reserve of the ministers, popular religion stressed 
devils and miracles. One is led to understand that upon conversion the need for a pa-
tron grows less urgent but does not disappear. Another example of the strength of 
popular belief in the effectiveness of mediators between man and the supernatural is 
provided by the multitudes that assembled, time and again, around messianic leaders. 
Some of these movements led to the settlement and organization of religious com-
munities, in the last century and in the 1930's and 1950's (cf. especially Queiroz, n.d.). 
The probity, industry and loyalty which the leaders to all accounts inspired in their 
followers are truly astounding. A later section, which will deal with the subject of 
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leadership, will again refer to these movements. Taken together, the evidence suggests 
that Roman Catholic popular belief, by its emphasis on the patronage that can be 
obtained from the saints, actually reinforces the disposition to seek secular protection 
and assistance. 
The distribution of land, the need for protection against hostile elements, slavery, 
the need for familial cooperation and religious belief have contributed, and to some 
extent still contribute, to relations of dependence and a concomitant quest for pa-
tronage. In many spheres of life, patronal rather than communal relationships were 
and still are important. Dependence in these spheres was not merely given, it was also 
actively sought, since welfare, promotion and success could only be achieved through 
patrons. Dependence should not be understood solely as a consequence of the un-
equal distribution of power and wealth; it also became the channel through which 
favours and benefits flowed to those who were less powerful and wealthy. The master 
could treat his slaves well and send a bastard-son to school; the landlord could feed 
his peasants when the harvest had failed, and protect his confidence man from the 
police when he had killed somebody in a saloon brawl; the uncle could further his 
nephew's career; the saint could grant his supplicant's request. Once a system of 
vertical relations does fulfil, albeit only poorly, such protective and patronage dis-
pensing functions, it tends to be self-perpetuating. It operates on all levels of society 
and can benefit everybody. Attempts to destroy it are often half-hearted and limited 
to certain specific manifestations of patronage and not to others. Dependence calls 
for mitigation by patronage, but patronage perpetuates dependence. The system may 
change, and in fact has changed, in that patrons gradually came to have specific rather 
than diffuse functions, and in that the State, sometimes consciously (cf. Wolf, 1966, 
p. 95), has tended to replace private individuals as provider of certain benefits. But 
these changes did not mean that the quest for patrons was abandoned, not even where 
any objective dependence seems to have vanished. The belief that really worthwhile 
improvements cannot be achieved without outside support or that such support would 
greatly increase the result of any effort while reducing the effort itself, may help to 
explain this. Obviously, such a belief gets another lease of life every time it is confirmed 
whereas it can hardly be belied. 
A corollary to the two already mentioned elements of the patronic syndrome is the 
lack of solidarity between people who are not related by kinship, friendship or patro-
nage. This lack is most noticeable in an inability to cooperate, in a certain indifference 
to the fate of strangers and to the state of public or common property, in a tendency 
to distrust other people's motives, and in an absence of responsibility for the common 
good. It does not necessarily imply active hostility or coolness; on the contrary, it 
can go together with great, if superficial, cordiality. Solidarity may be defined as a 
willingness to strive for common objectives even if that implies putting aside indivi-
dual interests. Parsons distinguishes between several aspects of solidarity, such as 
"the willingness to make specific contributions in exchange for somewhat diffuse bene-
fits (or even none except glory and reputation)", and "the willingness to maintain the 
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integrity of the system, in fact, an acceptance of responsibility for doing so" (Morse, 
1962, p. 118). These definitions point to two elements of solidarity, namely the wil-
lingness to make contributions and the existence of common objectives (or of a col-
ectivity, in Parsons' terms). In Brazil lack of solidarity means that the common 
objectives are lacking, that the collectivity does not exist.114 The absence of solidarity 
is most noticeable in situations in which the unheeding observer would expect a col-
lectivity to exist: between people whose habitat would be called a community in other 
cultures, for instance. Indeed, the close outward resemblance between such a habitat 
and a community elsewhere has often led to an interpretation of Brazilian rural 'com-
munities' in terms of Gemeinschaft115. 
The lack of solidarity follows logically, at least in part, from some of the phenomena 
described earlier. For example, it can be argued that the importance attached to the 
establishment of patronal relationships may lead to the neglect of communal, peer, 
relations. In that people seek patronage from superiors, they may even be inclined to 
regard their equals as competitors116. The more clients a person has and the more easily 
he can get them, the less he will value and repay each single client. Secondly, it may 
be noted that historically only a limited number of collectivities have been of impor-
tance: the following of the landlord, including his household, the joint family, and 
relatives. Even if it is true that in some areas the neighbourhood has been important 
as a cohesive social group, especially to the small farmers, as some authors maintain 
(Willems, 1961; Candido, 1964), compared to the large holdings the 'bairro' has al-
ways been marginal. The contemporary neighbourhood described by Candido con-
sisted to a large extent of people who were related to each other117. However that 
may be, all observers agree that solidarity based upon the neighbourhood has been 
on the wane for a long time now (Willems, 1961; Caldeira, 1956, p. 84). In general the 
rural community in Brazil has never been important as a basis for relationships of 
solidarity between equals. 
The supremacy of hierarchical groups has had other consequences. A patron 
values clients because he may reckon on their support, their armed support if neces-
sary, if a conflict arise. Throughout the history of Brazil such conflicts between pow-
erful individuals or families, in which at times thousands of men were involved (cf. 
Moraes, 1963), have pitted peasant against peasant, slave against slave, landowner 
against landowner. Historically, alliances did not follow class lines but cut across 
them. "Two caboclos, two agregados, two sitiantes (terms designating various kinds 
of peasants) were declared enemies if one of them belonged to the following of 
colonel Chiquinho and the other to that of Henriquinho de Almeida, in spite of their 
similar social, economic and political situations; each one belonged to his colonel 
and it was with him that they felt solidarity" (Queiroz, 1957, p. 61). Itis not far-fetched 
to say that the emergence of solidarity between equals has been obstructed to a 
considerable degree by the links between unequals in the traditional alliances. 
Not only are social equals not used to acting together; upon meeting an 'unknown' 
equal, they will also wonder whose 'man' he is. Conversely, a stranger in the interior 
of Brazil need not worry much about theft, I was told, precisely because the potential 
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thief, not knowing whom else he might prejudice apart from the victim, hesitates to 
commit the crime. 
So far, the examination of factors connected with or responsible for the posited 
lack of solidarity between social peers has been limited to those which followed logi-
cally from the traditional patterns of dependence. However, two other factors may be 
mentioned that are less intimately connected with these patterns. In the first place, 
that relationships between equals also often take the form of dyadic contracts118. 
In the project of Santa Cruz, as elsewhere in rural Brazil, the most clearly recogniz-
able relationships organized on the basis of the dyadic contract are those of co-parent-
hood. Although co-parenthood relations have not seldom been sought, and are still 
being sought, with persons] of superior status (Hutchinson, 1966, p. 14), most of 
them are with peers: sometimes family members, sometimes neighbours or acquaint-
ances. Unfortunately, questions regarding 'compadrio' were not included in the 
survey schedule; I only know from informal interviews that the practice is relatively 
widespread in the project. Sergio, for instance, reckoned that he had acquired about 
fifty compadres during his lifetime. In the project, he or his wife were God-parents 
of nine children. One man he had not even known before he came to ask him as com-
padre. The man had heard people speak well of Sergio. In a few cases his daughters in 
their turn were God-mothers to younger children of the same parents, thus further 
strengthening the bonds between the two families. Although by far the majority of 
Sergio's compadres were persons equal in status, the God-father of his youngest son 
was a rich shopkeeper in a suburb of Rio, where they had lived for some time. This 
man had sold to him on credit when he had been out of work. The bond between 
them had not been relinquished after Sergio's departure to the project in 1959; the 
shopkeeper had visited them once or twice. "It is clear", writes Foster (1961), "that 
co-parenthood can never be the basis of any kind of group. No two people have the 
same combination of compadres." 
Finally, it should be noted that also for solidarity the mechanism of the self-ful-
filling prophecy operates. If one expects others to neglect their duties and to lack 
responsibility, one is inclined to be neglectful and irresponsible oneself, thus confirm-
ing and reinforcing the expectations of others. Repeatedly informants said that in 
their opinion, a man did best to keep to himself. Their tone of voice indicated that 
they considered this sound advice such as a man might give his son, a piece of wisdom 
wrested from life itself, and not at all a somewhat cynical or despairing, but necessary 
attitude. 
The patronic syndrome in the project of Santa Cruz 
In the previous section three related elements of the traditional culture pattern of 
rural Brazil have been presented. For reasons of convenience they were brought to-
gether under the heading patronic syndrome. The historical circumstances which may 
have contributed to their emergence and permanence have been indicated briefly. 
Also an attempt was made to convince the reader that the syndrome was not a mere 
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word, but concords with observations and descriptions by others. 
This section intends to use a number of case histories and incidents that took place 
in the project of Santa Cruz, to show that the patronic syndrome operates among the 
settlers too. It intends to demonstrate also that the syndrome is incompatible with 
one of the conditions that a system of small family farms must meet in order to be 
viable, namely that there is a fair degree of cooperation among the farmers. 
Allocation of land and assistance 
In a culture where belief is widespread that if a person is getting ahead, he owes it 
to favours received from others rather than to his own achievements, there will be a 
tendency to apply this frame of reference to whatever happens. If the events support 
such an interpretation, people will try to achieve the same results by sohciting favours 
rather than in any other way. In two respects, the interpretation in terms of favours 
seemed to fit the situation in the project almost from the beginning, namely with 
regard to the distribution of farms and technical assistance. Obviously, the actual dis-
tribution of cheap land was fertile ground for suspicions of favouritism. Mostly there 
were more applicants than farms to concede. But a number of incidents may have 
strengthened these suspicions. For instance, whereas until 1940 it was not explicitly 
forbidden to grant farms to civil servants, in that year a prohibition to that effect 
came into force. Yet, in an administrative document of 1947 some twenty farms were 
said to belong to civil servants. In the same year a certain Onofre complained that he 
had to choose between a job with the Administration of the project or a farm, while 
others had both. Since the Administration employed settlers to help them through 
the first difficult years, it is hard to know whether Onofre had a point. Certainly the 
number of farms owned by officials increased in later years. For a time it was fashion-
able for the higher civil servants of Itaguaf to have a farm in the project. In the eyes of 
the other settlers, anyway, the fact that some officials had farms was proof enough of 
favouritism. That they believed that favours were important is shown by other docu-
ments, according to which on several occasions applicants fpaid money to a go-
between who said that he would settle the matter with the Administration. It is quite 
possible that such men acted on their own behalf and were not at all intermediaries, as 
the documents maintain. The point is that they could operate. In 1945, a man who, 
according to the Administration, was illegally selling plots of land he did not own, in 
his turn accused the officials of favouritism. One of his charges was denied; with re-
gard to another, to the effect that a son, a father-in law and a son-in law of a settler 
had all received farms in the project, the Administrator declared that these were in 
terms of the law four separate nuclear families, each of which could be given land. 
One must not think that the favouritism of the administrators, if it existed at all, 
was a matter of corruption or venality. Rather it was a question of knowing an appli-
cant personally and believing that he would make a success of his farm. A clerk said 
that in 1961, when a tract of 100 hectares had been subdivided and distributed, she had 
recommended three farm labourers whom she knew, and they had been given a farm. 
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With some amazement she added that two of them, for unspecified family reasons, 
had already sold theirs to others persons. She had been wrong about them, and would 
not recommend anybody again. Still, applicants thought that it was helpful to know 
(and to be known by) somebody in the Administration. One reason why Joao went 
to the extension meetings in the Santa Rosa neighbourhood, about two kilometers 
from his house, was that they were held in the house of Vercingetorix, an employee 
of the Administration. Noting his interest, Vercingetorix would see that he, Joao, 
deserved a farm. Unfortunately, Vercingetorix himself was not much interested in the 
meetings and was rarely present. In a few cases favouritism was clearly observable. 
Several settlers who had illegally bought a farm managed to avoid being evicted by 
somehow bringing pressure to bear on high officials of the federal agency which admi-
nistered all agricultural settements. Some resolutions to evict a settler, taken in Rio 
by the competent department of the agency, were never carried out. 
The second way in which the situation in the project lent itself to an interpretation 
in terms of favours and patronage was the giving of technical assistance to the settlers. 
As was shown in chapter 2, the laws on agricultural settlements contained clauses 
concerning assistance of various sorts, to be given for varying periods. One of the 
most important and lasting components of the assistance given in the project was the 
plowing and harrowing of land by tractors belonging to the Administration. This 
was done for a small fee which did not cover costs. Table 1 clearly showed that this 
form of assistence has been very irregular and of diminishing importance. At one time 
or another, during the history of the project, the settlers have been provided with 
irrigation pumps, seeds and seedlings (the Admimstration kept a nursery going for this 
purpose), free transport of produce to Rio markets, hybrid maize seed, road repairs, 
new drainage ditches, cattle, employment, medical services, clerical and administra-
tive assistance to the cooperative, and doubtless other things. But almost always, assist-
ance of some sort was rendered for a short period only; budget cuts or a considerable 
delay in the receipt of the allotted funds time and again caused the discontinuance 
of certain forms of assistance. A conscientious local adnumstrator would then advance 
the money needed for small repairs or petrol for some time but inevitably the mo-
ment came when he would get fed up with the incompetence and indifference of 
headquarters. Thereafter he would, sometimes deliberately, allow everything to go 
to pot, as a sort of revenge on his superiors. To illustrate the budgetary fluctuations 
the funds allotted to the project during a number of years are listed in table 47. 
It stands to reason that such unreliable but beneficial assistance will be regarded as 
Table 47. Funds allotted to the project of Santa Cruz, section Piranema, 1953-62. 
Year 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Funds m millions of Cruzeiros 5 5.5 3.2 4.5 2.5 2.7 3.9 0.7 0.5 0 
Executive agencies: Ministry of Agriculture (1953-54) and INIC (National Institute for Immigra-
tion and Settlement), other years. 
Source: Administrative Report 1962. 
96 
7%e commercial centre ofPiranema section. The schoolchildren are hoping for a sweet 
Cannibalized machines 
a windfall profit, a favour. But a favour to which, in view of the law, the settler feels 
nonetheless entitled; if it is denied he feels absolved from any obligation to get ahead 
without it. It is possible that the irregular, unpredictable character of the technical 
assistance has had worse effects than no assistance at all would have had. Many 
settlers have become addicted to government help and feel free to vegetate when they 
do not receive it. So pervasive is this atmoshphere of impotence and inaction that, 
sooner or later, each observer comes to see the settlers's viewpoint as justified under 
the circumstances. The extension officer of ACAR-RJ once told me of his plan to 
improve the market possibilities for oranges by cleaning and packing them. The Agri-
cultural University, he said, possessed a packing house which had been standing idle 
for years but was otherwise in good repair. He was planning to ask the University 
for permission to use it. If the permission was granted, he would use the installation 
to clean and pack the oranges of the settlers with whom he worked120. If the results Were 
satisfactory, maybe later a private individual would build a packing house. The beauty 
of the plan and the reason why he expected an enthusiastic response, was that it would 
hardly cost the settlers anything. When I pointed out to him that he was planning 
something which he had hotly condemned in others, namely to give free benefits, 
his spirits fell. 
To illustrate the way in which assistance was sometimes given, and the consequen-
ces it could lead to, let us consider a programme that started in 1952. It was called 
Piano Granjeiro, and was based on the idea that the various agricultural settlements 
around Rio de Janeiro were eminently suited for providing the capital with milk121. 
The plan also aimed at providing those settlers who had land of poorer quality with 
an additional source of income. The plan was implemented only in the Santa Cruz 
project. About 130 settlers were promised a couple of pedigree dairy cows if they 
(1) had already planted or would plant two hectares of pasture, (2) fenced in this 
pasture, and (3) constructed a shed to protect the cows from the inclemencies of the 
weather. Further conditions were that they had to feed the cows well (giving them 
concentrates if milk yields rose above 5 litres)122, provided the cows with fresh drink-
ing water, and in general followed the indications on health and treatment given by 
the technicians who directed the programme. Only artificial insemination carried out 
by a competent specialist was allowed. Calves would receive pedigree documents. The 
settlers were to pay for each cow they got with the first yearling heifer. Later calves 
would be their own. The response of the settlers, the reports tell, was enthusiastic, 
"as can be seen from the number of settlers who have constructed or started to con-
struct the fences and sheds". Barbed wire could be obtained on credit. However, a 
report written by a technician in September 1952 was already a bit critical. He had 
visited 78 farms which together had been benefited with 233 cows. The quality of the 
pastures was inadequate and they had not been divided into small plots; the shedding 
could not possibly be more rustic than it was. Most important, production was low. 
He recommended that the cows henceforth be entrusted to the settlers only during 
lactation and afterwards be handed back to the Administration so that they could 
be fed well during the last months in calf. I do not know whether this was done. In 
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fact, hardly anything is known of the programme for the years 1953 and 1954. It 
continued, despite a high turnover of the veterinarians who directed the programme. 
In two years, four of them were in charge. Altogether, 118 settlers received cows. In 
1955 it was reported that the herd had produced 139 calves, and that 5 cows and 19 
calves had died. By then, the Ministry of Agriculture which had started the programme 
had had to transfer all settlement tasks to a new agency, INIC, the National Institute 
for Immigration and Settlement. New people came to direct the project, and misunder-
standings ensued. Out of the blue, INIC decided that the settlers were to pay in cash 
for the cows which they had received, "in order to prevent still greater prejudices". 
However, the administrator of the project demurred, as did the settlers themselves. It 
was true, so he said, that for a variety of reasons many settlers had not yet paid for 
their cows with a calf, but it was unjust to demand payment in cash for animals 
originally promised as a gift by no less an authority than the President of the Republic, 
who had visited the project years ago. He suggested to give the settlers who had not 
yet handed over a calf the opportunity to do so, to sell the cattle which the Admini-
stration itself owned, and to forget about the whole affair123. A decision to this effect 
was taken. By the time of the survey, 1963, the whole episode had been forgotten. 
People hardly ever referred to it. I heard of only one man who had prospered with 
the cows he had been given, perhaps because he had started to sell the milk himself in 
Itaguaf. Gossips said he diluted the milk so mdiscriminately with water, that a small 
fish once choked the tap of his milk-can. Otherwise, the Piano Granjeiro had left no 
visible traces. There was not any longer an organization for artificial insemination; 
the pedigree register was no longer kept; the feed-mill had stopped working. Perhaps 
more farmers had cows than had been the case ten years ago, but that was about all. 
Obviously, one should not blame the settlers for what happened. The pattern is to be 
blamed: the promises made by high authorities, the 'unearned' favours, the lack 
of foresight and control, the final administrative 'collapse'. 
The story of the Piano Granjeiro shows that benefits were, at times, actually con-
ferred on the settlers. It is therefore not surprising that they came to be actively sought. 
Sometimes in an inncocent way, as for instance in the mending of roads, which needed 
constant repair. The settlers of the Gamba neighbourhood somehow or other got a 
federal agency to improve a dirt road for them, and afterwards rewarded the men with 
a churrasco (a barbecue). A municipal councillor from Piranema used his influence 
to loan a scraper from another official organization for a day or two. One informant, 
who was at first under the impression that I was employed by the Administration, 
asked me whether I would lend them a truck for repairing a road at Monro dos Cochos; 
he would make sure that there were enough men to help. Except for the Japanese in 
Chaper6, who filled the holes in their roads twice a year, the settlers only rarely cooper-
ated to this end. I know of only two other cases. Mostly the expectation of assistance 
meant that nothing was done if no assistance was forthcoming. Not even when a 
road became impassable on rainy days and the middlemen began to stay away. No-
where, except among the Japanese, was any such cooperation really institutionalized. 
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Attempts at cooperatives 
In other cases, the quest for favours and the lack of solidarity had graver conse-
quences. In Piranema three attempts to organize a cooperative have failed. Of the 
first attempt little is known. The cooperative was founded around 1950 by some set-
tlers who had recently arrived from the city. Apparently they have been too much 
concerned about their personal advantage. They started to use the truck and the 
tractor which the cooperative had acquired as if these were their private property. 
At a later stage they wanted to receive payment for the administrative and executive 
services they rendered to the cooperative. The other members would not stand this. 
About the other two cooperatives, I am better informed. Since it is often the details 
that are most revealing, both case histories will be dealt with extensively. 
The 'Cooperativa Mixta do Nucleo Colonial Santa Cruz' was founded in November 
1954. During the first years, the guidance of the Administration of the project was 
evident. Nine of the 47 persons who signed the deed of foundation were employed 
by the Administration. Its first executive director (gerente) and its first secretary 
were Administrative officials. In fact, until the 'disturbances' of 1956, Administrative 
staff sat on every committee. The Administration assisted the cooperative also in a 
variety of other ways. It provided storage facilities and a shop, and loaned it two 
trucks to take produce to the market in Nilopolis on Saturdays. The Administration 
also supervised the book-keeping and lent a hand when the Cooperative was behind 
on its clerical work. At times, it may have been inclined to take too much into its 
own hands: during a meeting in October 1955 the secretary of the cooperative, an 
employee of the Administration, threatened to resign unless the cooperation between 
the members of the committee improved and decisions were taken only after consulta-
tion with the committee members who were settlers. On the whole, however, things 
seem to have gone reasonably well. 
Participation by the members of the cooperative was poor. From the beginning, 
their attendance at the general meetings used to be insufficient to reach the required 
quorum. As a result, a meeting could often only be held after the third notice, when 
the number of members present did not matter any more. After a while, this situation 
was acknowledged as normal, and instead of three notices, one notice with three 
different dates was sent out. For a few months in 1956, however, participation soared. 
It began during a meeting in May. Following the election of a new committee, one of 
the settlers present, a certain Armando, mentioned the possibility that INIC, (the 
State agency at that time responsible for the project) would provide a number of 
tractors for the settlers. Armando had already come to an agreement with a high 
official of INIC. Attendance at the meetings shot up sharply. In June, the 
Administration of the project announced the existence of a Mechanization Plan, 
drawn up by Armando, the upshot of which was that the cooperative was to be provi-
ded with 200 tractors, that could be let to the members. Various officials had the floor 
during this meeting; all were eager and full of enthusiasm. In the beginning of July 
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another meeting was called. The President noted with satisfaction that more members 
than ever before were present, although only one notice had been sent out instead of 
the customary three. But the Plan had changed somewhat. Its name now refer-
red to the Financial Assistance to Cooperatives in the Baixada Fluminense. The mee-
ting elected three settlers to sit on the regional committee which would further elabo-
rate the Plan. Armando was the first to be chosen. The next two months seem to have 
been very turbulent. Unfortunately however, the minute book of the cooperative did 
not have any further entries, although only 23 of the 100 numbered pages had been 
filled. In October a new minute book was opened. But the attendance register provides 
some additional information. It is certain that the president and gerente of the coope-
rative resigned or were forced to resign. According to one informant, they were ill 
at ease with the course of events and were jockeyed out by the settlers themselves. 
The president and the gerente opposed the intrusion of political patronage into the 
cooperative and would not leave others enough room for manoeuvres124. The legal 
argument for their dismissal was that somebody employed by the Administration 
could not sit on the board of a cooperative. That indeed was the law, but it had never 
been operative before or since. The first explanation therefore is not improbable. Both 
had been in function for only a few months, far shorter than the normal duration of 
such functions. Some years later the gerente, who had become the Administrator of 
the project, again resisted the intrusion of political patronage into the settlement, in 
another context. In August a new committee was elected but that did not last long 
either. In September elections were again held. One can only guess atthemanoeuver-
ings going on at the time, but it is evident that the cooperative had fallen prey to 
political patrons. Although on the 16th, the 23rd and the 30th of that month more 
people than ever before signed the attendance register, the first two meetings could 
not be held through a lack of quorum. This would imply that the number of members 
had grown extraordinarily in a short time. There are indications that the chief figures 
during this period were not 'ordinary' members of the cooperative. Armando, though 
a settler, never attended a general assembly before May 1956, and only twice after 
October 1956, namely once in 1957 and once in April 1961. (Note this last date). 
But between May and October 1956 he signed the attendance register nine times. 
Other settlers, who could not attend for some reason, empowered him to represent 
them at meetings. On 30 september 1956 Armando signed for seven other members. 
His chance association with some high official of INIC propelled him into a leader-
ship role. The irony was that Armando had a farm in the Santa Cruz section. Logical-
ly he would be expected to join a Santa Cruz cooperative. But as his valuable contacts 
obviously were with a high official of INIC, and the Santa Cruz section had long since 
been emancipated, i.e. had become independent of INIC, Armando operated through 
a Piranema cooperative. Another man, a certain Roberto M., who was even elected 
president of the cooperative for a short time during this period, signed the attendance 
register seven times between June and November 1956, but only three times after-
wards, namely in April and May 1961 and in September 1962. 
In October the excitement died down rapidly, to judge from the number of members 
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that attended the meetings. It must have dawned on the settlers that they had been 
taken in by promises of politicians. The tractors never materialized. Instead, INIC 
proceeded to establish a central cooperative in Rio de Janeiro that was to purchase 
the produce sent to it by the cooperatives of the various settlement projects in the 
Baixada Fluminense. This central cooperative failed from the outset. For a while it 
purchased the produce but it did not manage so sell it all. As a result losses were 
incurred, debts accumulated, credit was never amortized. Moreover, politics soon 
entered the central cooperative and spread from there to the local cooperatives, 
which were asked to support certain candidates up for election. 
The Cooperativa Mixta in the project of Santa Cruz had grown considerably. In 
March 1957 membership stood at 268 persons. Nevertheless, one gets the impression 
that the unrest and excitement of 1956 had done more harm than good. It had become 
obvious to some people that the cooperative could be used as a political organization. 
The result was that the staff of the Administration, at least those who did not believe 
that any advantage would come from association with politicians, washed jjtheir hands 
of the whole affair. They could hardly tell their superiors in Rio de Janeiro not to 
meddle with the cooperative. Yet the people who did look for benefits from patronage 
had seen that the cooperative was vulnerable. Any credible promise of benefits attrac-
ted the settlers as sugar does ants. But the political leverage of the cooperative was 
insufficient to obtain anyjjbenefits. Although no outright politicians were elected to the 
committee125, its quality deteriorated steadily. One president simply quit and did not 
come back, accused of corruption; another drank all the cachaca he could find on 
the shelves of the cooperative shop. The members were quick to believe that the 
people they had elected were enriching themselves but nobody had enough backbone 
to denounce them at a meeting. The balances of 1956 and 1957 were still approved by 
the general assembly, although the president called the financial situation of the 
cooperative very serious. After 1957, no other balance was ever approved. 
In April 1961 politics again invaded the cooperative. At a meeting held in the be-
ginning of that month many outsiders were present: two professors from the nearby 
Agricultural University, a representative from ACAR-RJ, the state agency for agri-
cultural extension and credit, a reporter from a Rio TV station, and a councillor 
from Mangaratiba, a municipality further down the coast. The latter promised to 
invite a Federal Deputy of some renown to visit the project. He said that the people of 
Piranema should unite in order to obtain "benefits proper to the community". What 
he meant was that the Deputy was soon going to need their votes. The representative of 
ACAR-RJ promised agricultural credit to the cooperative if some definite arrange-
ments could be made about future meetings. It was agreed that meetings would be 
called on the first Sunday in every month. 
The members, this time, hardly stirred. Only the considerable number of meetings 
held in 1961 betrays the activity (see diagram). During the next meeting, in May, 
mention was made of a letter sent to the President of the Republic about the develop-
ment of the cooperative and how the Agricultural University could assist. (About 
this time, the Piranema section of the settlement was emancipated by presidential 
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decree. This tenriinated the official interference by INIC in the project). In June, anoth-
er letter was mentioned: this time, addressed to the director of IMC, about giving 
the cooperative any of INIC's machinery then present in the settlement. One of the Uni-
versity professors said that this director awaited a further declaration of intent from 
the cooperative. He also told the assembly that the Federal Deputy of some renown 
(mentioned above) expected to receive the verba (funds) with which to reopen the 
hospital of the project any time now. He was chosen as 'technical assistant' of the 
cooperative. Another professor lectured on hybrid maize. 
However, in September, after a row with the gerente, the president of the coopera-
tive resigned. A month later the gerente himself resigned. Although others replaced 
them, the end was near. In April 1962 the assembly decided to ignore all documents 
which dated from before October 1961 and to open new books. But this emergency 
measure was of no avail. Only one other assembly was ever convened afterwards, in 
January 1964. It had been called to propose the liquidation of the cooperative. 
Although the story of this cooperative admittedly presents lacunae, some con-
clusions can be drawn. Without outside technical and financial assistance and control, 
it is highly improbable that the cooperative would ever have been founded, or, once 
founded, would have functioned reasonably well for a couple of years. If solidarity 
is lacking in a locality, it is unrealistic to expect cooperatives to come into existence 
and work solely on the basis of collaboration between members. In such a context 
a functioning cooperative would have to be quite different from the ideal type of 
cooperative, so common in the literature126. Outside assistance, however, can be 
functional as well as dysfunctional. It is functional when it tries to foster the re-
sponsibility, participation and solidarity of the members, when it tries to make itself 
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superfluous. The assistance is dysfunctional when it increases the dependence of the 
organization on outside support and perpetuates the patronage system so ubiquitous 
in Brazil. 
In the project, the dysfunctional assistance necessarily put an end to the functional 
assistance because they had to follow the same channels. INIC could not at the same 
time be a-political locally and part of a political patronage network regionally. In 
general too it seems that functional assistance, which implies political neutrality, 
cannot last long if dysfunctional assistance is offered to the same people, because to 
obtain favours they will have to shed their neutrality. An association promised 
extraordinary benefits will be undermined from inside, by members willing to be-
lieve the promise, and from the outside, by the benefactor. It is extremely difficult to 
establish and maintain efficient, politically neutral, functionally specialized associa-
tions or institutions in a society where the benefits go, or seem to go, to followings 
(i.e. groups tied to a patron). 
Although the dysfunctional assistance remained limited to promises, people reac-
ted to it more avidly than they did to the functional assistance. They were also quite 
willing to follow those individuals through whose connections the benefits were most 
likely to be obtained, even if this implied a change of leadership. 
The history of the third cooperative seems to corroborate these inferences. 
In 1962 a new political group was formed in the project. Its headmen were Matias, 
an employee of the Administration, and Achilles, a settler and middleman. Although 
Matias nominally held a subordinate post, he had outlived various Administrators of 
the project. He had much experience with practical and bureaucratic problems and 
knew many settlers. Over the years he had been able to buy or otherwise acquire a 
fair amount of land inside and just outside the project. He had, in fact, become one 
of the bigger proprietors in the area. Achilles had arrived in the early fifties from a 
suburb of Rio, where he had kept a shop. After some time he had managed to buy a 
very old truck and established himself as middleman. 
At that time the settlers often found it difficult to dispose of their produce, so 
Achilles' endeavours had met with approval rather than scorn. He had, so I was told, 
personally organized a market fo^the cassava from Piranema. Anyway, he had pros-
pered. In November 1963 Achilles owned two trucks, a tractor, and nine farms in the 
project. Possibly (this is just conjecture) following the death of the Federal Deputy 
of renown mentioned earlier, who had received some support in the project and who 
in his turn had tried to be instrumental in bringing improvements, Matias and Achilles 
decided to support the candidacy of a man called Brandao for Federal Deputy. Un-
like some other municipalities in the region Itaguai did not 'belong' to a particular 
politician. Brandao was not a stranger to the municipality; his uncle was one of the 
public notaries in the village. It is therefore possible that Matias and Achilles were 
approached by Brandao and not the other way around. First, rumour had it later, the 
Administrator was removed from his post. He was accused of having permitted a 
grader of the Administration to improve a dirt road outside|the projectfThe real 
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reason was that he would not allow his staff to engage in politics. He was sent to 
Israel to attend a course and afterwards given a desk job in Rio. His successor was 
not, as had been customary for thirty years then, a University graduate in agronomy, 
but an administrative clerk. Apparently there was much underhand work in this 
appointment. Another man, an agronomist, seems to have been recommended for 
the job and his appointment had even been published in the Diario Oficial. It was 
said that Matías, Achilles and others thereupon travelled to Brasilia to reverse this 
appointment. This was only hearsay, but it shows that plotting is not considered ab-
normal when so much is at stake. We can only guess at the role played during this 
episode by Brandao's brother, who held a high administrative post in SUPRA (Super-
intendency for Agrarian Reform Policy, which had succeeded INIC, retaining its 
technical personnel). Anyway, this move made Matías in effect the chief administra-
tive employee in Piranema. The promoted clerk cooperated with him, content, gos-
sip had it, to draw his considerably increased salary. The Administration was not 
handed over properly; no receipt was signed. 
At some time it was also decided that Achilles would run for the municipal council 
of Itaguai. In a contest against ten other candidates, Achilles won. Brandáo got elec-
ted to the Chamber of Deputies at about the same time. He received more votes in 
Itaguai than other candidates; to some extent the municipality had become one of his 
political bulwarks. 
This development again increased Matías' importance and prestige. I once witnes-
sed how a woman came to ask him for a job. She said that the prefect of Itaguai had 
promised her a job but had failed to fulfil his promise and had even started to 'perse-
cute' her after his election12,7. The same afternoon a settler, a retired military man, 
who called Matías compadre, came to ask for a job for his son on one of the construc-
tion gangs that were busy in the project. 
Once elected, the deputy repaid his voters and vote-brokers. Through SUPRA, 
money suddenly became available for the project, for the first time in years. In Novem-
ber 1963 some wooden bridges were replaced by concrete ones. The hospital, which 
had been closed for some years through lack of funds, was being painted and cleaned 
and would be opened shortly128. Even something that had previously been impossible : 
electricity, seemed on its way. A high-tension cable was being constructed from the 
old Rio-Sao Paulo road to the center of Piranema. 
In December 1963 political capital was made out of the achievements. The Presi-
dent of the Republic was to visit the project, open the hospital and hand out 2000 
title deeds to landless peasants, as part of his campaign to force the Chamber of 
Deputies to vote his basic reforms129. The dilapidated tractors and trucks that had 
been rusting in the field across from the administrative office, were hidden (and because 
they were out of sight, it became still easier for people looking for spare parts to 
cannibalize). 
Two weeks later, a new move was made. The president of the old cooperative, 
which had been moribund for years now, convened the members. Matías, also pre-
sent at the meeting, explained that the cooperative, although it had been closed for 
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over a year already, juridically still existed. Ignorance of the members had led to 
this sorry state of affairs. However, a cooperative was a necessity, but it should be run 
by people with a different mentality. Therefore they, the members, should turn to 
people who were concerned with the common welfare. Matías thereupon proposed 
the dissolution of the old cooperative, to which those present agreed. This was done 
because legally no other cooperative could be founded while the old one was still in 
existence. A new cooperative had the advantage that it did not have to take over the 
debts and the unfinished business of the former one. 
A month later a new cooperative was founded by Matías and Achilles. A total of 
42 settlers were present at its founding. It was no secret that, once SUPRA had settled 
its affairs in the project, and possibly even sooner, certain installations and buildings 
(ware-houses, a hangar, a shop, a broken-down rice-hulling plant) would be handed 
over to the new cooperative. Later I was told that SUPRA had also promised to build 
a cassava-flour mill to be run by the cooperative. Anyway, between the draught of the 
regulations and the actual founding of the cooperative, its name was enlarged to 
include the word 'industrial' among its future functions. Although Achilles had told 
me two months before that he would become the first president of the cooperative, 
it was Matías who was elected to this post. 
However, owing to the 'revolution' of 31 March 1964 this cooperative never started. 
The Deputy Brandáo, who was affiliated to the Brazilian Labour Party, at the time 
the most radical of the big parties and the one which supported President Goulart 
and his programme of basic reforms, lost his political rights and his deputyship, being 
among those who had taken the most radical stand. His brother lost his job in SUPRA. 
Although he continued to live in the project, Matías was given another task which 
made long trips to the north of the country necessary. Only Achilles survived relati-
vely unscathed. In spite of this, he told me that the cooperative was finished. Every-
thing in the project, in fact, acabou (had come to an end), he said gloomily. Staff of 
the Administration saw it was a matter of course that when the official backing (cober-
tura) lapsed the new cooperative died a quiet death. 
To others it should not be so obvious. About 60 settlers, some of them rich (for 
instance, the biggest poultry-keeper and several middlemen) had signed an adhesion 
list for a new cooperative. 40 had signed the foundation deed and 31 had paid the 
equivalent of US $ 22 each as initial share. Nevertheless, when the leaders, a middle-
man and a relatively big landowner, found their political connections severed, so that 
the chance of financial or other governmental support diminished greatly, the coope-
rative, although existing juridically, was never heard of again. To my mind, this strong-
ly suggests that (1) the cooperative was the initiative of a few people who saw a 
chance of obtaining benefits, including, probably,|personal benefits, and was not or-
ganized by a group who wanted a cooperative: (2) those benefits were not seen as the 
fruits of the normal operation of the cooperative but as favours from the government, 
that could not otherwise be obtained; and (3) the change of government not only put 
an end to the hope of obtaining the favours in question, but made the whole organi-
zational build-up superfluous.130 
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It is a pity that the cooperative never had the opportunity to operate, because it is 
not impossible that it would have been fairly successful. In a country where communi-
ty and impersonal solidarity are weak, the answer may be an association run authori-
tatively by a few people, almost as a private company, yet with enough control to 
prevent misuse of their position. 
About a year later, when I left the project, I was told that Matias and Achilles had 
begun to look for new sources of support. This time they were seeking rapport with 
the local Church. 
It is easy, of course, to mock at these attempts to seek patronage. But one must not 
forget that the benefits can be considerable. Matias had almost succeeded in getting 
electricity to the project. Funds ran out after the high-tension cable had been installed 
but if the regime had not changed he would probably have obtained more funds. It is 
not unlikely that he would have initiated other schemes131. 
It is therefore not surprising that the disposition to seek assistance through patro-
nage can at times be obstinate. How obstinate is illustrated by Goat's story. Having 
been deeply involved in politics, Goat is certainly not representative of the majority 
of the settlers. But his story makes clear what involvement in politics at village level 
may mean, in terms of patronage. 
Goat's story 
Goat accosted me one day when I was drinking coffee at Manoel's roadside bar. 
He was dressed in white as an employee of the hospital, but he started to talk about 
the bad state of the road which led to his farm, in the north-east corner of the project. 
They needed a truck to transport sand. He would provide the people to carry out the 
repairs; fifty men, or a hundred if I wanted that many. Goat thought that I belonged 
to the newly organized Institute for agrarian reform, INBRA, which had succeeded 
SUPRA after the 'revolution'. I explained what I was doing in the project and offered 
him something to drink. The conversation became general. Those present knew 
Goat and they pulled his leg continuously. He had been one of the leaders of the 
Peasants Association of Itaguaf and for some years been active in politics. After the 
recent 'revolution' he had been kept in custody for some weeks but had finally been 
released. The others derided him, but not in a nasty way. They said he had become 
engaged in politics as a wag. The leaders had taken to their heels in time (they knew 
what it was all about, said the bar-tender with heavy sarcasm), but Goat had had to 
take the blame. Those present did not believe Goat's stories and caught him out as-
king for particulars. The way in which they differed in opinion, however, was remar-
kable: friendly, in good humour and as if they were not really serious. "With your 
permission, Goat; afterwards you finish with your story", interrupted the bar-tender 
him. 
Goat was class-conscious. He told of landowners who drove their cattle at night 
into the fields of a neighbour, to force him to sell his land, but he did not mention 
any names. That would be too dangerous, he said. The project he saw as a result of 
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presidential actions. Getulio had constructed it all. Janio Quadros had emancipated 
it because he had not known what was happening. The new concrete bridges, the 
recovery of the hospital, that was the work of Jango. 
A week later I went to see him in his house. It was well kept and seemed fairly new. 
Inside, however, it looked as if the constructors had just left and the family had not 
yet moved in. A table was the only piece of furniture. We sat on crates. A young boy 
was sitting on the concrete floor, playing. 
Goat had been living in the project for 25 years. His father had been settler on a 
farm in Santa Cruz once but he had sold it and now lived in Seropedica, a hamlet near 
the Agricultural University. His brother, though primarily a shopkeeper, still owned a 
farm in the project. Goat's political career had started in 1952, when he founded an 
Association of Peasants in Nova Iguacu, a suburb of Rio. Apparently it had not been a 
great success, because in 1955 he had gone to work in Sao Paulo. A year later he was 
back again and founded the Peasant Association of Itaguai. He earned his living as a 
sort of freelance reporter. Armed with petitions to redress particular abuses, he went 
to politicians to ask for their assistance. Nothing much was accomplished until a 
newly elected Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro instituted a programme for 
agrarian reform, called Piano Piloto. The Itaguaf Association received money for a 
concrete bridge in the project and teachers' honoraria for adult education. Goat also 
reaped some personal benefits during this period. He said that the Governor wanted 
to name him tax inspector, but this was impossible because he was illiterate132. Instead, 
he was made the local representative of the Piano Piloto programme. He also made 
a trip to Italy, all expenses paid, to study land reform there, and was invited to sit 
on the committee of the State Federation of Peasant Associations. But the Governor 
of the State had died suddenly, before the end of his term. Goat had an old newspaper 
photo which showed him being carried away^unconscious from the bier of his patron. 
The new Governor discontinued the Piano Piloto and Goat's local organization began 
to wither away. For almost two years he searched for another patron, without being 
very successful. One politician whom he supported was not elected. Another was: 
the Federal Deputy of renown, already referred to. This Deputy carried one of Goat's 
petitions to Brasilia and took the matter up with the authorities. But he died in 1962. 
In the meantime, Goat ingratiated himself with a local point-4 programme, which 
gave him a small allowance, and for which he carried out a socio-economic survey of 
lower class families in the municipality. 
Locally, political influence went to another group, headed by Matias of the Ad-
ministration and Achilles, a middleman. Together with eleven others, Goat stood for 
municipal councilman, but after he lost the election (which Achilles won) he got in 
with the new group. Matias got him a job in the hospital, which was to be reopened 
soon. Although he had lost his local following (he only received five votes at the elec-
tion) Goat continued to be active in the State. At least on paper his Association still 
existed, and he made the most of it, visited other associations, went to political rallies, 
and was around generally. At one time he also managed to get Deputy Brandao to 
be God-father to one of his children. Later Matias also became a compadre. The latter 
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(who had lost his influence after the recent 'revolution') was like a father to him, 
Goat said. Only yesterday he had lent him some money. The irony was that some 
years before, Mafias and Achilles had undone the only direct local action of Goat's 
Association, the invasion and occupation of an area of the project then still undistri-
buted, where Matias had been grazing his cattle for years. They had fired a few shots 
in the air and had put the invading peasants' huts to the torch. Goat now explained 
that Matias was not to blame for this episode; he had been under orders. 
The farm on which Goat lived belonged to a Rio lawyer, who was, he said, a 
friend of his. He did not have to pay rent. The land was lying fallow; Goat grew beans 
on a plot of maybe ten by thirty meters and he had planted some bananas. Despite his 
fervent pleas for land reform and government assistance to peasants, he himself ob-
viously had no stomach for agriculture. People called him maluco (crazy). Perhaps he 
was but at least he had not enriched himself, like the big shots. But then, as the cynical 
bar-tender had said, they knew what it was all about, Goat did not. "You do not even 
know how to steal, Goat", he had snorted. 
Although Goat's story is only indirectly connected with the project, it is told here 
to show that it contains the same elements encountered already in the foregoing case 
histories: 
1. Association in the expectation of benefits 
2. Actual favours 
3. A change of administration 
4. Termination of the benefits as a result of this change 
5. Dissolution of the group. 
Noteworthy too in Goat's case is the number of his patrons and the instability of 
his personal relationships and alliances owing to the many changes of patron. Matias 
had once been if not his enemy then his opponent. His relation with the President of 
the Itaguai Peasant Association (Goat himself had been vice-President) had cooled 
considerably, witness the fact that they had both stood for election as municipal coun-
cillor. The Brazilian agronomist who had directed the point-4 programme in Itaguai 
was accused by Goat of having cheated him of his allowance. This may be untrue and 
an effort to dissociate himself publicly from somebody who, after the 'revolution', 
was considered a subversive element; but even so, the effort was made. 
The ordinary farmer 
If one is to assess the importance of patronage in the daily life of an ordinary far-
mer who is not involved in politics, one has to know him rather intimately. Since I 
never came to know many farmers that intimately, I am unable to indicate precisely 
how far the one example I am going to relate is representative. It is certain that the 
great majority of settlers had similar patronage relations, but I cannot say whether 
they had as many, or whether these relationships served the same purpose. The man 
I am referring to, Joâo, was possibly a bit more dependent than others, having no 
land of his own, but his case is illustrative of many others. 
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Joao maintained relations with several persons who were of higher socio-economic 
status and who could become, or to some extent already were, patrons. I am not 
saying that he consciously maintained these relationships to tap possible sources of 
favours; that was not so. I am only saying that in addition to sympathy, friendship 
and other considerations, patronage undoubtedly played a role.To avoid an accumula-
tion of small stories, I have made a list of actual and eventual patrons whom Joao fre-
quented (table 48). With some patrons, it is true, the actual favours given were not 
Table 48. Patronage relationships of a farmer in Piranema. 
Category of patron Actual favours Possible future favours Return service 
Extension officer 
Priest 
Employee of Adminis-
tration 
Shopkeeper (local) 
Storekeeper (not 
local, co-father) 
Politician (through 
others) 
Sociologist 
Prominent Japanese 
settlers 
Employee of 
prefecture 
Neighbour (non-
local merchant) 
Peasant Association1 
free samples, seed, 
advice, protection 
free gifts of food 
(milk powder), medi-
cines 
resolution of conflict 
credit, sharecropping 
contract 
credit 
recommendation for 
job in industry, 
participation in 
invasion of fazenda 
gifts 
sharecropping 
contracts, favourable 
treatment 
resolution of 
conflict, assistance 
in bureaucratic 
matters, appointment 
of wife as school 
janitor(?) 
milk, fruit 
none 
recommendation to be pressingotherstoattend 
granted land 
grant a piece of land 
for house 
recommendation to be 
granted land 
meetings, regular atten-
dance 
attendance at mass and 
other meetings 
prestige 
frequenting shop also 
when not in debt 
presents to son, interest unknown 
in son's career, assis-
tance 
help to acquire land praise, prestige, votes 
recommendation to be 
granted land 
information, hospita-
lity, introductions 
help to repair road, 
prestige 
unknown 
access to land 
keep an eye on farm, 
keep him informed 
bridge construction, 
prestige to leaders 
1 Membership for two years, discontinued because Japanese settlers did not look favourably upon 
Association. 
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really personal benefits that could not have been obtained otherwise than through 
patronage. In those cases, however, the possible favours clearly were important. In 
addition to illustrating active patronage-seeking, the list shows how often apparently 
'normal' relations become tinged with patronage. Some of the eventual patrons more-
over obviously saw themselves as such. The extension officer spoke to me more than 
once of his attempts to help Joao to acquire a piece of land. The patronic syndrome 
enters into a relationship quite naturally. Recourse to patrons comes naturally too. 
Once Joao's other neighbour (not the one on the list) complained to the Administra-
tion of the project that Joao had built, about seven meters behind his house but not 
on land belonging to this neighbour, a very rustic bamboo fence to prevent his chickens 
from straying. I was not in Rio at the time; Joao told me the story afterwards. Ap-
parently he got into a panic, fearing that the complaint would attract official attention 
to the fact that his house stood at the roadside on public property. He saw patron 
No. 3 about it who introduced him to the Administrator if the project, he visited the 
prefecture in Itaguai (patron No. 9) and saw the extension officer (No. 1), all with 
the purpose of obtaining protection against the complaint. Only after he had seen these 
people did he talk with the discontented neighbour, and found that the matter could be 
easily settled to the satisfaction of both parlies. He convinced the man that the fence 
did not in the least imply intended encroachment upon his land, and in return receiv-
ed permission to leave things as they were. 
I believe that the stories and case histories leave little doubt that the disposition to 
seek patronage is widespread and that the quest itself endangers all associations based 
on cooperation and solidarity. 
Everyday examples of the lack of solidarity and unity among the settlers are hard 
to come by. The absence of something is more difficult to demonstrate than its pre-
sence. The observer does not so much see something as miss something. Besides, after 
a while he is liable to get used to this deficiency. I have never come across or heard 
tell of examples of institutionalized mutual help (mutirao), and I do not believe that 
I missed them. What one observes is a settler who deliberately drains onto the land 
of his absentee neighbour (deliberately because he has dug a ditch in that direction). 
Or another settler who sighs that his neighbours are not willing to help solve their 
common drainage problem by digging a deep ditch to the nearest canal. Or one hears 
settlers lament that, since their neighbours do not combat ants, they may as well stop 
doing it themselves. Why don't their neighbours do it? "Sauva nao come p6 de boi" 
(Ants are not meat-eaters). Or one hears of the numerous rows because cattle have 
strayed, a fence has caught fire when a neighbour's field was burnt off. One notices 
the eventual paralysis and disappearance of most recreational associations, such as 
the Lideranca Football Club, the Piranema Athletic Club, the Teatro das Fantochas, 
so that in 1964 only the recreational association founded by the Japanese settlers 
survived in Piranema. 
A quantitative illustration of the lack of unity in this section is given by table 49, 
which presents the outcome of the 1962 municipal elections in the project. Although 
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able 49. Distribution of votes in 1962 local election, Piranema.1 
Number of Number of votes Remarks 
candidate he received 
1 374 Achilles, elected councillor 
2 104 -3 70 employee of Administration; left afterwards 
4 69 -5 54 -6 46 brother of Goat, shopkeeper 
7 36 President of Itaguaf Peasant Association 
8 31 a president of 2nd cooperative, ran shop in project 
9 20 employee of prefecture, later of hospital in project 
10 13 one-time manager of 2nd cooperative 
11 5 Goat, Vice-President of Itaguaf Peasant Association 
total 822 
1 All candidates lived in Piranema. 
all candidates were, at least on paper, affiliated to some political party, it was the 
number of candidates and not the number of parties which caused the list to be so 
long. Ideological differences played a minor role, if any. Among the candidates were 
several shopkeepers, a middleman, two public functionaries, and some settlers. Achu-
les, middleman and up-and-coming landowner, was affiliated to the Labour Party. 
The extreme vote-sphtting which occurred prevented a second municipal councillor 
from being elected by the settlers. This would have been possible and would have given 
Piranema a greater voice in the allocation of municipal funds. 
There are, of course, also examples of cooperation in the project. Mostly between 
relatives, sometimes between friends. Incidentally the members of a larger group 
cooperate, such as a neighbourhood that repairs a road, or the members of a sect 
who construct a chapel. But such cooperative endeavours are few and far between. 
Something is needed to enhance cooperation and solidarity. The following section 
will deal with the possibilities I see in this respect. 
Remedies to the lack of solidarity 
In the recent past, Brazil has known groups of peasants or farmers who were 
cooperative and united. I am referring to the groups which assembled around charis-
matic religious leaders such as Antonio Conselheiro, Padre Cicero, Joáo Maria, or 
Pedro Batista. There can be no doubt that these leaders roused in their followers very 
strong feelings of solidarity and unity, a great willingness to work hard and sustained-
ly, and great religious fervour (cf. especially Queiroz, 1957, and Queiroz, n.d.). Of at 
least one of them, Batista, a contemporary leader, it is known that he promoted the 
introduction and acceptance of a host of innovations (Queiroz, 1963). It is of impor-
tance to note that these leaders did not augur in a break with the pattern of dependen-
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ce and patronage. They were regarded as patrons and they acted as patrons, provi-
ding people with pieces of land, arranging loans, counselling, blessing. But essentially 
they were messianic patrons; it was believed that the real benefits which would be 
obtained through them consisted of some future salvation or paradisial state of 
affairs on earth. It is difficult to judge in how far the long duration of the attitudes of 
cooperation, hard work and solidarity, instilled in the followers, was due to the sacred 
nature of the hoped-for ultimate benefits. It is likely that the followers were on good 
behaviour to obtain these ultimate benefits. This raises the question whether a secular 
leader would have achieved similar results. There are examples of group solidarity 
vis-a-vis outside groups, infused by non-religious leaders (Moraes, 1963) but I know 
of no non-religious leader who dedicated as much attention to the day-to-day beha-
viour of his followers as the religious leaders did. It is not impossible that a hope for 
materialistic, secular benefits would soon flag if the latter failed to materialize. How-
ever, the effects of the cooperation and the sustained effort which the religious leaders 
evoked were beneficial in themselves and reinforced the hope for further sacred bene-
fits entertained by their followers. 
It seems that within the prevailing culture, of which the patronic syndrome is an 
important part, an incorruptible leader, who is not after his own interest, can achieve 
a considerable change for the better. His leadership derives from the fact that he is 
a patron. His patronage is not limited to a single favour but is continuous. Because of 
this, and also because of the moral authority stemming from his incorruptibuity, he 
is in a position to demand from his followers a continuing effort in return, not just 
one short burst of loyalty. It certainly helps if such a leader is regarded as the embodi-
ment of spiritual values which emphasize surmounting one's egoistic inclinations. Not 
only the changes wrought by the charismatic leaders, but also those observed by Wil-
lems (1955) in small contemporary groups of people in rural Sao Paulo, suggest that 
everyday behaviour is altered more easily when religious sanctions are brought into 
play. 
Further sociological and historical research is needed to clear up this point and to 
answer the question whether, and how, it is possible to create such leaders. If it remains 
a matter of chance whether they will appear or not in certain places and at certain 
times, we cannot do more than cross our fingers and hope that they will in fact come 
forward. In the project of Santa Cruz, they have not yet appeared. There are a few 
indications of the importance of honest, unselfish leadership; indications consisting 
of the sad decline of some association or endeavour following the departure of the 
leader. One of the reasons for the rapid failure of the Piano Granjeiro after 1954, 
I was repeatedly told, was the sudden death, in a traffic accident, of the female veteri-
narian who was directing the programme at the time. The 1958 report of the Admini-
stration noted that a youth vocational training course, which had been running for 
almost two years and even had been provided with its own farm in the project, had 
lapsed when the leader, an Itaguai priest, returned to Italy. The second cooperative 
began to degenerate when the agronomist who had been its gerente was squeezed out 
"because he was employed by the Administration". 
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President Goulart visits Piranema. The platform is filled to capacity with clients of clients. 
Awaiting the march-past 
road in Piranema after some rainfall 
Pounding rice 
Even though one cannot very well recommend the creation of charismatic leaders in 
the project of Santa Cruz, the past achievements of such leaders suggest where a first 
remedy to the problems attendant upon the patronic syndrome must be sought. The 
charismatic leaders were incorruptible (or rather were thought to be incorruptible), 
durable, diffuse patrons who demanded a certain behaviour in return. They were com-
patible with the syndrome; in a way, it can be said that they used it. 
I believe therefore that, in the absence of charismatic leaders, the next best is to 
institutionalize patronage. The agency which executes a project should not leave it, 
but stay on as its official patron. Although its incorruptibility is not automatically 
assured, measures can be taken to prevent its local agent, the administrator, from 
using his position to his personal advantage. Government assistance in agricultural 
production, marketing, public facilities, education, or health can be officially and 
consciously directed to the project through this agency. At the same time, steps can 
(and should) be taken to protect the agency itself from non-governmental political 
pressure. In this way the durability and diffuseness of the patronage can be assured. 
Finally, the agency can be given the power to apply sanctions. 
To some extent, the various agencies which ran the project of Santa Cruz did play 
this role of patron. But they never functioned as such officially and consciously. The 
gerente of the cooperative could be shouldered out when he obstructed some political 
machinations. Later he could be made to resign as Administrator of the project. Sanc-
tions against those who illegally sold or bought plots were, at best, applied halfhearted-
ly, often not at all. In short, although the administrative agency sometimes did func-
tion as a patron, it was never explicitly meant to do so. Administrators never learned 
to see their own patronage dispensing role clearly. One Administrator (the gerente 
of the second cooperative who was made to resign) recommended during an interview 
that the State assign executive directors to all agricultural cooperatives in land-
settlement projects but at the same time deplored the paternalism which, he said, up 
to 1950 had marked the actions of the Administration of the project of Santa Cruz. 
I believe that the patronage dispensing role of the agency which administers devel-
opment projects such as Santa Cruz should be officially recognized and defined. This 
seems to have several advantages 
1. Agricultural development is not conditional on the prior disappearance of the 
patronic syndrome, since the syndrome can be held in check, as it were, by the agency. 
Anyway it is questionable whether traditional culture can change rapidly in such a 
way that the syndrome disappears. 
2. As the agency functions in many respects as a local patron, a relapse into the tra-
ditional social structure, marked by private patrons who misuse their position to a 
greater or lesser degree, can be prevented. In the project of Santa Cruz, such a relapse 
has occurred. 
3. Allowance is made for the fact that, on the regional and national level, the institu-
tion of patronage remains necessary to obtain benefits which cannot otherwise be 
obtained, such as public works and services. 
Such an institutionalization of patronage does not mean that no attempt at all is 
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undertaken to weaken the attitudes and values that form the patronic syndrome. The 
agency which administers a project can gradually transfer many of its tasks to the 
people themselves and just keep a close watch on the course of events. The powers 
should be retained to intervene and stop undesirable developments183. 
As to the organization itself of cooperatives, it may be useful to take up an idea 
mentioned to me by the Brazilian sociologist C. A. de Medina. He envisaged grouping 
a small number of farmers, who know each other informally, say 8 or 10 neighbours, in 
subcooperatives. Some cooperative activities and tasks, such as the mechanical pre-
paration of the soil and various marketing and buying operations, could then be 
delegated to these subcooperatives. Bank credit could be given directly to them or 
through a parent cooperative consisting of several such groups. The intimate infor-
mal relations between the members of afsubcooperative could be much more successful 
than the weak control exercised by relative strangers in preventing committee mem-
bers from abusing their position. Abuse, venality, irresponsibility would become much 
more of a sin and would be subject to more severe and immediate sanctions. Although 
such subcooperatives would be unsuitable for certain tasks, the idea deserves a try. 
Larger cooperatives should, I believe, fall under the control of the administering 
agency of the project, or of a special State agency where there is no project. The con-
scious use of patronage, recommended above, should include the direction of, or at 
least control over, cooperatives134. 
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7 Ethos in agriculture 
Introduction 
In the project of Santa Cruz, traditional values and attitudes appear not only in 
social relations but also in agricultural production. This chapter will deal with the 
values and attitudes which affect production and allocation of resources in the project. 
These cultural elements are part of a traditional culture pattern that will be called here 
the 'Grand Tradition'. After describing briefly its most characteristic historical traits, 
I will seek reasons why this tradition, derived from great landowners, and not some 
other tradition has been transferred to the settlers in Santa Cruz. In the last section I 
will try to find how far the respondents adhere to the 'Grand Tradition'. It will be 
seen that many of the values and attitudes pertaining to the ['Grand Tradition' can 
be observed in the project but that the high adopters sometimes do not hold to it any 
longer. It will become clear that not all elements of the tradition are incompatible 
with the success of a system of small family farms. Some are, some are not. It will be 
necessary to state each time which conditions of the system a particular value or 
attitude does not meet, or more generally: in how far it imposes a certain line of 
development by restricting alternative lines. 
The 'Grand Tradition' of agriculture 
Except for a short period after the Colony of Brazil was founded, in which extrac-
tion of Brazilwood was his main occupation, the Portuguese settler has concentrated 
from the begktning on commercial agriculture. In the absence of gold or precious 
stones, which were found only much later, his aim was to acquire wealth by cultiva-
ting, processing and exporting sugar. He did not turn to agriculture because he had 
always been a farmer, or because he wanted to ensure his subsistence. He did it be-
cause it was the only way he saw to grow rich. "The truth of the matter is that many 
of the colonists who here became big proprietors had no real love for the land and no 
taste for its cultivation.... The ideal for them would have been not a plantation eco-
nomy, but another India, with which they might, in the manner of the Israelites, carry 
on a trade in spices and precious stones; or a Mexico or Peru from which they might 
extract gold and silver" (Freyre, 1946, p. 32). 
After sugar, which was grown along the coast, and cattle ranching, which was 
taken up in the drier regions of the interior, later centuries saw the rise of other com-
mercial crops. Some, such as coffee and rubber eventually covered enormous regions, 
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though rubber remained part of the natural vegetation and was only sporadically 
grown on plantations; others, such as cotton, cocoa, citrus and sisal, remained restric-
ted to smaller areas, mainly for climatic reasons. But in all cases (except rubber which 
was collected) the pattern was the same: large holdings, production for the market 
with slaves or indentured labourers, and monoculture. This had become the 'Grand 
Tradition' of agricultural production, a norm and a value. The objective was the 
acquisition of wealth (Prado, 1961, p. 34). 
Land and soil 
In the last chapter it was shown that the Portuguese Crown granted large tracts of 
land to a small number of rich men, to stimulate the settlement of the country by 
private entrepreneurs, and also because the production of sugar required a large 
capital outlay. This concentration of land has endured to the present: plantations 
and fazendas still tend to be large. One of the reasons for the permanence of the large-
scale agricultural exploitation is that the sheer quantity of land has come to fulfil 
important functions in the production process. 
The abundance of land permits the owner to increase production, when the price 
is attractive, by simply increasing the area under a crop (Medina, 1964, p. 82). 
Conversely, production can be decreased by reducing the area under cultivation. In 
line with this behaviour, landowners tended to acquire more land when the crop they 
were planting was in high demand and the price therefore remunerative. A boom meant 
further concentration (cf. Stein, 1961, p. 19). When the cultivation of a crop became 
unprofitable, estates broke up (Prado, 1960, p. 225 et seq.), though not always. 
Another possibility was for the fazenda to fall back on subsistence farming. That way 
it could weather a period of crisis without a radical change in the tenure system (Fur-
tado, 1963, p. 56 et sqq.). 
The quantity of land was also functional in view of the rather primitive methods of 
production. The more land he had, the better the owner could rotate fields. By fallow-
ing used land he could prevent or at least postpone soil exhaustion. However, the 
slow southward movement of coffee for the past hundred years, from Espirito Santo 
through the States of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo to Parana, due to soil exhaustion, 
shows that maintenance of fertility had little to do with the size of coffee-estates. 
In fact, the landed proprietors generally cared very little for the soil. There was so 
much land that it seemed inexhaustible, a resource that did not need protection. It was 
seen as a sort of mine. The indifference to maintenance of soil fertility and to erosion 
control led everywhere to decreasing yields and soil exhaustion. Only in some cases, 
a period of fallow re-established a measure of fertility; in other instances soil deteriora-
tion became permanent and led to the replacement of the original cash crop by tol-
erant food crops or pasture. The most dramatic example of the disappearance of a 
crop from an entire region is provided by coffee, which can hardly now be found in the 
State of Rio de Janeiro where in the nineteenth century it was by far the most impor-
tant cash crop. Even in our day, it seems that cocoa is being gradually replaced by 
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pasture in the State of Bahia (CIDA, 1966, p. 496 et sqq.). 
Some authors argue that for a long time it was more advantageous for the owner 
to buy land elsewhere and open a new fazenda in a sparsely settled region rather than 
incur costs to maintain soil fertility in the old place (James, 1955; Prado, 1963). 
Only recently, with the growing scarcity of virgin land, has it become more profitable 
to employ modern techniques for mamtaining fertility (Prado, 1963). In the forties and 
fifties of this century coffee reappeared in areas where it had been replaced by other 
crops and pasture some decades earlier. This time the growers gave manure and 
fertilizer, and controlled erosion by contour-planting or terracing (Monbeig, 1957, 
p. 184). 
But this does not detract from the assertion that the 'Grand Tradition' of agricul-
ture did not contain any love for or attachment to the soil. Traditionally, the commercial 
production of crops has been followed by declining yields and soil deterioration. The 
exceptions are still few. 
Crops 
Also the attitudes towards crops were shaped by the 'Grand Tradition'. To produce 
for a market implies the existence of a market. For centuries, the only profitable mar-
ket for which Brazilian agriculture could produce has been the export market. Sugar, 
tobacco, cotton, rubber, coffee and sisal were entirely or mostly produced for export. 
The cultivation on a large scale, especially of sugar, inhibited the production of food-
stuffs. The authorities attempted to redress matters by obliging big proprietors to 
plant food crops too, but they did not meet with much success. One landowner pro-
tested openly that he "was not going to plant one single cassava stalk, so as not to 
commit the absurdity of desisting from the best crop of the country in favour of the 
worst that could be found" (Prado, 1961, p. 43). Many foreign visitors have wondered 
in the past why Brazil still imported foodstuffs (such as butter, wheat and cheese) 
that it could produce at home (cf. Spix and von Martius, n.d.). Paradoxically, food 
prices were often high in Brazil, but as markets were small and could not absorb great 
quantities of a product without a fall in price, an extension of food production was a 
real risk. The preference for commercial agriculture therefore implied a preference for 
export crops, and later also for crops which were sufficiently in demand on the inter-
nal market to assure the sale of large quantities. In short, a preference for cash crops 
rather than subsistence food crops. Sometimes a preference for perennial cash crops, 
since these gave less work than annual crops (Amaral, 1954, p. 263). 
Work 
Working and the employment of labour were also influenced by the practice and 
ethos of the 'Grand Tradition'. Since the expansion of the sugar industry in the North-
East of the country in the sixteenth century, labour on the estates has been furnished 
by slaves, first by autochthonous Indians captured during expeditions to the interior, 
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later by Negro slaves imported from Africa. After the Abolition of slavery in the late 
nineteenth century, the Sao Paulo coffee-planters for some time paid the fare to Brazil 
of European labourers who came to work on their fazendas. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that for centuries manual work was associated with 
slavery and hence despised. Work was for negroes (Santos Filho, 1956, p. 37). "As 
soon as they set foot in Brazil", said an eighteenth-century governor of Rio de Janei-
ro, "the Portuguese even if they grew up with a hoe in their hands, do not want 
to work any more" (Viana, 1933, p. 84). Landowners particularly were inclined to 
show by conspicuous idleness that they did not need to work. "It was the slaves who, 
literally, became their masters' feet, running errands for their owners and carrying 
them about in hammock or palanquin. They also became their masters' hands, at least 
their right hands; for they it was who dressed them, put on their trousers and their 
boots for them, and hunted over their persons for fleas", Freyre (1946, p. 428) tells 
us, referring to the golden age of the sugar region in the North-East. Although such 
extreme idleness has disappeared, not to have to work has remained a value in agricul-
ture. Farming is done with labourers (cf. Amaral, 1958,1, p. 21; II, p. 153). 
Work was held in contempt, yet a labour force was necessary if anything was to be 
produced. It was also something that had to be acquired at a cost. For centuries, rural 
labour has been rather scarce and expensive. After Abolition, the institution of share-
cropping became one of the means of tying labour to the estate at no monetary cost. 
Other arrangements also existed, from granting peasants a piece of land just to assure 
their presence at the time they would be needed as paid labourers, during planting and 
harvesting, to the cambao, the obligation to work without wages or for a low wage 
for a certain number of days for the proprietor in exchange for the use of a piece of 
his land. Proprietors generally tended to employ many workers but at a low monetary 
cost to themselves. Payment in kind or in land seems to have been more widespread 
during times of economic recession than during booms. Then many owners took to 
money wages and cultivated the lucrative crop on the vacated fields (Prado, 1960). 
Capital 
Another of the peculiarities of the 'Grand Tradition' of agricultural production 
was the allocation of capital. Since production was normally increased by an exten-
sion of the area under the crop, very Utile money was spent to raise productivity per 
acre or per man. Capital was rarely employed in cultivation but in purchasing slaves, 
and in processing and transporting the product. It was, of course, also used for acquir-
ing new land. 
The Sao Paulo coffee planters may have financed the building of railways (Dean, 
1966), but in earlier centuries transport was not a matter of cooperation. With the 
exception of the cattle-ranchers, whose products transported themselves, every large 
landowner possessed his own means of transport, organized his own mule trains, and 
sometimes also the storage of his produce (Viana, 1933, p. 236). 
As to processing, much ingenuity went into the improvement of sugar-refining meth-
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ods, and inventions were readily adopted (Simonsen, 1962, p. 99 et sqq.), although 
in the nineteenth century the steam engine was slow to replace water-power and 
draught animals in the sugar refineries (Andrade, 1963, p. 83 et sqq.). 
It is therefore not surprising that observers are contradictory about the innovative-
ness of Brazilian landowners. Agricultural production methods did not change much 
for centuries and from this it was concluded that the proprietors did notacceptchange135. 
Yet processing methods were sometimes readily changed138, new lands were im-
petuously brought under cultivation, and this gave rise to a contrary conclusion (Si-
monsen, 1962; Rodrigues, 1956, p. 56). But if I have correctly appraised the features 
of the 'Grand Tradition' it follows that agricultural production methods remained 
static for centuries not because they were in any way sacred or hallowed by tradition, 
but because they were, or seemed to be, the most immediately profitable. It is true 
that agricultural and industrial development in Sao Paulo and Parana has been dynam-
ic during the last seventy years or so. This development has led some observers to 
posit the theory of the two Brazils (e.g. Lambert, 1953), one archaic, colonial and 
resistant to change, the other modern, open to change and marked by great mobility. 
Yet I believe that the difference, apart from the contribution of immigrants, is due 
to changed circumstances rather than to changed mentalities. Prado (1963) described 
how proprietors from the 'old' rural zone of Paraiba participated in the settlement of 
those dynamic pioneer zones of Sao Paulo and Parana. Dean (1966) writes that "the 
entrepreneurial success of the Paulista planters as a class may be attributed not to 
innate or to cultural endowments but (1) to the operation of a profitable market, 
which attracted outsiders and rewarded the capable; (2) to capital brought from other 
places and other activities; (3) to the necessity of conforming to the requirements of 
a market economy, particularly to free labour; and (4) to the nature of coffee culti-
vation, which rewarded the capitalistic, i.e. reinvesting planters". Dean qualifies this 
last adjective by saying that reinvestment was in new land and in laying out new 
coffee plantations. 
Attitudes toward innovation, then, have not necessarily been negative in the past 
They seem to have varied on three criteria. 
1. The immediate financial rewards expected. 
2. The extent to which the innovation would interfere with other vested interests, 
established prerogatives or values of the proprietor. 
3. The financial status of the proprietor; whether he still had to make his fortune 
(or was counteracting its certain decline such as resulted from the ageing of the coffee 
trees) or was already rich (cf. Freyre, 1961, p. 528). 
Capital or wealth was not an end in itself but a means to an end. Money was spent 
easily by the great landed proprietors of the past. Their wealth enabled them to live 
in the grand style described by Freyre (1946) for the sugar regions in the North-East, 
and by Stein (1961) for the coffee zone in the State of Rio de Janeiro. Luxury was no 
sin, whatever Calvinist sects in Europe taught (Weber, 1956); on the contrary, it 
raised a man's prestige and was seen as the natural reward for acquired wealth. There 
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was little merit in saving, in frugality. The purpose of having money was to spend it. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that both the sugar and the coffee planters used credit 
to meet operating costs and before Abolition to purchase slaves. In times of crisis, 
many planters lost their estates through debts to creditors, often bankers or commerci-
al houses (Azevedo, n.d., p. I l l ; Freyre, 1961, p. 10; Stein, 1961). After Abolition, 
the same thing happened during the crisis of the 1930's to the cocoa planters (Semen-
zato, 1963, p. 7). 
The relevance of the 'Grand Tradition' 
The 'Grand Tradition' originated among great landed proprietors. Though some 
of the settlers in the Santa Cruz project, owning 200 or 300 hectares, may be called 
landowners, the great majority are clearly smallholders. So my claim may seem strange 
that this tradition, and not some other, influences farming in the project. Apart from 
the 'Grand Tradition', perhaps two other agricultural traditions may be distinguished 
in Brazil. One is the food-cropping that went on in between and on the big estates. 
Usually this subsistence sector was a secondary activity, subordinate to the commerci-
al sector (Furtado, 1963,p. 131). Slaves grew their own food; the peasants and labour-
ers who lived on the fazendas often received a piece of land to grow food crops for 
their own use. A fazenda could be well-nigh self-sufficient, and yet have commercial 
agriculture as its basic reason of existence (Santos Filho, 1956, p. 35). In some regions 
between the big estates belts of small farms existed on which food crops were grown. 
But this sort of food-crop production hardly deserves to be called a tradition. Even 
when it occurred on independent small farms and not on the estates themselves, it 
seems to have been a matter of necessity rather than of choice. Food-crop production 
expanded when the cultivation of some commercial crop became unremunerative 
and retracted when a new commercial crop became lucrative137. Almost without excep-
tion the ideal seems to have been to grow a crop that could be sold or else to keep 
livestock that could be transported to a market, if necessary over great distances. 
The other tradition may have been the subsistence tradition of independent settlers 
and squatters in peripheral regions. Such people of course had no choice but to pro-
duce their own food. Referring to the colonial period, Prado (1967, p. 185 et sqq.) 
asserts that subsistence farming was often found in regions where commercial agri-
cultural ventures had failed and was, in the main, carried out by people who had sett-
led there because they had found no place in the more prosperous agricultural regions. 
The accounts which European travellers have written of their peregrinations through 
Brazil in the nineteenth century abound with observations on the poor quality and 
small scale, in a word the neglect of agriculture in the interior of the country. What 
these travellers saw was, in fact, the absence of any tradition based on the family farm. 
It was a surprise and relief for Wells to come across a well run, prosperous family 
farm (Wells, 1886, II, p. 241). He also met proprietors who owned "eight miles of 
river frontage, by several miles deep", or "considerable herds and hundreds of square 
miles of land", yet were relatively poor and lived in mud houses, thatched with grass 
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(I, p. 315 et sqq.): proprietors who lacked means and a market, but held to the 'Grand 
Tradition'. 
The description that Candido (1964, p. 57 et sqq.) gives of such a subsistence tra-
dition in the State of Sao Paulo makes clear that it is not so much a tradition of 
peasants as one of seminomads, whose cultural ideal is the bandeirante, the adventurer-
explorer of earlier centuries. The caipira, as these peasants are called, attached great 
importance to such leisure activities as hunting, fishing, and social gatherings. Given 
their contentment with a low level of living, they did not have to work hard. The pre-
cariousness of their title to the land which they occupied, and the bringing of a new 
piece of land under cultivation every few years, reinforced the ephemeral character 
of their settlement and their agricultural production138. Yet, even in the Sao Paulo 
municipality where Candido in the 1950's studied the caipira tradition or what re-
mained of it, half a century earlier there had been a considerable production of coffee 
on large estates. In 1950 the area under cultivation in the municipality was only 73 % 
of what it had been in 1904, the number of coffee trees had fallen to 51 % and coffee 
production to 32% (p. 74). Also in that municipality the 'Grand Tradition' had been 
predominant once. The subsistence tradition only reappeared when coffee production 
declined and was not replaced by any other commercial crop. 
I believe, therefore, that the two subsistence traditions were both almost forced 
upon the rural population by particular circumstances (the absence of a marketable 
crop foremost among them). They have seldom, if ever, been regarded as ideals worth 
realizing under all circumstances. Apart from the 'Grand Tradition', Brazil has never 
possessed a proper tradition for smallholders139. Agriculture is either a way to riches 
or something one cannot avoid doing, but hardly ever a way of life140. 
The relevance of the 'Grand Tradition' in general is also suggested by the fact that 
in the most important areas which were settled during the last hundred years or so, 
the tenure structure and the methods of production that came to prevail were similar 
to those of the 'Grand Tradition'. The cocoa region in the State of Bahia, settled 
some 70 years ago, is at present in decline because the cocoa-trees have not been re-
placed in time by young trees and yields per tree have declined considerably. That is, 
not enough capital was plowed in to at least maintain yields per hectare (Semenzato, 
1963). The success of the Sao Paulo coffee planters was due to the opening up, in time, 
of new plantations somewhere else and not to their investing in the maintenance of 
fertility and yields of their actual plantations (Dean, 1966). 
Even though some time after settlement the tenure structure and the ways of pro-
duction in new areas came to resemble closely those prevalent in the traditional areas, 
it can be argued that this was due to the fact that some settlers in the new area were, 
or had been, great landed proprietors elsewhere (Dean, 1966; Moraes, 1963). Only 
of the cocoa region in Bahia I know that plantations were opened up by "anonymous 
men, without history" (Semenzato, 1963, p. 5). In other cases I do not know what 
part was played by former landowners and what part by poor peasants. Most inves-
tigators have been preoccupied with the rigidity of the tenure structure characteristic 
for the 'Grand Tradition'; I know of no study that focuses on the upward mobility 
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resulting from the occupation of new areas. Hence, it is often unknown whether it 
were the relatively poor, anonymous settlers or the former proprietors who were 
mainly responsible for establishing a tenure and production structure resembling 
that of the 'Grand Tradition'. Not seldom authors introduce 'commercial interests' 
and merchants who buy land and become landowners in new areas, but again the 
status of these people is not specified (Brandao, 1963, p. 43; Geiger, 1956; Medina, 
1958). Only casually is it sometimes observed that the smallholders in a region behave 
and farm in the same way as the landowners (Brandao, 1963, p. 28; Geiger, 1956, 
p. 56; Nogueira, 1962, p. 90). The second argument for the relevance of the 'Grand 
Tradition' is, therefore, that in recently settled areas it at least prevailed over other 
traditions, as long as a commercial crop could be grown. If circumstances are pro-
pitious, smallholders also seem to adhere to the 'Grand Tradition'. 
Other reasons for believing that it is the 'Grand Tradition' rather than some other 
agricultural tradition that influences people's behaviour in the project of Santa Cruz 
concern the local situation itself. The project is situated near one of the largest inter-
nal markets of Brazil, the city of Rio de Janeiro. There is no lack of market for crops 
in Santa Cruz; the farmers are not forced, by their isolation, to grow subsistence 
crops. On the contrary, the presence of so huge a market may be expected to solicit 
productive behaviour focused on commercial crops, i.e. in line with the 'Grand Tra-
dition'. 
Secondly, the Santa Cruz area is a settlement project, a newly occupied agricultural 
region without an established agricultural tradition. The previous chapter showed to 
what extent the concession of farms came to resemble the distribution of favours. 
Those benefited will often have considered their receipt of land as proof that the sup-
port from superior powers, for which they had been waiting to improve their lot, 
was finally forthcoming. This reaction, while it lasted, will have induced behaviour 
similar to that subsumed under the 'Grand Tradition', i.e. an effort to bring about 
such an improvement by growing rich. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that the great majority of the farm-operators were of 
rural stock: 86% of the Brazilian respondents had fathers who worked in agriculture, 
54% had fathers who owned a farm. This means that a good many of them would 
have been exposed to the 'Grand Tradition' during childhood and adolescence, either 
because their fathers adhered to it, or because the most prestigious people in the neigh-
bourhood where they grew up, the landed proprietors, did. 
Lastly in 1961 a sample survey141 of male heads of households and single indepen-
dent farmworkers living in Piranema showed that 66% of the respondents preferred 
a non-farming profession for their sons, and only 18% farming (Galjart, 1965a). 
This result again indicates that farming is, in general, not regarded as a way of life 
to be preferred above others, but as one way out of many of earning an income, and 
certainly not the best. It is unlikely that farming behaviour in the project is a reaction 
to circumstances rather than a result of any tradition. Chapter 5 has shown, and this 
chapter will show again, that the Japanese farm-operators often differ markedly from 
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the Brazilians, despite the similar circumstances. Indeed, implicit in my effort to 
show these differences is the idea that they can have derived only from differing tra-
ditions. 
The 'Grand Tradition' in the project of Santa Cruz 
Now that the most important elements of the 'Grand Tradition' in Brazilian agri-
culture have been outlined and its relevance has been argued, an attempt to show that 
it still influences production and investments in the Santa Cruz project will follow. 
As far as possible the various aspects of the tradition will be dealt with in the same 
order as in the second section, but some of the quantitative material to be presented 
involves two or more aspects. 
Crops 
Chapter 4 has shown that the crops grown in the project are mainly cash crops. 
Only maize and cassava are cultivated also as food crops for home consumption. 
The most popular crops, in terms of the number of farm-operators who cultivated 
them, were also the crops that were planted on the largest mean area. This is not 
a matter of course. The project should not be compared to some hypothetical region 
where, let us say, potatoes and barley are the most frequently planted crops and where 
it is found that farmers dedicate the largest part of their land to these two crops. In 
such a region, other crops would be more marginal. In the Santa Cruz project, how-
ever, many crops do well; there are farms dedicated in their entirety to crops that are 
not often planted by others: coconut palms, maracock, bananas in Piranema. Other 
fruit-trees and crops are planted almost exclusively for home consumption but pro-
duce very well, such as genipap, mango, jackfruit, sweet potatoes, yams, and several 
kinds of vegetables. 
This means that other than natural factors restrict the production of such crops. 
These factors are (1) the tendency to grow crops for sale; (2) the fact that the market 
is badly organized: most farm-operators are dependent on a limited number of mid-
dlemen, who have their own specialized outlets and do not buy everything; (3) the 
necessity for the individual farm-operator to find his own outlets for 'unusual' pro-
ducts, such as maracock, mango and other fruits which spoil easily142; (4) the fact 
that some crops need more care than others. 
Chapter 4 also mentioned that the number of farms on which a certain crop was 
grown could change rapidly in a short time. Farm-operators seemed to follow changes 
in prices keenly. But it appears now that the lack of marketing opportunities imposes 
restrictions: some crops could be grown on a larger scale, but are not because they 
are too difficult to sell. 
Chapter 5 showed that the Brazilian respondents had a certain preference for peren-
nial cash crops. The Japanese differed significantly from the Brazilians in that they 
planted more annual crops, and this difference was not due to their high adoption 
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scores; the fourth-quartile Brazilians did, if anything, plant perennial crops more of-
ten than the Brazilians who scored in the three lower quartiles. The Japanese also 
more often mentioned an annual crop as being of financial importance to them. I 
believe that the Brazilian preference for perennial crops is at least partly due to the 
traditional aversion for sustained manual work that cultivation of annual crops en-
tails without outside labour. Yet, for small farmers the risks in cultivating perennial 
crops are greater, or anyway last longer, than the risk in planting an annual crop for 
which demand turns out to be disappointing. Orange-trees take four years before they 
begin to bear any amount of fruit; once planted, the cost is made and the farmer hesi-
tates to cut them down solely because prices are low. 
The preference for cash crops which marked the 'Grand Tradition' in the past 
seems to continue practically unabated in the project of Santa Cruz. For agricultural 
development, this preference has advantages as well as drawbacks. The advantage is 
that farmers react quickly to price differences. The drawback is that, at least in the 
project, the tradition results in (1) an emphasis by many on particular crops for which 
more or less organized markets exist and not on others that would grow equally 
well; (2) the occurrence of periodic gluts and hence of low prices, either owing to a 
phenomenon similar to the famous pig cycle or to market imperfections; (3) greater 
risks and losses than small farmers can reasonably bear. In June 1965 I saw oranges 
rotting on the trees in the north-eastern, rather inaccessible part of the project. Such 
losses may lead to disappointment, discouragement, impoverishment, and eventually 
to sale of the farm and departure from the project (cf. Galjart, 1965a). 
In these circumstances, I believe that most farm-operators (especially those with-
out access to their own organized outlets) would be much better off with (a) an 
increase in the cultivation of food crops for home consumption; (b) the cultivation 
of a greater number of crops per farm to reduce the risk inherent in monoculture; 
and (c) an increase in the area under annual crops, to reduce dependence on income 
from perennial crops. This does not necessarily imply a reduction in the area "under 
perennial crops because the change could be at the expense of fallow. 
It is not the persistence itself of the 'Grand Tradition' in the kinds of crop that are 
planted that obstructs development, but its persistence under the limitations imposed 
by the marketing system. In the past only the big proprietors, by organizing their 
own marketing, were able to prosper despite these limitations. 
Chapter 4 already mentioned that the respondents also strive for individual indepen-
dence from the middlemen, thus emulating the big landowners of the 'Grand Tra-
dition'. Although it is possible that some will succeed in this endeavour, their very 
success will imply a gradual transition from a system of small family farms to a system 
of latifundia and minifundia. 
Land 
Coming much land, a value associated with the 'Grand Tradition' of agriculture in 
Brazil, was to some extent still a value for the respondents. The concentration which 
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Table 50. Frequency distribution of farm-owners according to national descent, practice adoption and 
investment. 
Category of owners Bought 
tractor 
only 
(1) 
Bought 
land 
only 
(2) 
Bought both 
land and 
tractor 
Test and level 
of significance 
(3) 
Non-Japanese 
Japanese 
Non-Japanese of 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile 
Non-Japanese of highest quartile 
Non-Japanese of 4th quartile 
Japanese of 4th quartile 
11 
7 
5 
7 
6 
5 
14 
4 
18 
1 
4 
1 
7 
5 
8 
7 
1 
7 
combining (1) and (3) 
X2 = 4.75; p<Q.05 
not significant 
X 2 = 8.32;/><0.02 
occurs in the project leaves no doubt that some people at least are trying to acquire 
great tracts of land. It is true that those who bought the most land in the project (220, 
even 300 hectares) did not start as settlers on a ten-hectare farm but came from out-
side. However, also among those who began with only one farm there are people who 
now own 40,60, or even 90 hectares. The settlers are not averse to owning much land. 
The tendency of high adopters to extend existing operations when offered credit and 
to rent land but not to lease it, make a further concentration likely. 
In the past, the possession of a lot of land had several functions. One was that pro-
duction could be raised easily by increasing the amount of land under cultivation in-
stead of adopting productivity-raising practices. It appears that many of the Brazilian 
respondents are still inclined to buy more land before they invest in such methods. 
Table 50 contains the frequency distribution of farm-owners who had acquired more 
land, a tractor, or both. In terms of cash outlay, a tractor is roughly comparable to a 
ten-hectare farm in the project. The two top rows of the table show that, whereas the 
Japanese have tended to buy a tractor first and then land, the Brazilian farm-owners 
gave higher priority to buying more land. The third and fourth row, however, indicate 
that this preference is found among the less innovative Brazilian farm-owners rather 
than among the owners who were high adopters. This is in line with the lack of sig-
nificant difference between the Japanese and the Brazilians in the highest adoption-
score quartile. Innovativeness seems to coincide with a change in value in that land 
is no longer preferred over a tractor. 
Table 50 shows that in the lower quartiles the purchase of more land was more 
common than the adoption of a tractor. Traditionally, an abundance of land often 
replaced the use of son protecting or improving practices. Since the need for erosion 
control was small in the project and the difficulties involved in estimating, on each 
farm, the need for additional drainage works would have been considerable, no ques-
tions about these two practices were included in the schedule. That leaves the use of 
manure, lime and fertilizer as indicators of how far the respondents tried to maintain 
and improve the fertility of their land. Table 51 shows the frequency with which these 
practices were used by various categories of respondents who scored in the highest 
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Table 51. Use of manure, fertilizer and lime by highest-quartile respondents. 
Category Used Used Used N 
manure fertilizer lime 
yes no yes no yes no 
Brazilians, operators1 of 1 farm 13 5 6 12 6 12 18 
Brazilians, owners of more than 1 farm 9 2 2 9 4 7 11 
Japanese 11 3 12 2 10 4 14 
1 Owners and non-owners. 
Table 52. Adoption of sown pasture by various categories of farm-owners who had pasture, in per-
centages {Japanese excluded). 
Quartiles Respondent Wild grass Partly sown Wholly sown N 
owned (1) (2) (3) 
1st, 2nd and 3rd 1 farm 77 10 12 67 
> 1 farm 80 10 10 10 
4th 1 farm 82 9 9 11 
> 1 farm 44 33 22 9 
Total 75 12 12 97 
quartile. Although in use of lime and fertilizer, Brazilian high adopters differed sig-
nificantly from their Japanese colleagues (see chapter 5), the two Brazilian categories 
did not differ among themselves. The possession of more land does not appear to be 
any longer a substitute for the use of these three innovations. 
Table 52 provides some further data on this issue. It shows the adoption of sown 
pasture by Brazilian farm-owners. Its adoption was not associated with practice adop-
tion in general; the percentage of those who had their pasture partly or wholly sown 
was 20 in the lowest quartile, 37 in the second, 14 in the third and 35 in the highest 
quartile. The only category of respondents that seemed to do a bit better in this re-
spect was the owner of more than one farm who scored in the highest quartile. The 
difference between him and all others was significant at the 5 % level143. In the lower 
quartiles, the possession of more than one farm did not affect the adoption of sown 
pasture at all. 
The literature indicates that in Brazil, unlike some non-Mediterranean culture areas, 
rural tradition was marked by a lack of attachment to the land. One indication of 
attachment can be that people are unwilling to leave the farm. Chapter 5 showed a 
slight positive association between practice adoption and the employment of older 
sons on the farm for non-Japanese respondents ( T c = 0.15, significant at the 10% 
level). If the employment of older sons may be interpreted as an indication of their 
attachment the finding suggests that it was not among the sons of the low adopters 
that such attachment was found. Farming seemed to be accepted mainly when it 
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provided the farmer with a reasonable income. In line with this tentative inference, 
it was found that among the fathers of absent older sons (i.e. sons who did not work 
on their fathers' farm or on another farm in the project), those who scored in the 
highest quartile had more often sons who farmed elsewhere (43 % against 20% of all 
other non-Japanese fathers) and less often sons who worked outside agriculture. This 
difference, however, was not significant at the 5 % level. It was also found that those 
Brazilian respondents who would accept a job in industry or commerce at the (then 
prevailing) legal minimum wage, generally scored in a lower adoption-score quartile 
than those who would not accept such a job (Mann Whitney U; p <0.001). For one 
thing, the former were also much less likely to own the land on which they farmed 
than the latter (x2 = 3.93; p <0.05). Finally, it may be recalled that in the section 
Santa Cruz (but not in the section Piranema) there was a significant association be-
tween length of residence in the project and practice adoption. In Santa Cruz, at 
least, the more innovative farmers have stayed longer in the project. That this associa-
tion exists at all is meaningful, because it is mitigated by the fact that the high adop-
ters are more likely to have an urban background and slightly less likely to have been 
the first concessionaires to their farm. 
To recapitulate, it was found that the respondents in the three lower adoption-
score quartiles still tended to adhere to some traditional values placed on land, where-
as those in the highest quartile seemed to be more free from these values. We may 
ask how far the existing attitudes and values for land are inimical to agricultural 
development. Chapter 5 provided a significant association between area owned and 
practice adoption. Table 50 suggests that this significance may be mostly due to the 
highest quartile: 42% of all non-Japanese farm-owners who owned more than one 
farm scored in that quartile. The example of the Japanese and Brazilian high adopters 
indicates that it is advantageous to modernize and mechanize before buying more 
land. To the extent that the tendency in the lower quartiles to buy land before buying 
a tractor is due to adherence to the value traditionally placed on much land, this value 
is inimical to agricultural development. 
Ten hectares are, of course, not much land for a modernizing farmer, unless he cul-
tivates it very intensively, a thing the Brazilian respondents seldom do. One cannot 
therefore seriously object to an increase in farm size to, say, thirty or forty hectares. 
However, farms of a hundred or even three hundred hectares, specklizing in cattle-
raising, run counter to the original aims of the settlement project, dislodge people and 
entail a loss of employment opportunities. It is true that the biggest of these cattle 
estates are found in the least accessible parts of the Piranema section, where prices 
of land have been lowest and agriculture, perhaps, more difficult and less remunerative 
than elsewhere in the project. In places, that is, where the original settlers have be-
come discouraged more rapidly and have been more inclined to sell. Yet, some other 
'estates in the making' consist of discontiguous 10-hectare plots spread all over a 
section. 
It is certain that the present concentration will continue. I do not know how fast; 
rather, I do not know for certain whether the high adopters and others like them have 
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a definite maximum farm size in mind when they buy land, nor what that size is. The 
two biggest owners in the latifundium part of Piranema were not interviewed, but I 
do not doubt that they would have scored in the highest quartile, if they had been. 
Two 'smaller' big proprietors with land in the same area were interviewed and did 
score in that quartile. This means that scoring in the highest quartile is not of itself a 
guarantee that a man will stop acquiring land when his farm is reasonably large. If 
there are many farmers who are IliinMng in terms of a hundred hectares or more, the 
danger exists that in another twenty years the project will have ceased to be a system 
of family farms, and a reversal will have occurred to the traditional tenure pattern of 
a few big, possibly even innovative proprietors144 and a mass of dependent workers. 
Whether one wants this to happen or not depends on a value judgement. The least 
one can say, however, is that it is neither practical nor cheap to begin with 800 farms 
of 10 hectares each if it is agreed to end up with 30-odd farms of 300 hectares. 
Labour 
The next values to be considered are those towards work and the employment of 
labour. Traditionally manual work, and thus most agricultural work, was held in 
low esteem in Brazil. I did not, however, measure the degree to which the respondents 
disliked work, nor whether they worked hard themselves. The conviction that the 
traditional dislike has persisted stems especially from qualitative information ob-
tained during informal interviews or by observation. All the same, some quantitative 
data can be used to support the argument. 
If the respondents really hold work in low esteem, one would expect to find that 
they avoid it, as far as possible, themselves. This could happen in two ways, by redu-
cing the amount of labour that is needed on the farm, and by employing others to do 
the work. A reduction in the amount of labour needed could be achieved in a variety 
of ways. Firstly, by planting labour-extensive perennial crops, or keeping cattle, 
instead of planting labour-intensive annual crops. Chapter 5 has shown that significant 
differences exist in cropping between the highest-quartile Japanese and the highest 
quartile Brazilians, but not between the Brazilians themselves. Ji* anything, the high-
adopters planted more perennial crops than the low adopters. Now the Japanese 
farm-operators did not only work harder themselves than their Brazilian peers (as 
could be observed) but they also employed more outside labour. To neutralize the 
variables ownership and innovativeness, in table 53 the Japanese and Brazilian farm-
Table 53. Employment of outside labour by Brazilian and Japanese highest-quartile owners, in percen-
tages. 
Employed Did not employ N 
labour labour 
Brazilian 64 36 28 Fisher exact probabil-
Japanese 93 7 14 ity test: p — 0.048 
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The press of a primitive cassava flour mill 
The cassava flour is dried and slightly roasted on top of an oven 
owners who scored in the highest quartile are compared for employment of outside 
labour. As the former had not more often more land than the latter, the significant 
difference between the two categories is most probably due to the crops they grow 
and not to the size of their farms. 
Some informants indeed said that they kept cattle because labour had become so 
expensive that farming could not pay for it any longer; if necessary, one man could 
look after a thousand head of cattle. But as farm-workers were equally averse to 
work and took employment only of necessity, the complaint was often heard among 
dairy farmers that it was difficult to find a conscientious and careful labourer. To 
counteract this disinterest, the Japanese settlers in Piranema usually paid wage-earners 
15 or 20% more than the Brazilians in the neighbourhood were paying. 
Despite the fact that some labourers only earned a quarter of the legal minimum 
wage and the right to plant something in a corner of the farm, the settlers generally 
complained that labour was expensive and difficult to get. Two Brazilian farmers said 
that they were averse to some alternative way of using their land because it would 
give too much work. Such honesty was more common when the speaker was referring 
to others than to himself. Then he rather often accused a person of laziness, lack of 
initiative, or a similar fault. A second way of reducing the amount of labour needed 
on the farm was to leave land fallow unnecessarily, for instance because "no tractor 
was available" and the settler regarded plowing with animals as too much work. There 
is no doubt at all that this happened. More farm-operators in our project did not plow 
than plowed with animals, although interest in this method of soil preparation seemed 
on the increase. Such inactivity was not new. The many allusions to partly or entirely 
uncultivated farms in the annual reports of the Administration show this. 
Thirdly, labour needs could be reduced by not carrying out certain tasks. The weed-
ing of the orange orchards is an example. I doubt whether leaving the trees standing 
in tall grass really reduces the risk of fumagina. Rather it seems merely a justification 
for not doing something that is not absolutely necessary. Of the Brazilian respondents 
who grew oranges not exclusively for home consumption 7 % had not weeded their 
orange orchard in 1963, 25 % had not pruned in that year145. In both cases these per-
centages were highest in the lowest quartile and decrease through the quartiles. These 
practices, however, can hardly be considered as innovations. They are often carried 
out by hired labour. The findings suggest that in the lower quartiles it is a bit more 
common to leave a certain task undone than in the higher quartiles. 
A very curious way of not doing something was 'the sharecropper's coup'. This 
coup consisted of the sharecropper deliberately seeking a row with the owner of the 
land and being dismissed, at a time that the crop was growing nicely but harvest still 
a long way off. The case was then taken to the project Administration for mediation 
and the owner was forced to pay his sharecropper half the value of the growing crop. 
Of course, not all such rows have been deliberate, but some undoubtedly had been. 
The fact alone that a (Brazilian) informant, himself a sharecropper, interpreted some 
rows in this manner, is suggestive. 
A fourth way to reduce labour needs is by leasing part of one's land. Chapter 5 men-
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tioned a strong association between practice adoption and the lease and rent of land. 
In fact, when only the Brazilian farm-operators are considered, it turns out that the 
three lowest quartiles do not differ significantly from each other, the frequency of 
lease being higher in the first and third, lower in the second quartile. But the highest 
quartile differs significantly from the other three (Fisher exact probability test, p 
0.007) in that it only rented but did not lease land. It appears, then, that the high adop-
ters rented land from the low adopters. The findings are interpretable, however, not 
only in terms of reluctance to work on the part of the lower quartiles, but also in terms 
of their lack of resources. 
Work can be avoided by employing others to do it as well as by reducing the need 
for it. One source of labour consists of the farm-operator's children. In chapter 5 
it was found that, whereas the association between practice adoption and employing 
sons younger than 18 was negative but not significant ( T c = -0.13), that between 
practice adoption and the employment of sons older than 18 was positive and, though 
weak, significant at the 10% level. It could be that there is a tendency for the lower 
quartiles to 'exploit' their younger sons, a source of labour for which no extra cash 
costs have to be made. When these sons are old enough to break away from paternal 
influence, they often do, and the pattern of employment is reversed. A number of 
informants actually stated that the sons left because they thought that they Were not 
earning enough. Only one father paid his older son a wage; 24% of the Brazilian 
farm-operators (TV = 55) said that they gave their son a part of the production. 
Again, this percentage was lowest (8 %) in the lowest quartile (N = 14), highest 
(45%) in the highest (7V= 11). The other farm-operators provided their older sons 
who worked on the farm with board and lodging and gave them some pocket-money. 
In a few cases a son actually rented a piece of land from his father and farmed on his 
own. 
The wives of the farm-operators rarely work on the land. One of the differences 
between Brazilian and Japanese settlers, some informants remarked, was precisely 
that the wives of the latter much more often helped on the land. 
A second source of labour consists, of course, of hirelings. Chapter 5 showed that 
employing sharecroppers was not associated with either practice adoption or farm 
Table 54. Mean socio-economic status scores of employer categories of Brazilian owners of one farm. 
Respondents employ All employers Total 
share- wage- both neither 
cropper earner 
Lowest quartile 4.2 3.7 3.0 4.2 3.8 4.0 
Second quartile 7.2 7.0 3.5 6.1 6.5 6.3 
Third quartile 6.4 5.9 9.0 6.9 6.4 6.6 
Highest quartile 9.5 8.6 - 8.7 8.8 8.8 
Total 6.3 6.4 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 
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size, employing paid workers was. Farm size and to some extent practice adoption 
affect the employment of outside labour. To find out whether wealth also did, I 
have compared the combined socio-economic status scores of those who employed 
outside labour and those who did not, among the non-Japanese owners of a single 
10-hectare farm. Table 54 shows the mean scores per quartile of various categories of 
employers. In general no category of employers had mean scores consistently higher 
than that of those who did not employ outside labour. Table 55 shows the frequency 
of employment of such labour, by quartile and socio-economic status category. 
Neither in any particular quartile nor in general is high status significantly associated 
with employment; not even in the highest quartile. Unless they are more innovative 
at the same time, the more prosperous farm-owners do not more often employ out-
side labour than the less prosperous owners. 
Disregarding the possibility that the status scale does not measure wealth (a possi-
bility that in view of its earlier behaviour seems remote) this finding can be interpre-
ted in two ways. Either the low status farm-owners unexpectedly often employ hired 
labour, or the high-status farm-owners less often employ workers than could be 
expected. It is possible that other variables, such as differences in crop pattern, inten-
siveness of land use, and employment of sons or relatives on the farm, completely mask 
the association between socio-economic status and the employment of outside labour, 
but I believe it is unlikely. I was so often told that the settlers could not do certain 
things (cultivate tomatoes, adopt innovations, continue farming) because they were 
poor, that I had expected to find that they could not employ workers for the same rea-
son. The complaints about the expensiveness of labour induce the same expectation. 
The scores in table 54, however, suggest that these complaints did not mean: "labour 
is so expensive that I cannot employ it", but: "labour is damned expensive but I have 
no choice". I am inclined to believe that the figures mean that low-status farm-owners 
unexpectedly often employed outside labour. After all, fully 50 % of the owners of one 
Table 55. Frequency of employment of outside labour by Brazilian owners of one farm, by socio-econo-
mic status and by adoption-score quartile. 
Socio-economic status (combined scores) 
0-4 5-7 8-11 
Lowest quartile employers 8 4 2 
others 9 3 2 
Second quartile employers 3 4 5 
others 5 6 5 
Third quartile employers 4 6 7 
others 2 3 7 
Highest quartile employers 0 2 9 
others 0 2 4 
Total employers 15 16 23 
others 16 14 18 
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farm in the lowest quartile employed hired labour (table 40). This is certainly a high 
figure, but it is a matter of conjecture whether it is 'too high' or higher than it would 
be if they themselves also worked hard. A standard of comparison for employment is 
lacking. The CIDA report (1966) classified Brazilian farms into minifundia, family 
farms, multi-family farms and latifundia. The size ranges of the classes, however, 
differ greatly according to whether this classification was based on the 1960 Census 
data or on field estimates of the land needs of one family148. For Itaguaf, one of the 
municipalities studied, minifundia, i.e. farms considered to be too small for one family, 
range from 0 to 1 hectare, when Census data are used. But when field observations 
are used, minifundia range from 1 to 10 hectares, family farms from 10 to 20 hecta-
res (CIDA, 1966, p. 126 and table 36). If these field estimates can be regarded as essen-
tially correct, it follows that 10-hectare farms (whose owners have been considered 
here) are minifundia and do not even provide employment for one family. The needed 
standard of comparison has then been found; it implies that our respondents definite-
ly employed too much outside labour; in fact, they should not employ any. If the 
Census data are normative, however, the report says that farms in the 1 to 20 hectare 
range do employ, on the average, between 2.7 and 3.8 workers. They still fall in the 
CIDA category of one family farms, but if we regard as workers only those who 
actually work (i.e. do not assume that the farmer's wife is a worker) then the employ-
ment of outside labour by the Santa Cruz respondents does not seem excessive. But in 
this case the standard of comparison was the practice in the municipality of Itaguaf; 
the respondents have been compared with themselves147. Although it weakens my argu-
ment, I believe that the CIDA field estimates do not differentiate sufficiently between 
the amount of land which a family in theory could cultivate and the amount of land 
it does cultivate when it is not forced to work as hard as possible. 
Although it has not been possible to prove beyond doubt that the respondents em-
ployed outside workers or otherwise obtained income from their land without wor-
king it, partly because they hold manual work in low esteem, the evidence about the 
allocation of labour certainly does not contradict this hypothesis. If the more inno-
vative or greater farmers employed more hired labour, slightly fewer younger sons, 
slightly more older sons, and rented more land, this does not imply that their attitude 
to manual work had changed, that they worked more themselves. They had less need 
to work. They could better afford to have others work for them and to mechanize. 
It is the small farmer who is the 'victim' of the traditional value. If he is to progress 
by his own efforts, he has to work hard and sustainedly and to cultivate intensively 
the small amount of land he possesses. Above all, he must be motivated to work and 
reject the idea that agricultural toil is degrading. 
Capital 
A last value which should be considered is that regarding the allocation of capital. 
Traditionally, capital was employed in transport and processing rather then in pro-
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Table 56. Frequency of owning a truck, a tractor or both by various categories of respondents. 
Had truck Had tractor Had both 
(1) (2) (3) 
Test and level of 
significance 
Brazilians, all quartiles 
Japanese, all quartiles 
Brazilians, 4th quartile 
Japanese, 4th quartile 
18 
1 
5 
0 
10 
4 
5 
4 
10 
11 
7 
8 
X 2 = 10.61; d.f. = 2 ; 
p <0.01 
Fisher exact probability 
test; p = 0.0521; (2) and 
(3) combined. 
Xs = 2.78;p<0.10;(2) 
and (3) combined. 
Brazilians, quartiles 1-3 
Brazilians, 4th quartile 
13 
5 
5 
5 
3 
7 
duction. Are there indications that this pattern still persists? Table 56 shows the 
frequency with which several categories of respondents had invested capital in re-
spectively a truck, a tractor or both. The differences in the frequency distribution be-
tween the Japanese and Brazilian farm-operators are highly significant. The Brazilians 
tend to buy only a truck, or at least first a truck, before considering a tractor. This 
difference is not due to the fact that the Japanese score predominantly in the highest 
quartile; if the highest-quartile Japanese are compared with the highest-quartile 
Brazilians, it turns out that the probability that the actual or a more extreme frequen-
cy distribution is due to chance is still only between 5 and 6%. The Japanese really 
seem more likely to buy a tractor first. All the same, the highest-quartile Brazilians 
also seem to differ from the other Brazilian farm-operators, although the difference 
is significant only at the 10% level. The Brazilian high adopters seem to be intermedi-
ate between the fourth-quartile Japanese and the other Brazilian respondents. 
The reader will recall the strikingly similar data in table 50 about investment in a 
tractor or in more land. Together, these results suggest that the less innovative farm-
operators are still inclined to follow the traditional pattern of investing in more land 
and in transport instead of (or before) investing in production. If innovativeness rises, 
this disposition tends to disappear gradually and may even be replaced by a contrary 
disposition. 
However, the difference between the Japanese and Brazilian fourth-quartile res-
pondents in the investment of capital in trucks rather than in tractors, and in the 
adoption of productivity-raising innovations such as fertilizers, lime and pesticides 
(tables 45 and 46) seems to indicate that, although the likeness between the two cate-
gories may be increasing, the Brazilians are still influenced by traditional attitudes. 
The differences are not apparently due to a greater prosperity of the Japanese fourth-
quartile respondents; their mean socio-economic status score is in fact a bit lower 
than that of the Brazilian high adopters, 8.7 against 9.1. 
Without a detailed economic analysis of costs and returns it is impossible to prove 
that heavy investments on small farms 'pay'. It has been assumed here that they do 
pay, simply because the informants appeared to be cost-conscious enough not to go 
in for unremunerative investments and also because those respondents who had in-
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vested most capital per hectare, the Japanese, obviously were among the most prosper-
ous farmers. Nevertheless, it was sometimes said that the pedigree bull of a particular 
farmer, or the new stable of another, or the new coconut-palm plantation of a third, 
were a matter of'vaidade', vanity, rather than a paying proposition. These judgements 
sounded very much like a defense of the traditional pattern of capital allocation, but 
I am unable to say whether they have any truth. 
Chapter 4 showed that some innovations were adopted selectively because people 
expected immediate benefits with one crop but not with another. Selective adoption 
was particularly notable in the use of pesticides and the vaccination of animals. Capi-
tal was employed in production if cash returns were expected, or if cash losses through 
failure to adopt could be considerable. This behaviour, too, may be not dissimilar 
from the traditional attitude. Instances already mentioned of cane-growers who 
planted other varieties (Andrade, 1963) and of coffee-growers who reinvested in new 
plantations (Dean, 1966) come to mind. If the failure to adopt did not entail cash 
losses, capital was less likely to be employed in cultivation. For maize, not an impor-
tant cash crop in the project, an unusual cash outlay like the purchase of hybrid seed 
was resisted, as was shown in chapter 4. Only 14% of the maize growers did plant a 
hybrid variety, despite a campaign to introduce hybrid maize some years before. 
The drawbacks of the traditional attitude towards capital allocation are partly 
obvious, partly not. It is obvious that on small farms only high capital investments 
can lead to an increase in production and income, and that the insistence on short-
term returns may entail the rejection of innovations whose returns are spread over 
many years. The traditional use of capital for land and transport, rather than in 
innovations may limit the total effect of investment. This is certainly true for the 
national economy. But it may also be true for private welfare. If a farmer does not 
profit so much from an increase in production because the middleman will offer lower 
prices at the farm, it is only good sense that he will try to become independent of 
middlemen. But if he invests in transport without really having much to sell himself, 
or (and this has occurred in the project) subsequently stops producing much himself, 
the only result will be that a new middleman has appeared. Investments in land and 
transport thus may lead to the perpetuation of a pattern. Once he has bought his 
truck, our not so hypothetical farmer will become less interested in a radical reorgan-
ization of the market; when he becomes a middleman Mmself, a continuation of the 
status quo will be in his favour. Certainly the advent of a well organized cooperative 
will make his truck less necessary and hence reduce its profitableness. 
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8 Summary and suggestions 
The aims of the study 
Originally the intention of the investigation was simple: to find out what important 
pertinent differences could be distinguished between successful and unsuccessful 
settlers in a land-settlement area. For various reasons the Santa Cruz project near the 
city of Rio de Janeiro was chosen as site for the study. One part of this project (the 
Santa Cruz section) had been settled in the 1930's, the other part (the section Piranema) 
in the 1940's. All farm-operators had begun on an equal footing, with a farm of 10 
hectares. What differences had come into existence since? Given the small size of 
their farms, the success of the farm-operators seemed to depend on the degree to which 
they had adopted technical innovations; indeed, in the beginning I intended to regard 
their adoption score as an indication of their sucees. It was the literature on diffusion 
and adoption of innovations that suggested which differences between high and low 
adopters might be most meaningful. 
During the first reconnaissance, however, I found that the adoption of innovations 
might not be the only relevant, or even the most relevant, aspect of behaviour that 
determined agricultural development in the project. Traditional values and attitudes 
seemed to be at least as important as adoption. Unfortunately, the planned survey by 
questionnaire had to be carried out at an early stage and the schedule could, for that 
reason, contain only a limited number of questions on these values and attitudes. 
But much information on traditional culture could be gathered by anthropological 
methods after the survey had been completed. During this second stage of the inves-
tigation attention was focused on traditional values and dispositions relating to 
cooperation and agricultural production which were still adhered to in the project 
and which seemed to be inimical to its development as a system of family farms. 
ImpHcitly I have assumed that a project like that of Santa Cruz, consisting of small 
family farms, did not represent a form of agricultural organization that is, in Brazil, 
under all circumstances incompatible with development. It may be that there are other 
organizational forms which, considering the ethos of the rural populace, are better 
suited to further development. But it can hardly be suggested that the family farm is 
an economic impossibility. 
Once I had observed that there existed other obstacles to development than the use 
of traditional agricultural techniques, I had to stop using the terms 'modern' and 
'traditional' which I had until then employed to distinguish between the high and the 
low adopters. There was no telling, beforehand, whether the adoption of technical 
innovations by a Santa Cruz farmer would go together with a value and attitude change 
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in other respects. The concepts 'modern' and 'traditional' implied much more than 
merely the adoption or rejection of innovations; their contents, so far as they could 
be gleaned from the (non-Brazilian) literature, mostly seemed inapplicable to the 
situation in the project. Yet the terms did not imply those value and attitude changes 
that, in the project, seemed to be indispensible for further agricultural development. 
The results 
The results of the study are presented in chapters 4 to 7. Chapter 4 contains a de-
scription, based on quantitative material, of the important aspects of agriculture in the 
project such as crops, animal husbandry, technical level, land tenure, marketing and 
professional and informal relationships of the farm-operators. 
The settlers had a marked preference for cash crops over crops grown for home 
consumption, and were not averse to changing the cropping pattern, replacing one 
crop by another, if the price was more remunerative. Having cattle was associated 
with farm size, the dependent variable being farm size. Independence of middlemen 
was valued enough to have caused the purchase of a sizable number of trucks. Some 
innovations were adopted selectively, that is, used for one crop but not for another. 
The criterion appeared to be the importance of the crop as a source of cash income, 
and hence also the magnitude of the financial loss that the non-adoption of the innova-
tion could entail. Innovations were also discontinued: used for some time and then 
dropped. 
Chapter 5 deals with some differences between high and low adopters of agricultural 
innovations. Practice adoption was found to be positively and significantly associated 
with the following variables: socio-economic status, income, area owned, education, 
literacy, former urban residence, urban visiting, contact with extension officers and 
with other personal sources of extension and advice, membership of cooperatives, 
and education of older children. The use of partial associations, controlling for sta-
tus, suggested that education, literacy, former urban residence and urban visiting 
were partly consequences of high status and only significantly associated with practice 
adoption in the highest (or higher) status categories. Owing to the difficulty involved 
in 'dating' socio-economic status as compared with education, former urban residence 
and urban visiting, the associations between practice adoption and these variables 
may be spurious. Yet the consistency with which practice adoption was associated 
with these variables only in the highest status categories, seems to warrant the con-
clusion that education and familiarity with urban ways of life and ideas do only fos-
ter practice adoption if the farmer has the means to adopt an innovation, the insight 
necessary to assess its usefulness and the wish to remain on his farm. 
Practice adoption was differently associated in the two sections of the project with 
having professional relations. In Santa Cruz, by far the oldest of the two sections, 
practice adoption was associated with visiting a farm, with asking for advice when the 
farmer met with a difficulty on his farm, and with having been asked for advice. In 
Piranema, the section which was settled much later, only the last association existed. 
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In neither section was practice adoption associated with having non-professional 
relationships. In Piranema the number of choices per chooser, for professional and 
for non-professional relationships, tended to be higher the higher the adoption-
score quartile. In Santa Cruz, the specificity of professional relationships, i.e. the 
degree to which a respondent reported having only one sort of relationship with anoth-
er person, was strongly and significantly associated with practice adoption. The 
innovative farm-operators in that section seemed to choose, much more than in 
Piranema, with whom they would have a certain relationship. In line with this, in 
Santa Cruz the percentage of choices falling on neighbours decreased when the adop-
tion score of the chooser increased. 
Remarkably, practice adoption proved not to be associated with the education of 
children of school age. The employment of sharecroppers likewise was not associated 
with practice adoption, but the employment of wage-earners was. 
The last section of chapter 5 showed that the Japanese farm-operators not only 
differed significantly in adoption score from their Brazilian colleagues, but also in 
how they operated their farm. 
Chapter 6 opens with a description of a cluster of traditional rural values and atti-
tudes which I have called the patronic syndrome. This syndrome consists of three 
elements: the belief that one's own efforts to improve one's condition will be ineffec-
tive unless assisted by superior (or supernatural) powers; the disposition to seek to 
establish patronage relations with people with whom one is not related by kinship 
or friendship; and the absence of feelings of solidarity towards people with whom 
one is not related by kinship, friendship or patronage. The existence of this syndrome 
in traditional rural Brazil is possibly a result of historical circumstances. I have tried 
to indicate its functions. In the project, however, it is its dysfunction that appears to 
carry most weight: the fact that it hampers the establishment of cooperative action. 
An analysis of some case histories and incidents related with cooperation leads to the 
conclusion that the patronic syndrome is still operative in the project of Santa Cruz 
and that it is dysfunctional in the sense described above. Some suggestions are given 
as to how the syndrome can be not so much overcome as used: the institutionalization 
of patronage is recommended. In practice this means that the government agency which 
administers a particular project should be accorded the role of patron. 
Chapter 7 deals with how traditional values and attitudes towards agricultural 
production (land use and resource allocation) still influence matters in the project of 
Santa Cruz. Like the preceding chapter, it starts with a description of this value pat-
tern (which I have called the 'Grand Tradition' of agriculture), such as it has been 
found to exist in the past in Brazil. The pattern is shown to have been intimately asso-
ciated with certain historical developments in Brazilian agriculture, and its functional 
aspects are stressed. The few relevant quantitative data which were available and the 
qualitative information from interviews and observation were used to assess how much 
the 'Grand Tradition' is still adhered to in the project. Somewhat surprisingly, rather 
consistent indications were found that the high adopters among our respondents are 
freer than others from at least some of the values and attitudes involved. This was 
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true of the attitude to land as a substitute for capital investment (not of the attitude 
to land as a good thing on its own) and of the attitude towards the allocation of capi-
tal. The high adopters seem to realize, or are coming to realize, the necessity of using 
capital if agriculture is to become more remunerative. In the choice of crops and the 
partaking in farm work they probably hold the same values as the low adopters. The 
consistent differences between the Japanese and Brazilians in the highest adoption-
score quartile show that the Brazilians are only approaching the Japanese but have 
not overtaken them asfyet. Perhaps they will never consider intensive vegetable grow-
ing as practised by the Japanese as an ideal to be imitated. The Brazilian low adopters 
seem still to adhere to values and attitudes of 'the Grand Tradition'. They tend to 
plant cash crops, to buy more land before they mechanize or otherwise invest in 
capital goods, to 'exploit' their children a bit and hence to contribute to the children's 
subsequent departure, to employ much outside labour and to be, in general, somewhat 
work-shy themselves. Since the 'Grand Tradition' has been made by big proprietors, 
to adhere to it is much more dysfunctional for smallholders than for larger and more 
prosperous farmers. 
Even though the high adopters may have undergone a change in value away from 
the low adopters, it is far from certain that this change is due to the project, that is, to 
the fact that the tenure structure was drastically altered in a certain area. The Brazi-
lian farm-owners who scored in the highest quartile seem to differ from those in the 
other three quartiles combined in that they are less often the first concessionnaire of 
their farm. The occurrence of high adopters thus may partly be due to the fact that 
they have bought a farm in the project later instead of obtaining one when it was 
settled. The project will have meant an opportunity to progress for some settlers. 
Other high adopters probably did not need the project; they could have settled else-
where. For the great majority of the settlers the project has made little difference; 
they have remained at a low level of living and agricultural development. Part of the 
reason for this stagnation lies, as asserted, in the persistence of traditional value 
patterns in farming and social relations. 
Suggestions for further research 
Having been in part exploratory, this study has failed to provide definite answers 
to some pertinent questions. Sometimes I could not prove with quantitative data the 
existence of a relation between certain variables; elsewhere the data gave only a first 
indication that an association suggested here may indeed exist. Even if their existence 
had been proved, they would give rise to new problems. Further research seems 
necessary on the following subjects and problems. 
1. The quantitative measurement of the various aspects of the patronic syndrome 
(preferably not by means of attitude questions) and the associations between these 
aspects. 
2. The relation between the patronic syndrome and various individual and group 
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variables, such as farm innovativeness, gregariousness, socio-economic status, pres-
tige, education, political preferences, anomie, group cohesiveness, efficiency of goal 
oriented associations, efficiency and extent of cooperation, etc. 
3. The relationship between sensitivity to public opinion and the strength of the 
patronic syndrome. If there is a negative association, the next question must be how 
this sensitivity can be increased. 
4. Research into the personaUty structure and the sociological attributes of the exem-
plary leaders who manage (or have managed) to overcome the dysfunctions of the 
patronic syndrome, and into the conditions which give rise to such leaders. 
5. The views on farming (e.g. goals and ideals for farm size, cropping patterns, 
farm work, employment and treatment of labour, investments) of innovative farmers. 
If these views are still 'traditional', the implication is that the adoption of new far-
ming methods covers only a minor part of the problem of agricultural development. 
The question then arises how these views can be changed. 
The rather consistent differences between the section Piranema and the section 
Santa Cruz suggest that these studies should be undertaken in localities which vary 
in infrastructural and institutional development. 
Some suggestions about future settlement projects 
The findings of the study carry implications for the organization and management 
of future land-settlement projects. It is not my intention here to describe in detail what 
should be done and what omitted in such a project. I only want to draw attention to 
a number of acts or omissions of the administering agency which in Santa Cruz had 
grave consequences, and may have had elsewhere. I also want to present, for further 
consideration, some suggestions on the organization of similar projects in the future. 
Although it will be assumed in subsequent paragraphs that future land-settlement 
projects will be carried out more or less along the lines followed in Santa Cruz, it 
may first be asked whether that is really the most suitable organization. The study has 
proved that poor peasants are unlikely to build up a modern, efficient and profitable 
family farm from scratch. Nevertheless, ideally this is the aim of a settlement pro-
ject: to provide the poorest with the means of progress. With some technical and 
material assistance, they are expected to do well. In Santa Cruz, this first contradic-
tion between aim and reality has led to further contradictions. Not having any reser-
ves, or rapidly exhausting any he had, a poor settler had to look for work outside his 
farm when some misfortune befell him. The administration permitted this and even 
created jobs to help such people out. But once a settler works full-time on anoth-
er farm or in another occupation, he cannot dedicate much attention to his own land. 
He seldom manages to return to farming his own land. In the end he often sells his 
farm and leaves the project. The conclusion must be that the poor are often too poor 
to start farming on their own and make a success of it. If they are to be helped (and 
they should be) perhaps it is better to provide them for the first five years or so only 
with employment. For instance, by running part of the project, or the entire project, 
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as a plantation managed by the State Agency for Land-Settlement, and employing 
the poorest settlers-to-be as labourers. Having proved their competence, after these 
five years they can be provided with farms of their own, which could be carved out of 
the plantation itself. Such a system would have several advantages. 
1. There is time to do some field experiments with crops, fertilizers and pesticides. 
2. As wages are guaranteed, the risks attendant on bad drainage, pests, imperfections 
of the market, bad harvests in general, and illness of the settler (who is insured) are 
carried by the administering agency, not the settler. 
3. The market can be organized centrally and on a sufficiently large scale. 
4. The settlers-to-be can be thoroughly trained in the cultivation of the crops that are 
most suited to the soil. Extension can be much more thorough than if each farmer has 
to be approached individually. 
5. The settler-to-be does not receive a benefit which he can sell immediately to the 
highest bidder. He has to prove his conduct for several years. Potential speculators 
will hardly be attracted by a coup that can be brought off only in five years. 
It need hardly be said that such an organization148 will be unsuccessful if the appoint-
ment of the managers, or the employment of the workers, become political favours 
and sinecures. 
If it is assumed that future land-settlement projects be similar to the Santa Cruz 
project, the following remarks can be made on the administering agency. 
1. Since it would be extremely difficult to get several different government services to 
cooperate, the field of action of the administering agency should be comprehensive 
and embrace, next to agriculture: education, extension, credit, marketing and medical 
care. 
2. The administering agency must be safeguarded against the intervention of politi-
cians or other pressure groups who defend private interests. 
3. The administering agency must be able to count on a fixed budget. 
4. The staff in the field should be rewarded for being in the field instead of sitting in 
some metropolitan office. The agronomists on the field staff should be encouraged to 
visit the settlers often. 
On the management and operation of the project the following remarks are in order. 
1. All projected works such as roads and drainage canals should be executed. If 
drainage or accessibility remain poor in some areas they should be improved by the 
administering agency. 
2. Well defined responsibilities over maintenance of roads, ditches, bridges, buildings 
and machines should be laid down in the regulations governing the administration 
of the project. Funds should be kept in reserve at all times to meet maintenance and 
repair costs. Although there will be a temptation to employ such funds 'more pro-
ductively', a different allocation would be unwise if it results in the inability to defray 
maintenance and repair costs. It is better that one project succeeds than that two fail. 
3. As to technical assistance, the agency should not offer to do in one year what it 
140 
cannot also guarantee to do in the next. After one or two years, payment for these 
services should be gradually introduced. The agency could consider transferring cer-
tain services after a number of years to contractors, on whose profit rates a watch 
could be kept. 
4. One of the most important tasks of the agency refers to the reduction of risks. This 
embraces supervision in maintenance and improvement of drainage ditches and 
dirt roads, and in enforced pest control activities; the provision of supervised credit, 
and, if necessary, the organization of marketing. 
5. The purchase of fertilizers, seeds, etc. and the marketing of the produce make a 
cooperative a necessity. The administering agency should assist at the founding of a 
cooperative and should help to run it for a number of years. It should be authorized 
to keep a close watch on its operations and to intervene if undesirable developments 
occur. 
6. The agency should be prepared, if need be, to function as patron to the new com-
munity when the acquisition of certain community benefits depends on preferential 
treatment by the authorities, hence on some form of patronage. The agency should 
furthermore be authorized to prevent a local backsliding into traditional social (and 
tenure) structure. This does not mean that the local population should not be consult-
ed on the course of action to take, or that decision making powers cannot be gradu-
ally transferred to representatives elected by the people. It means that the power to 
intervene and to put an end to undesirable developments should not be relinquished 
too soon. 
7. The extension service should be prepared to indict traditional values and attitudes, 
in so far as they influence farming and social relations between the settlers, as 
well as to give technical information. It should be made clear to the settlers what 
disadvantageous effects values they consider normal may have in terms of the future 
local tenure situation and social structure. 
8. The purchase and sale of farms must be permitted and regulated. It is an illusion 
to think that turnover can be prevented. There will always be unsuccessful farmers wil-
ling to make a good deal of money on a benefit they received, and richer farmers 
willing to pay for land which they are less likely to receive on the same terms as the 
original settler. The agency should, for instance, function as an unpaid broker, whose 
task it is to record all sales of farms. Unrecorded sales can be declared illegal and 
result in the buyer being evicted from the farm.That way the maximum farm size can 
be controlled much better. 
9. The agency should institute a recurring evaluation of its own performance. Evalua-
tive surveys should be carried out regularly and their findings should lead, if necessary, 
to changes in administrative policy. The participation of sociologists in such evalua-
tions should be considered. 
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Annex I. The socio-economic status scales: an explanatory 
note and item-analysis 
For the construction of the two socio-economic status scales the starting point was 
the study of Belcher and Sharp (1952) on a scale to measure the level of living of farm 
families. Their scale contained 29 items, relating mainly to the construction and 
furnishing of the house, the possession of a number of appliances, reading and church 
attendance. For the project, I discarded all items about the last two activities. Reading 
might in some respects be important as a medium of communication with the outside 
world but in others it had not yet replaced oral communication or had been bypassed 
by the radio. In Itaguaf no bookshop existed. Church attendance did not seem to be 
Table 57. hem-analyses of the socio-economic status scales. 
Number of adopters 
lowest quartile highe 
JV=46 JV 
st quartile 
N=46 
Possessions scale 
has bicycle 
has cart (or in absence of cart, tractor) 
uses cylinder gas for cooking 
has radio 
has sewing machine 
owns lorry or pick-up truck 
17 
4 
3 
18 
12 
3 
45 
42 
46 
46 
46 
28 
Sanitary-installations scale 
has bathroom 
has piped water 
has septic tank 
has concrete-lined well 
has water-filter 
2 
1 
0 
11 
4 
45 
44 
46 
43 
45 
Combined scale 
has bicycle 
has cart (or in absence of cart, tractor) 
uses cylinder gas for cooking 
has radio 
has sewing machine 
owns lorry or pick-up truck 
has bathroom 
has piped water 
has septic tank 
has concrete-lined well 
has water-filter 
19 
8 
5 
17 
13 
2 
2 
1 
1 
15 
5 
46 
40 
45 
45 
45 
26 
44 
43 
46 
39 
44 
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a good indicator of socio-economic status either. The various denominations which 
existed in the project had different norms in this respect and so were not comparable. 
I felt that political participation, which might have done well as an indicator of status, 
was too intimate a subject for a survey. The scale used here was therefore restricted 
to items related to the house, the possession of household appliances and of vehicles. 
Since some houses had been built by the Administration of the project before the 
arrival of the settlers, whereas other farmers had had to build their own houses, I 
doubted whether the construction of the house or the number of rooms were good 
indicators of socio-economic status. Instead, I preferred to include items about various 
sanitary installations, relatively cheap ones (water-filter, concrete-lined well) as well 
as expensive ones. The scale likewise included items about both cheap and expensive 
household appliances and vehicles. Because some farm-operators did not own their 
farm, and thus lived in houses which were either not their own or were not thought 
of as more than temporary abodes, they could be expected to be less inclined than 
others to improve their houses (see chap. 5; also Fais Borda, 1963, p. 113). Therefore 
the scale was divided in two parts, one part for movable appliances and possessions 
and the other for fixed sanitary installations. Whenever in doubt whether the posses-
sions scale behaved in the same way as the sanitary-installations scale, I used both, 
or the combined scale. All items received a weight of one. As table 57 shows, all 
items of the separate and the combined scales discriminated between the highest and 
the lowest quartile. In the highest quartile at least twice as many respondents have 
any one item as in the lowest quartile. 
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Annex II. Statistical treatment of the data 
To establish a relationship between two (or three) quantitatively measured variables, 
statistical tests have been used. Most of these (y_2, Fisher exact probability test, Mann 
Whitney U, Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance, and sign test) are meant to 
decide whether there is some relationship between the variables, that is, what proba-
bility there is that an observed difference between categories of respondents is due 
to sampling error (chance) rather than to a similar difference between the categories in 
the population. Usually a difference was considered significant when this probability 
was smaller than 5 %. Which one of these tests is used in any particular case depends 
on the level of measurement of the variables (nominal or ordinal), the number of 
samples (categories of respondents) involved, and the size of N (the total number of 
respondents included in the calculation). 
The other tests used (Yule's Q and Kendall's T , T c and W) measure the degree of 
association between variables, i.e. indicate how strong an association is. The measures 
may vary between 0 (no association) and ± 1 (perfect association). Q is a measure of 
association between dichotomous variables (2 X 2 table) ; T measures the association 
between two rankorders; W the concordance between three or more rankorders; 
T c is a measure of association between two ordinal variables when the data are group-
ed in a m x n table. Also for these measures I have examined whether the value 
actually found was significantly different from zero, that is, what risk I incur when I 
conclude, on the basis of the sample data, that an association exists between the 
variables that does not exist in the population. 
As levels of significance had to be calculated by longhand, I have generally used 
formulae which did not contain a correction for ties and therefore were simpler, unless 
this resulted in a significance level above 5 %. If so (given, of course, the presence of 
ties), I resorted to the formula that contained the correction, so as to arrive at the 
lowest possible level of significance. 
The reader may consult Siegel (1956) for all tests except Q and xc. These are dealt 
with by Blalock (1960). The significance test for T c is treated by Spitz (1965). 
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Notes 
1. Since November 1963 three of these wooden bridges have been replaced by 
concrete ones. 
• i i . 
2. This city lies in the State of Guanabara, not in tl|e State of Rio de Janeiro. 
S 
3. Lands given out by the Portuguese Crown or its deputies to applicants were called 
sesmarias. ! 
¡1 
4. Installations for the extraction and refinement of sugar that used animal- or 
water-power. 
5. According to Rugendas (1954, pp. 155-6), these C hiñese were brought to Brazil 
as part of an attempt to introduce the cultivation of tea. They numbered about three 
hundred. They planted tea in the Botanical Garden of Rio de Janeiro and in Santa 
Cruz. Today a small hill just outside the project is still called Morro do Cha, Tea Hill. 
6. Decreto 19133 of March 11,1930. 
7. Curiously enough, none of the authors I consulted rnentions the fact that a Centro 
Agrícola and not a Núcleo Colonial was created, althcfugh Decreto 19133 and later 
also Decreto 21115 of 1932 categorically speak of a Cefitro Agrícola. At one time or 
another this Centro must have become a Núcleo Colonial, but I have not been able 
to find the relevant legal text. Furthermore, it seems th|t the first farms were handed 
over in 1931 mostly to Central European immigrants (ipf. the 1962 report of the Ad-
ministrator of the project), that is as if a Núcleo Colonjjal and not a Centro Agrícola 
had been installed. The very difference between the two had to do with the nationality 
of the settlers; a Núcleo Colonial (regulated by Decree 9801 of November 1911) 
was primarily meant for the establishment of immigrants, a Centro Agrícola (regu-
lated by Decree 9214 of December 1911) was meant fo promote the settlement of 
Brazilian agricultural labourers. 
¡I 
8. It is not clear what 'prepared' exactly meant. j : 
9. The juridical incorporation in the municipality in which the settlement lies. 
S 
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10. The Decree literally says that some things may or can be done, implying that 
they were not obligatory. It is obvious that such a lenient text cannot have been very 
efficient in guaranteeing the complete equipment of land-settlement projects. The text 
possibly means that the Federal States could include expenditures made according to 
the benefits which they 'could' distribute. They could then receive reimbursement from 
the Federal Government for 25 % of the costs of settling immigrants. 
11. Benfeitorias, literally improvements, ameliorations, can be considered as value 
added to the land, e.g. crops, trees and buildings. 
12. Two of these canals had, in fact, been constructed by the Jesuits in the 17th 
century. See Alonso, 1960, p. 406. 
13. Some cases still ran in 1965. 
14. Again the wording of the law was vague: "os fornecimentos poderao ser feitos". 
However, one would be guilty of ethnocentrism if one were to hold the law responsi-
ble for the irregularity of the assistance later rendered to the settlers. 
15. In the 1957 report of the Administration it is said that of the 87 km projected 
roads only 47 were built by that time. Although later some of the missing roads were 
constructed, there can be no doubt that when the section Piranema was emancipated 
its network of roads was still incomplete. 
16. But in at least one instance the further extension of a drainage canal was suc-
cessfully opposed by a landowner outside the settlement, who feared that his land 
would dry out if such a canal ran across it. By the time he repented his opposition it 
was too late. 
17. See Moreira, 1962, although he refers to the nearby land-settlement project 
of Tingua; and Geiger, 1956, p. 155-6. 
18. Most of these buildings are near the Administrative office in Piranema, but 
they were originally meant for the whole project. The early emancipation of the sec-
tion Santa Cruz, and later the destruction of the only bridge between the two sections, 
has separated them rather drastically. The section Santa Cruz was thus cut off from 
the services provided by the Administration, but because of its proximity to the Rio 
de Janeiro suburb called Santa Cruz, and the relative wealth of the government of the 
Federal District, the section gained rather than lost by the transition. 
19. This possibility was not unimportant. In some years the Administration had up 
to 400 persons on its payroll, most of them settlers or members of their families. 
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20. During the first years of the project, such a sale always concerned the benfeito-
rias: the crops, fruit-trees and buildings on a farm. The Civil Code concedes the owner-
ship of such benfeitorias to the person who created therfli, even if they are on somebody 
else's land. So, in a certain sense, it clashed with the laws? on settlement which prohibit-
ed the sale of benfeitorias. For instance, when asked to intervene in a conflict between 
a settler and a sharecropper who, upon his dismissal, Wanted to receive an indemnity 
for the benfeitorias he had planted, the Administratipn always had recourse to the 
Civil Code and decided in favour of the sharecropper. By allowing the settlers to sell 
the wood they found on their land and to dispose of their produce as they saw fit, 
the Administration did, in fact, acknowledge their right to their benfeitorias. Maybe 
for this reason, the right of the buyer to the benfeitorias which he had bought was 
never, to my knowledge, contested. Rarely the Administration has thought of acquir-
ing, in its turn, the benfeitorias from the buyer, but the lack of ready cash, bureaucrat-
ic impediments and countermeasures taken by the buyer made this procedure an 
exception. Normally the Administration transferred the concession to the farm to 
the buyer of the benfeitorias. 
21. But CorrSa (1964) says that in 1953 only 90 of the 714 farms in the section Pi-
ranema were entirely under cultivation; the others were poorly cultivated, uncultivat-
ed or abandoned altogether. 
22. In the States of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, for instance, where timid 
beginnings were made with land reform, the governments resorted to land-settlement 
projects. || 
23. That other, equally possible, ways of organizing agricultural production are 
often rejected on ideological rather than economic grounds needs not detain us here. 
24. The lack of roads and transport facilities had apparently caused several settle-
ment schemes in the interior of the country to fail; cf. Rios, 1961, p. 205. 
25. I soon noticed, however, that my first problem, the differences between innova-
tive and traditional farmers, did not seem to interest thfem very much. To them it was 
obvious that the more education, the more income, the more contacts with the outside 
world a farmer had, the more he would apply modern farming methods. They did 
not think that adoption would be resisted once certaih conditions (a higher income, 
or government assistance) were met. They were also curiously ambivalent in their 
opinion about traditional farmers; at times they explained the traditionalism of the 
settlers by the absence of assistance - "eles nao tern cohdipoes" - ; at times the tradi-
tionalists were called "lazy bastards". It took me some time to realize this ambiva-
lence. In the beginning the Administration's lack of enthusiasm for my problem only 
served to make me wary myself. 
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26. This phenomenon has also been observed elsewhere, for that matter (cf. Rogers, 
1962, p. 93 etsqq.). 
27. It was at this point that I became conscious of the difficulties involved in the 
use of the concepts modern and traditional, a question that will be taken up in the 
next section. 
28. See also Rogers, 1962, p. 63 et seq. 
29. Or a non-Mediterranean one. Redfield (1963) is willing to admit the existence 
of at most two general types of traditional culture, but it does not seem advisable to 
keep to a definite number. The question whether originally (whenever that may have 
been) there did or did not exist one type of traditional peasant culture is also left unan-
swered. Traditional here is that culture which existed before the industrial revolution. 
30. Although the present study was restricted to the project of Santa Cruz, I do 
believe that many of the findings and inferences will apply also to other areas in 
Brazil where circumstances are similar. The reader should, however, be warned that 
I will not prove this claim. At most it will be supported by a converse procedure: 
cultural traits found to exist in other regions of the country seem to apply to the settlers 
I studied. Especially where dealing with the culture of the settlers, I was inclined to 
call them Brazilians, instead of Itaguai or Santa Cruz farmers. This generalization 
may be disallowed. 
31. The insight that the structural and cultural context deeply affects the relative 
importance of these norms (and hence also the relative usefulness of research findings 
on these norms) is growing (cf. Felstehausen, 1967). 
32. Basing himself mainly on Indian data, Gusfield (1967) has argued that tradi-
tion is both more specific and more ambiguous than is usually realized, and much less 
incompatible with modernity. However, Gusfield equates modernity with the realiza-
tion of various goals, thus compounding the difficulties, since modern goals need not 
be compatible with one another. A breakdown in political modernization, i.e. a shift 
from a democratic structure to a totalitarian regime, may very well enhance the mod-
ernization of the economy, for instance. If one intends to maintain the concept, it is 
necessary to state beforehand which goal is the truly modern one. 
33. This insight is gaining (Hursch, in preparation). However, too little is said of 
the period necessary to become acquainted with a foreign culture. A year seems to 
be the minimum. 
34. The confusion to which the concept of attitude may lead is demonstrated in 
Bergsma's (1963) otherwise excellent book. He hypothesized that the attitudes of 
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respondents would correlate with their overt behaviout; this may be called the 'atti-
tude as a deeper cause' hypothesis. 
However, in two cases it turned out that the attitude did not correlate with the 
corresponding overt behaviour. Instead of accepting th|s as very interesting, Bergsma 
blamed the questions, upon which the attitudes were e|tablished. In a sense, this was 
logical. If a result is present, the cause should be present. However, even though 'better' 
questions would have resulted in significant correlations, nothing would have been 
proved that had not been brought in beforehand, to wi|, the significance of the corre-
lation. That is, only the significant correlation tells whether the question has been 
'good' or 'bad'. 
In the absence of proofs, however, one cannot speak of an attitude as if it caused 
something. And proofs are lacking because it is impossible to establish an attitude 
otherwise than through the observation of its "results", the overt behaviour. To posit 
attitude as a deeper cause is a category mistake, according to Hutchinson (1956). 
(cf. De Fleur and Westie (1964) who also reject what ttey call the latent process def-
inition of the concept of attitude). 
8 
35. This does not necessarily mean that the respondent will tell lies. Sometimes 
mutually incompatible values seem to exist (Moog, 1954, p. 333 et seq.). In other cases 
the respondent will have recourse to 'codigo', language in which the literal meaning 
of the words masks another message (see Kellemen, 19(J3). It is also possible that the 
conditions under which a value is held by a respondent differ widely from those ob-
taining in the culture of the interviewer. For instance, responsibility may be regarded 
as a value applicable only in relationships with family members. If the interviewer 
does not know this, he will assume that the value is held under the conditions to which 
he is himself accustomed. 
jj 
36. Even if the investigator learns to phrase his questions in such a way that the 
respondent is left no room for misunderstanding or evasion, these questions tend to 
be too intimate for a formal interview, and will only solicit truthful answers after a 
certain rapport has been established. |i 
37. This has met with only partial success, becausp respondents sometimes did 
know neither the full name nor the farm number of a relation. Also nicknames and 
patronymics abounded. For this confusing phenomenon see Candido, 1964, p. 196 
etseq. 
a 
38. Originally the idea was to select a sample on the pasis of random numbers, but 
I discarded it because the substitution of blanks would |put too heavy a strain on our 
transport facilities and time. For instance, if farm 969 had to be replaced by farm 
123, a trip of some twenty kilometers became necessary. However, a simple random 
sample without substitution, but sufficiently large to attain the desired sample size 
despite the presence of blanks in the sampling list, woulfi have been best. 
i 
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39. That is: did not live nearby and visited his farm less than twice a week. 
40. In the tables presented in subsequent chapters the number of cases will sometimes 
vary slightly because information was not complete on every subject. 
41. As will be shown in more detail in chapter 5, the Japanese farm-operators tend 
to score in the highest quartile and also differ in other ways from the Brazilian re-
spondents. They will be often excluded from the statistical calculations, if their inclu-
sion makes the association between some variables much stronger than if the Brazilian 
respondents are considered separately, and also where the Brazilians are especially 
examined. 
42. One of the precautions I had taken was not to precode the answer does not 
know. If the respondent did not know, the interviewer could write this down. 
43. Both the quantities and the prices are subject to errors in estimation. Only in 
1958 have maximum and minimum prices been recorded. For some products (chickens, 
oranges, okra) the maxima were three times the minima. The value of production 
was calculated by multiplying the quantities with the arithmetic means of these 
two prices, a procedure that leads to an overestimation of the results. It was not pos-
sible to trace how production was calculated in other years. 
44. The prices mentioned in the annual reports cannot be very well compared, as 
in one year they refer to weights, in another to numbers. Furthermore they do not 
allow for inflation and (judging from the 1958 report) fluctuate greatly over the year. 
45. See Geiger (1956, p. 144), who mentions a switch from vegetables to bananas 
induced by a rise in price in the early fifties in Itaguaf. 
46. Candido (1964, p. 130 et seq.) mentions an extremely fast increase in groundnut 
production by otherwise traditional peasants when merchants promised satisfactory 
prices. 
47. Alves (n.d., p. 11) found in Vicosa, Minas Gerais, that the area under pasture 
increased with farm size as well as with number of cattle. Since here only two size 
classes are distinguished (10 hectares and over 10 hectares) and since more settlers 
in the project have pasture than have cattle, the first relation could not be found. 
48. Expressed in US dollars, to exclude the influence of the periodical devaluations 
of the Cruzeiro, this cost ranged from US $ 1.5 to 2.5 per hour. 
49. Even at this rate, the cost of plowing and harrowing one hectare equals the 
farm price of 400 dozen oranges. 
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50. Some orange growers buy their seedlings because they are unable to graft, but 
the question in the schedule did not distinguish betweeh seed and seedling and there-
fore did not entirely serve its purpose: to single out those farm-operators who buy 
selected seed because it is supposed to give higher yields than seed produced on the 
farm itself. ;< 
51. Strictly speaking, it was not asked, and therefore is not certain whether the 
earlier use of a practice was a trial or an adoption. Bit remarks made by some re-
spondents such as: "I could not pay for it this year", or: "it does not pay", and my 
own observations, make it probable that it is justified to speak of discontinuances 
or interruptions of adoptions rather than of rejections after trial. Rogers (1962, 
p. 88 et seq.) distinguishes between rejection of an injflovation before the adoption 
proper, and discontuances which are "decisions to cease use of an innovation after 
previously adopting". Discontinuances can be provisional, as the figure on p. 95 
of Rogers' study shows. 
52. As far as I know, no field trials with fertilizers (or any experiments, for that 
matter) were ever carried out in the project. 
53. For oranges x 2 = 3.3, p <|(0.1); for okra x 2 =4 3.7, p <|(0.1); for güó x 2 -
4.0,/><K0.O5). 
54. Geiger (1956, p. 73) mentions a similar phenomenon. "Look at the example 
provided by the fazenda Coqueiros, in Marica: the owner is interested in the pro-
duction óf milk and bananas and in consequence the pastures and the banana-
plantations receive dressings of manure; meanwhile, tide fields on which the tenants 
grow vegetables are not dressed". He attributes such differences in treatment to the 
fact that for some cash crops credit is easier to obtain than for crops grown for home 
consumption. This would imply that, once all farmers can get credit for all their crops, 
selective adoption will no longer occur, which seems hardly likely. Although the 
availability of credit promotes the adoption of innovations, more fundamental seems 
the principle that money is spent only if returns are likewise obtained as cash. 
A somewhat different instance of the selective application of modern farming methods 
is reported by Fliegel (1966). In an area in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, he found 
that "techniques employed in tobacco production contrast sharply with other agri-
cultural practices". But "...tobacco is usually grown under contract, with decisions 
not made by the grower, but by the contractor...". It may be asked if the last assertion 
is really essential. Medeiros (1963), who studied a very! similar county in Rio Grande 
do Sul, does not resort to contractual obligations to explain the adoption of innova-
tions in tobacco culture, but to the activities of the extension agents ('instructores de 
fumo') employed by the industry, and to the provision,/ on the farmer's request, of 
seed, fertilizers and insecticides on credit. Here again better methods are employed 
in growing cash crops and the adoption of these methods is apparently greatly stimu-
lated if no cash need be paid down. 
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55. Some were still paying off their debt to the Administration, others were already 
in possession of the title deeds to their land. Some had received a concession to the 
farm, others had purchased their farm from a concessionaire. 
56. Of the respondents who were not interviewed in their capacity as tenants, 17 % 
either let out land to somebody or rented land. 
57. Medina (1963) found in the State of Sao Paulo that the adoption of agricul-
tural machinery permitted landowners to dismiss many of their permanent labourers, 
thereafter meeting their seasonal demand for labour with the unemployed from a 
nearby city. 
58. Consequently, when opportunities arise, for instance a boom in a certain 
crop, wage labour sometimes replaces sharecropping (cf. Prado, 1960, p. 215). 
59. He said that he owned 13 farms but others assured me that he owned at least 
twice as many. It is rather difficult to find out how much land such people own, since 
many of their farms are on record as belonging to sons, daughters, uncles, and cousins 
where records exist. 
60. The Tocher modification implies that, when the probabilities of more extreme 
frequencies than the one actually found are less than the specified rejection level, the 
frequency actually found may be considered significant in a proportion of cases. 
61. It is in such cases customary for foreign consultants to urge the simplification 
of bureaucratic procedure. The solution, however, is not so simple. Bureaucratic 
procedure has an important function, preventing favouritism and other undesirable 
allocations of funds. 
62. A comparable phenomenon occurs with the shops in the project. Short term 
credit is normal. Between harvests a farm-operator may be short of money for his 
purchases (e.g. some foodstuffs) and may have to buy on credit for several months, 
running up a sizable bill. For instance, in each of the three years that I knew him, 
Sergio went heavily into debt between January and June with a local shopkeeper. 
When his cabbages and okra came into season, he paid off his debt but continued to buy 
in this shop, despite the slightly higher prices. He regarded this as a sort of obligation, 
in return for service. Willems (1955, p. 328), describing a similar situation, says: 
"The whole system works because buying is non-competitive to the extent that one 
prefers easy credit, general accessibility and a group of friendly people - who 
habitually gather in the store - to lower prices". I believe that it is mostly the credit 
that creates a monopoly. I did also come across farm-operators who went out of their 
way to avoid buying at an expensive local shop. 
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63. The percentage of those who sold only through middlemen was considerably 
lower, 41 % of all respondents. j 
64. It is possible that the percentage of feiristas in Pifanema rose not long ago. Staff 
of the Administration asserted that after a decree whic}i exempted farmers from State 
customs duties up to a certain value of agricultural produce, "everybody now wants 
to sell on the feira livre" (a market open to all farmer?). 
!! 
65. See Geiger (1956), p. 74 and p. 109. j 
ij 
66. In the section Santa Cruz the relation between truck-ownership and indepen-
dence of intermediaries was not clearly significant. A Fisher exact probability test 
yielded p = 0.101. The probabilities of more extreme frequencies than those actually 
found added up top = 0.019. If an error of 5% is accepted, this means that in about 
a third (to be exact 0.3177) of the instances in which the frequencies actually found 
occur, the difference may be considered as significant. The impression is that this 
inconclusive result is mainly due to the small number of Santa Cruz truck-owners in 
the sample (N = 10). Simply doubling all numbers in the 2 x 2 table would yield a 
X2 significant at the 5 % level. The association between truck-ownership and entire 
dependence on intermediaries in Santa Cruz is: Q = 4 0.58. 
67. The association between truck-ownership and the absence of complete depen-
dence on middlemen, expressed in Yule's Q, is, for the project as a whole: g=0.73. 
I I 
68. According to Geiger (1956, p. 185), direct sales to consumers are not rare in 
the Baixada Fluminense. 
i i 
I , 
69. The Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks was performed 
( # = 5.35;/; <0.2). 
ij, 
70. Only in two instances was the adviser chosen ah 'other person' with whom no 
other formal or informal relations were mentioned. Tie exclusion of these two pairs 
does not impair the significance of the relation (sign |est; p <0.05). But among the 
7 pairs of neighbours, in 3 cases the adviser's score wp.s equal to or lower than that 
of the advice-seeker. 
71. Other instances of farmers seeking advice or infjormation mainly from slightly 
more innovative colleagues are reported by Rogers bid Burdge (1961, p. 23 and 
1962, p. 15), Rogers and van Es (1964, p. 42) and van den Ban (1963, p. 176 et seq.). 
72. To measure the significance of the difference in adoption scores between the 
non-Japanese good farmers and the other non-Japanese^ respondents, a Mann Whitney 
U was calculated, not corrected for ties (p <0.03). 
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73. Originally this scale was slightly different. To distinguish as sharply as possible 
between production and marketing, two items that referred to marketing were dis-
carded. The present items 14 and 15 were originally included in a crop-treatment scale 
and an animal-husbandry scale, respectively, but these scales had to be dropped 
because too many respondents had only one or two of the crops or animal species 
involved. 
74. Socio-economic status is here taken as: the position an individual or family 
occupies by the prevailing standards of cultural and material possessions and income 
(cf. Belcher and Sharp, 1952; Chapin, 1933). 
75. For the items of these scales and the results of the item-analysis see annex I. 
76. To calculate associations, the 4 ranked quartiles rather than the absolute scores 
were used as a measure of innovativeness. This reduced the number of categories 
considerably. The lowest quartile consisted of 49 individuals with scores from 0 to 14; 
the second quartile of 46 respondents with scores from 15 to 27; the third quartile 
of 48 people with scores from 29 to 47; and the highest quartile of 43 people with 
scores from 50 to 93. The four quartiles did not contain exactly 46 individuals, because 
I wanted to avoid the inclusion, for instance, of three of the eight respondents who 
had a score of 47 in the highest quartile just to have 46 people in this quartile. Only 
for the item-analysis of the scales has this cumbersome procedure been followed. 
77. What are called here partial associations are normal associations between two 
variables computed per category of the control variable. For a similar use of partial 
associations see Coughenour (1960). 
78. For this inference see Kendall and Lazarsfeld (1950, p. 148 et seq.) and Hyman 
(1960, chap. 7). It is assumed here that former status preceded practice adoption. 
79. In a county in southern Brazil Oliveira (1964) found neither schooling nor 
literacy significantly related to practice adoption. 
80. When controlling for years of education, a significant association is found be-
tween practice adoption and socio-economic status (possession scores) within each 
category. In other words: when farm-operators are alike in education, the degree to 
which they adopt new practices is associated with their socio-economic status. 
81. Most Japanese farm-operators had been farmers all their lives and would 
unduly influence the results, so they were excluded from the calculations in this sec-
tion. 
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82. Controlling for status on the basis of the possession scores or the combined 
possession and sanitary-installation scores gave roughly similar results: 
possession scores 0-3 T C = 0.15 N = 70 n h 
4 f c = 0.38 N = 42 P <0.04 
5-6 T C = 0.24 N=> 54 P K0.05 
combined scores 0-4 T C = 0.07 N = 55 n ;s. 
5-8 T C = 0.11 •N = 62 n 8. 
9-11 T C = 0.24 N = 47 P ko.06 
83. In Piranema: ACAR-RJ, the Posto Agricola of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and from time to time the Agricultural University. In Santa Cruz ACAR-RJ did 
not work, but the Posto was much more active than in Itaguai. Also in the section 
Santa Cruz University staff sometimes acted as advisers. 
84. The value of T c varies with the way in which the scores are grouped. Since the 
difference between the highest quartile and the three others is the most relevant here, 
the lowest possession scores were combined. This resulted in three classes: 0-3, 4 
and 5-6, 
85. The Japanese respondents tended to be members and had high adoption scores, 
so they were excluded from the calculation. Their inclusion would have increased the 
association in Piranema (to T c = 0.30) but would haye hardly altered that in Santa 
Cruz ( T c = 0.43). 
86. The Japanese respondents were excluded form |hese and the following calcu-
lations in this section. They were generally rather relujkant to mention the names of 
people they had relationships with; not infrequently the answer was: "with my 
compatriots". That they often tended to associate solely with each other was another 
reason. 
87. See Siegel (1956, p. 229 et sea.) 
88. In communities in the Netherlands, Bergsma (1963, p. 185) found that modern 
farmers tended to choose specific persons as advisers, whereas the choices of tradition-
al farmers were diffusely spread. 
89. The farm-operators of Japanese descent have not been taken into account in 
this section. 
90. That is: all children aged 18 or over. ! 
91. Farm-operators who said they were willing to accept a job in industry for a 
wage equal to the legal minimum were found to differI from those who would not in 
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that they tended to score in a lower quartile (Mann Whitney U; p <0.001). A signifi-
cant number of those who would accept the job, if it were offered, did not own their 
farm(x2 = 3.93; p <0.05). 
92. The respondents of Japanese descent were excluded from the calculation. 
93. The inclusion of the Japanese farm-operators would not have significantly 
altered the result. 
94. Leaving out the Japanese respondents, and also those who were themselves 
sharecroppers on farms owned by absentee owners, 20% of all respondents employed 
sharecroppers (iV= 148). By quartile the percentages were: lowest 20% (N = 40), 
second 21 % (N = 38), third 24% (N — 41), highest 17% (N = 29). 
95. Those who adhere to the 5 % level may be set at ease by the fact that a Mann 
Whitney [/did indicate a difference in quartile between those who employed labourers 
and those who did not at an even lower level (p <0.04). 
96. These differences will also explain why the Japanese respondents were so often 
excluded from previous calculations. 
97. It should be added that the sample included no Japanese farm-operators with 
more than thirty hectares; several Brazilians had. 
98. Not fields in a physical sense, really, but times of reported cultivation of annual 
and perennial crops, respectively. 
99. The literature on the project of Santa Cruz is ambiguous when it comes to 
explaining the success of the Japanese farmers. Faissol (1950) says that the Brazilian 
settlers were favoured above the Japanese and other foreigners; but Geiger (1956) 
asserts that their reputation as good farmers made it easier for the foreign settlers to 
obtain favours. 
100. For the use of fertilizers the probabilities of the frequencies actually found 
were p = 0.0004 for 1963 andp = 0.002 for former years (Fisher exact probability test). 
I did not calculate the probabilities of more extreme frequencies, since they can only 
be smaller than the ones above, and thus cannot raise the level of error even to 1 %. 
101. Other categories, theoretically imaginable, did not occur. 
102. Buddhists, of course, were not included in the calculation. 
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103. The literature contains other instances of imnilgrant farmers who did better 
than their Brazilian neighbours. Brandao (1963, p. 14Ï2 et seq.) noticed it in a land-
settlement scheme in the State of Bahia, Galvao (1965); in Sao Paulo. But Wagemann 
(1949) and Waibel (1949) showed that immigrant farnjlers were not always successful. 
104. In the section Santa Cruz two cooperatives Survived, a general one and a 
cooperative for poultry-keepers, both founded by the Administration before the eman-
cipation of the section. They were not very active. The illustrative material in this 
chapter is drawn from Piranema, however, where failure was more evident and 
its effects more harmful to the settlers. 
¡1 
105. Hutchinson coined the term dependency syndrpme for this but speaks of the 
patron-dependent relationship when referring to the ^ame phenomena (1966). Pa-
tronic is used here for the sum total of the values and attitudes involved in the syn-
drome (lack of individual effort and of communal spifit, an attitude of dependence 
and striving for patronage). The word stresses the mos): important element. Patronal 
is used in the more restricted sense of pertaining to the relation between patron and 
client. 
I 
106. For an almost ideal-typical description of such a man, in this case her hus-
band, see the autobiographical novel of Hollander-Bnjjnder (n.d.). 
107. Pohl and Leclerc, quoted in Hutchinson (1966)j and also Wells (1886). 
108. But the dislike for work has not disappeared a|together. Some years ago the 
leading article in the farming section of a Brazilian newspaper described a clock 
which, installed on a tractor, counted the hours that the machine was actually moving. 
This was said to be a great improvement over earlier devices which had only measured 
the time the motor ran for, thus allowing tractor driver!? to take a nap in the shade of 
a tree while the motor idled (Jornal do Brasil, 30-6-196$). 
109. One of my informants, who had lived for years in the mountainous region of 
Nova Friburgo, complained of the climate in the Ba^xada. In Nova Friburgo, he 
said, he had been able to work twelve hours a day without feeling tired, now he was 
exhausted after six hours. 
|| 
i 
110. Boissevain (1966) makes the same point and giVes some striking examples of 
chains in Sicily. | 
111. Viana (1933, p. 199 et seq.) asserts that protectioh was needed above all against 
what he calls the white anarchy, the corruption and venality of officials, especially 
judges. See also Bloch (1965, p. 142), who imputed the emergence of feudal ties in 
Europe to the fact that kinship ties alone were too weak to offer sufficient protection. 
1 i 
i 
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The ties he describes so much resemble certain patronal relationships in Brazil be-
tween big proprietors and smallholders or agregados that the latter have been repeat-
edly called feudal too. 
112. See the observation of an administrator of the project, already mentioned, 
that many sons leave after completing their military service. The service forcibly 
withdraws the sons from paternal authority, and so helps to make a later separation 
easier. No quantitative data are available to confirm the relation between the father's 
authoritarianism and the sons' departure from the project, but what is known does 
not exclude the possibility of such a relation. Respondents with high adoption scores 
report more often that they had received advice from their children, which may indi-
cate that they are more inclined to regard them as a source of advice, and hence are 
less authoritarian. They also have sons of 18 or older slightly more often working on 
their farms, that is, sons who did not leave the project, and they use their younger 
sons less often as labourers on the land. 
113. Reported in José Verissimo de Mattos: As populacöes indigenas e mesticas 
da Amazonia (1887) and quoted by Galvao (1955), who, however, had not observed 
these practices himself. 
114. With McClelland (1961, p. 186 et seq.) one might speak of an orientation to-
ward a 'peer' collectivity. He found that rapidly developing countries differed from 
slowly developing ones in that requests or demands for cooperation from the peer 
collectivity were often more successful in making the individuals conform. He draws 
a parallel between this orientation to a peer collectivity and Riesman's concept of 
'other-directedness'. He concludes that the sensitivity for the opinion of others is 
an essential feature of rapid economic development in its early stages, as it may be a 
new source of morality or social cohesion. 
115. The difference of opinion between Redfield (1930) and Lewis (1951) over the 
'real' nature of human relations in the village of Tepoztlan relates to the same prob-
lem. 
116. To explain the strife and distrust that has been observed in rural Latin Ameri-
can communities, Foster (1960) has put forward the hypothesis that it is due to the 
fixed size of the 'pie' (the total production). The consequence is that "if someone is 
seen to get ahead, logically it can only be at the expense of others in the village" 
(p. 177). It may be doubted, however, whether this hypothesis is tenable in Brazil, 
where resources have hardly ever been used to the full. 
117. It was C. A. de Medina who pointed this out to me. 
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118. Foster (1961), who originated the concept, regarded the dyadic contract as 
one of the most important principles of social organization in the Mexican village 
he studied. It will be clear that using the term contract for patronal relationships (i.e. 
persons of unequal status) has advantages as well as drawbacks. As far as the term 
connotes an agreement freely concluded, it is perhaps not felicitous, because the 
dependence implicit in the relationship is sometimes given, not sought. In as far as 
the term connotes the quid pro quo character of the relationship, it is useful. For some 
relationships between persons of equal status the term dyadic contract is iUuminating, 
because it calls attention to a pair of significant traits of such relationships: that they 
are formal rather than informal (although they may be intimate) and that they involve 
only two persons (who accept similar obligations). 
119. Without mentioning names or otherwise providing proof, Geiger (1956) and 
Moreira (1962) assert that political connections affected the distribution of farms in 
the settlement projects of Santa Cruz and Tingua. 
120. Other settlers, of course, could join in. 
121. That is what the preamble stated. It is possible that the whole plan started not 
with an idea, but with a couple of wily individuals who saw a chance of selling several 
hundred dairy cows to a government agency. This is by no means certain but illus-
trates the danger in a country like Brazil of accepting a plan at face value, however seri-
ous it may sound. Some plans are indeed serious; others are partly or wholly a cover 
for a big private deal; still others are made 'para ingles ver', which in our time can be 
translated by: to convince the American government of pne's good intentions. 
122. To assure the availabihty of concentrates, a small feedmill was planned and 
later indeed built. 
123. Obviously, this would enable the settlers to buy any old calf instead of paying 
for a pedigree cow. i 
124. Implicitly the presupposition here is that a plaii which originates in such a 
way cannot be anything else than the facade of a scheme meant to benefit other individ-
uals than the settlers. I cannot prove this; in such c^ses only the most important 
participants know what is going on and they will not tell. But the question what kinds 
of individuals may benefit from such a scheme can be answered. The politician who 
uses his influence to allocate the necessary funds may J win popularity, support and 
votes. The producer of the tractors may win an important order. The high civil servant 
whose appointment is political (i.e. tied to the election of a certain politician or to the 
influence of a political group) may avoid losing his job. Also, the handling of a lot of 
money raises his prestige and power within his service. The small-time local electoral 
bosses (the brokers of votes) may win patrons and material benefits: if there are more 
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than 200 candidates for the tractors they are certain to get one. The settlers may ob-
tain a tractor, and will have no objection to return this favour with their vote. A 
further implicit supposition is that such a plan is not likely in the long run to benefit 
the settlers because that is not its principal objective. The plan is not serious. When the 
votes are in, or when the politician is not elected, or when the budget is cut, the plan 
will be quietly shelved, the programme discontinued. Yet such a plan may benefit 
the settlers temporarily. 
125. But at least two committee members of the cooperative later stood for the 
municipal council. 
126. Abma (1962, p. 17) regards a cooperative as a voluntary association to be 
placed in the same sociological category as a sportsclub or a social club. In such a 
definition there is no room for the role of the government as founder and executive 
of cooperatives. 
127. This should not be taken in the obvious sense. Her meaning would be that 
the prefect used his influence to prevent her from being employed by others, or some-
thing of the sort. 
128. A digression to illustrate how much all details were connected with each 
other. One of the new physicians employed at the hospital was of Japanese descent. 
He was a brother of one of the informal leaders of the Japanese settlers in Piranema. 
I was present when Matias told him that Deputy Brandao would visit the project on 
the day when the Japanese settlers traditionally organized a festivity. It was arranged 
that Matias would present the Deputy to the Japanese settlers and that they would 
stay for lunch. Although only a first encounter was involved, this sounded like a 
departure from the usual Japanese distrust of politics and politicians. Matias, of 
course, was trying to enlist their political support. 
129. Where the number came from is a mystery. The three nearby settlement 
projects, Santa Cruz, Santa Alice and Floresta, contained at most 1700 colonists. In 
the first two many farmers already owned title deeds or were well on their way to 
getting them. Employees of the Administration moreover confessed that the legal com-
plications involved in drawing up such deeds took so long, that they would have at 
most 60 or 100 of them ready on the big day. Also, Santa Cruz and Santa Alice had' 
been settled long before Goulart came to power, and thus were not of his doing. Only 
the Floresta project, involving 210 families, had recently been started. The President 
finally gave out one single symbolic title, to a man who already owned several farms 
in the Santa Cruz section. But he was obviously not conscious of all the ironies 
involved. 
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130. For a cooperative organized by landowners and middlemen it is strange that 
it was associated so closely with a seemingly radical politician and a government which 
fell because it so valiantly urged basic reforms in Brazil. No doubt this riddle will 
give the many Marxist interpreters of Brazil food for thought. 
131. For instance, he was looking for labourers who could be willing to go with 
him and settle on a fazenda in Mangaratiba, expropriated by SUPRA and completely 
under forest. Each would receive a plot. 
132. How Goat managed to be a reporter and illiterate at the same time is some-
what of a mystery. He probably could read fairly well; at least he knew what the 
subject was of the newspaper clippings he showed me. itis reporting consisted mostly 
of calling the attention of real reporters to noteworthy kbuses and to his own antics. 
i 
133. For a further elaboration of these ideas, see Galjart (1967). 
i i 
134. One of Harris' informants thought that any cooperative in Minas Velhas 
would be doomed to failure as long as its committee nad to be elected. He pleaded 
for the appointment of a paid expert as executive director (Harris, 1956, p. 205). 
i 
135. Especially Rodrigues (1962, p. 54 et seq.), who buotes foreign travellers. But 
Andrade (1963) affirms that several changes, such as new sugar-cane varieties, the 
plow and new processing methods were rapidly adopte|l. 
S 
I I 
136. Though not always. Freyre (1961, p. 527) describes the irritation of a British 
traveller, Mawe, when noticing the unwillingness of certain cane-planters to change 
their distilling methods. Mawe (and a few years later Wal|h, another traveller) attribu-
ted this aversion to improvements to the reliance of the pwners on their slaves and to 
the slaves' dislike of the increased responsibiUty entaile| in new processing methods. 
Interestingly, Dean (1966) did find that the substitution; of free labour for slaves was 
one of the factors contributing to the development of Sab Paulo agriculture. 
137. For examples of such 'tidal movements' that ocpurred in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in various regions of Brazil, see BJandäo (1963, p. 56 et seq.), 
Candido (1964, p. 74), Geiger (1956, p. 35) and Semenzato (1963, p. 5). 
!i ¡1 
138. For a similar description of such a peasant subsistence culture, see Queiroz 
(1957). 
139. The rural traditions of European immigrants ar^ not relevant to the present 
argument and have been ignored here. • 
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140. The only exception may be the urge of peasants in the dry interior of North-
East Brazil, the sertao, to return after they have been expelled by drought, as soon as 
they hear that some rain has fallen (Semenzato, 1963, p. 7, quoting Paul Walle; 
Medina, 1958). 
141. The survey was carried out by Professor Glaucio A. D. Soares and Professor 
Ivan Freitas. 
142. The one farmer who had planted maracuja on a large scale had first solved 
his marketing problems. Also the main poultry-keepers had done so. In their case, of 
course, it was the quantity and not the kind of produce that would have caused mar-
keting difficulties. 
143. A Fisher exact probability test was calculated after combining columns (2) 
and (3) of the table. For the frequency observed p was 0.035. For the first more ex-
treme frequency p was 0.005. Still more extreme frequencies were not calculated. 
144. One of the findings of Nicholls' and Paiva's study of the structure and pro-
ductivity of Brazilian agriculture was precisely that the large agricultural establish-
ments were remarkably well managed (1965, p. 361). 
145. The percentages per quartile, from lowest to highest, were for weeding: 
12 (JV = 34), i(N= 35), 5 (N = 37), 0 (JV = 23); for pruning: 35, 31, 19 and 9, 
respectively. 
146. The writers of the CIDA report assumed that, because of population pressure 
on the land, a classification on the basis of census data would not reflect the 'true' land 
needs of rural families. Sometimes, even often, this may be a correct assumption, for 
all I know.'Tn all cases but one (Santarem, Amazonas) the observers interviewed 
reported that a family of 2-4 workers needed more land than the amount of land in 
farm classes established through Census computations" (p. 125). In the Santa Cruz 
project, however (and it is extremely unlikely that the remainder of the municipal 
area of Itaguai was very different), it was found that 10 hectares was often too much 
land for one family. The frequent employment of outside labour and the absence of 
sons invalidate the hypothesis of population pressure on the land. In Itaguai labour 
is not hired and sons do not leave because otherwise there would be starvation. 
147. Nicholls and Paiva (1965) remark on the unexpectedly large labour force 
employed by the big proprietors among their sample of farmers. The CIDA report 
tries to prove otherwise. It is remarkable that among the eleven municipalities stud-
ied by CIDA, only in Santa Cruz do Sul (Rio Grande do Sui) does one worker, on 
the smaller farms, appear to farm consistently more land than elsewhere. Santa Cruz 
162 
was populated by descendents of German immigrants who adhered to a different 
cultural tradition (table 36). 
148. Similar systems are possible. In Spain, for instance, the settlers in irrigation 
projects are employed as sharecroppers of the adnunistering government agency during 
the first five or more years. 
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